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Introduction 
T
HIS STUDY aims at exploring the crisis of the German socialist 
movement which grew in intensity from the time of the open 
split of the Social Democratic Party during the war until its 
climax in the bloody fighting between the radical left and moder­
ate socialists during the so-called Spartacist Uprising of January 
1919. In the course of this primary pursuit, two subsidiary aims 
are served: an analysis of the relationship existing between the 
theory and practice of the German Communists during their 
period of political infancy; and an examination of the impact of 
the Communists on the course of the German Revolution. 
The organization of this study can be summarized as follows: 
Part I deals with the emergence of the left-wing socialists and 
Spartacists, the forerunners of the German Communists, prior to 
the outbreak of the November Revolution of 1918. Part II exam­
ines the impact of the November Revolution upon the socialists, 
and discusses the problems created by the different aims for the 
revolution held by the various parties and factions of the socialist 
movement. Part III presents the first major crisis of the German 
labor movement in the post-World War I period, the Spartacist 
Uprising. It also deals with the revolution in retrospect, indicat­
ing the utilization by present-day German Communists of dis­
torted versions of the revolutionary events of 1918-19 for the sake 
of contemporary propaganda. 
Since the importance of ideological concepts of young revo­
lutionary movements is often underestimated, an effort has been 
made throughout to relate the political theory of the left-wing so­
cialists and Spartacists ( or Communists, as the case may be) to 
the problems under discussion. It should be remembered that 
during their early phase almost all revolutionary movements rely 
heavily on theoretical foundations. The democratic liberal creed 
was no exception. It is only at a later stage, after consolidation 
has set in and the revolutionary party or movement acquires ma­
turity, that the pragmatic approach to political problems gains 
predominance, replacing the earlier ideological guidance and de­
termining party actions. 
The translations of German quotations in this study are this 
writer's own. An effort has been made to keep them as close as 
possible to the original text in order to retain some of the flavor 
of the period in which they were written. This holds true parti­
cularly for newspaper articles and transcripts of speeches. Ger­
man words and names appearing in this book were hyphenated, 
when required, according to German syllabication. 
The phase of German political history into which this study 
falls is marked by an abundance of source material. The author, 
therefore, was faced with the problem of a proper selection of 
representative sources and an evaluation of the highly subjective 
accounts which were written for the most part within a few years 
after the events. It is probably characteristic of highly controver­
sial issues, such as the one under discussion, that they frequently 
· become the subject of many authors who are less interested in a
scholarly treatment of the problem than in proving a particular
point of view and in justifying the actions and views of their own
affiliations. This lack of objectivity even holds true for such re­
cent publications as Ruth Fischer's Stalin and German Com­
munism. Convenient historical oversights and incorrect factual
premises are some of the means used frequently by these authors.
Fortunately the abundant documentary materials - some in spe­
cific collections, but most of them widely dispersed in secondary
works - obviate the need to rely on these partisan accounts, ex­
cept where an analysis of these biased views adds to the over-all
understanding of the events under examination.
xii 
The Emergence 
of the Spartacists 

The Left Wing Within the 
German Social Democratic 
Party Prior to World War I 
1. The Growth of the German Socialist Movement
Many of the ideological concepts and organizational charac­
teristics of the Spartacists, the forerunners of the German Com­
munists, have their origin in the period which followed the unifi­
cation of the Lassallean workers' organization with the Marxian 
socialists in 1875. The end product of this fusion was the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany ( SPD) .1 In the decades following 
the union, the SPD developed into a strong mass party and along 
with its allied trade unions became a powerful factor in German 
political life. 
During this period, a number of political factions emerged 
within the SPD. These were an outgrowth of basic disagreements 
m major political and tactical issues, resulting partly from dif­
.terent interpretations of Marxian doctrines and partly from the 
.::onflicting objectives of an organization which regarded itself as 
a proletarian party in a bourgeois state. The perpetuation of 
these factions in a period of crisis caused by the outbreak of 
World War I led eventually to a division of the German labor 
movement into hostile camps, a situation which persists to the 
present time. 
1 The German designation for the So- lands, or SPD. This abbreviation will
cial Democratic Party of Germany is be used hereafter in this paper. 
fozialdemokratische Partei Deutsch-
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The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the factors and con­
ditions contributing to the growth of the political thought and 
revolutionary tactical concepts of the radical left wing of the 
SPD. This complex later became known, organizationally, as 
the Spartacist League and eventually, on December 31, 1918, as 
the Communist Party of Germany (KPD).2 An attempt has also 
been made to analyze a selected number of concepts character­
istic of the radical left wing of the German socialists. 
Socialist ideas were abroad in Germany before 1848, but it 
was not until that year that a genuine working-class movement 
came into existence in the form of a number of workers' asso­
ciations. The growth of organized labor was not impressive, how­
ever, until the 1860s, when Ferdinand Lassalle brought life and 
action into the movement. A group of professed Marxists with 
a relatively small following was also active among the German 
proletariat, but it did not succeed in increasing its strength sub­
stantially until after the death of Lassalle. 3 
In 1875_ the two movements among the German workers 
combined to form the united SPD, thus providing a more power­
ful organization to fight for the interests of the increasing number 
of German workers.• Thus, from its very inception the SPD car­
ried within its organization two basically different creeds. Those 
who held the romantic nationalism and democratic concepts of 
2 The German term is Kommunis­
tische Partei Deutsch/ands. The abbre­
viation KPD will be used hereafter in 
this study. 
The Spartacist League (Spartakus­
bund) was a loose organization of left 
wing radicals; under the leadership of 
Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, 
it fought against the policies of the 
SPD and the trade unions which were 
designed to support the war effort. 
The group adopted the name "Spar­
takus," the pseudonym used for their 
illegal publications. Spartacus was the 
leader of a Roman slave revolt; his 
name was selected to serve as a sym­
bol for the revolt of the modern 
"wage slaves." On December 31, 1918, 
the Spartacists founded the Commun­
ist Party of Germany (KPD). 
3 For an excellent account of the 
early phase of the German socialist 
movement see Franz Mehring, Ge­
schichte der deutschen Sozialdemokra­
tie ( 4th ed.; Stuttgart; J.H.W. Dietz, 
1909). See also Veit Valentin, Ge­
schichte der deutschen Revolution von 
1848-49 (Berlin: Ullstein, [c. 1930-3].) 
• William S. Halperin, Germany
Tried Democracy (New York: T.Y. 
Crowell Co., 1946), p. 16; Joseph A. 
Berlau, The German Social Democratic 
Party, 1914-1921 (New York: Colum­
lin: E. Rowohlt Verlag, 1930), p. 52. 
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the Lassallean group had complete confidence in the possibility 
of improving the workers' lot by reforms within the framework 
of the existing state. The other group accepted the Marxian con­
cepts regarding the historic mission of the proletariat and the ulti­
mate socialist revolution as the final stage of the inevitable class 
struggle within the capitalist society. It was the second group 
which gained dominance in the SPD and caused at least a tem­
porary subordination of Lassalleanism.5 
After the unification of Germany was achieved by Chancellor 
Bismarck and the subsequent rapid industrialization, the SPD 
considerably widened its influence among the growing number of 
German workers. Bismarck's concern with the rapid spread of 
socialism among the workers prompted his anti-socialist law of 
1878 which was intended to stop the growth of the movement. 
But persecution only resulted in making the SPD stronger, and 
Bismarck soon realized the futility of the provisions of the anti­
socialist law. While keeping the law on the books, in the 1880s 
he changed his policy toward the workers, in an attempt to give 
them a definite interest in the perpetuation of the existing state 
by promulgating progressive social legislation. Marx's famous 
phrase in the Communist Manifesto that the proletariat has noth­
ing to lose but its chains lost part of its significance for the German 
workers as a result of the social policies of Bismarck. 
After the fall of Bismarck in 1890 - the year which also 
saw the end of the anti-socialist law - William II sponsored an 
ambitious program of factory legislation. But even this did not 
stop the steadily mounting strength of the socialist movement.6 
In the face of this development one could have expected that the 
German government would follow one of two alternatives. One 
was the brutal suppression of the socialists. However after 1890 
- the year in which the SPD obtained almost one and a half
million votes and entered the Reichstag with thirty-five deputies
- apparently none of the leading German politicians were in-
5 Berlau, op. cit., p. 329. 6 Halperin, op. cit., pp.16-17. 
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dined to use the methods Bismarck had tried with so little suc­
cess. The other alternative was to pursue a policy based on a 
compromise with the political aspirations of the middle class and 
the workers and gradually to transform Germany into a demo­
cratic constitutional monarchy. William II and his chancellors 
( Caprivi, Hohenlohe, and Buelow) followed neither of these 
courses, but allowed the socialist movement to take its own · 
course.7 
A few figures will illustrate the rapid strengthening of the 
SPD and the trade unions during the prewar period. The only 
figures available for the SPD prior to 1906 are the election re­
sults. In 18 71 less than three per cent of all votes cast went to 
the SPD. In 1879 the number had risen to almost nine per cent. 
During the anti-socialist law period there was a temporary set­
back and the figure dropped to six per cent in the 18 81 election. 
In 1890 the SPD received almost twenty per cent of all votes cast 
and in the last election before the war the figure reached 34.8 
per cent.8 In actual votes the number grew from roughly 1,000,-
000 to 4,250,329 and the number of representatives in the 
Reichstag increased to 110. In the elections for. the Reichstag on 
January 12, 1912, every third man over 25 years of age voted 
for the SPD.9 
Membership figures for the SPD run as follows: in 1906, 
384,327 members; in 1910, 720,038; and in 1913, 982,850. 
Even more impressive are the trade union figures. Here the in­
formation goes back to 1891, the year after the anti-socialist law 
was discarded. Membership in the trade unions increased from 
277,659 in 1891 to 2,548,763 in 1913, and the financial assets 
of the unions in the same period increased from 425,845 marks 
to 88,069,295 marks.10 
7 Arthur Rosenberg, Die Entstehung 
der deutschen Republik (2d ed.; Ber­
lin: E. Rowohlt Verlag, 1930), p. 52. 
8 Ossip Kurt Flechtheim, Die KPD 
in der Weimarer Republik (Offenbach 
a.M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1948), p. 2.
9 Gustav Noske, Erlebtesaus Aufstieg 
und Niedergang einer Demokratie (Of­
fenbach a.M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1947), 
p. 37.
10 Internationaler Arbeiterverlag, Il­
lustrierte Geschichte der Deutschen 
LEFT WING PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I 7 
These figures tell only one part of the story. The SPD had a 
highly disciplined organization - the first modern mass organi­
zation in history - based on a large, thoroughly-trained party 
bureaucracy, which gave the workers confidence in the strength 
of their organization. They believed that their party was a bul­
wark of peace and would make wars completely impossible. 
Indeed the SPD had developed into a nationwide party with 
an organization managed by about 4,100 professional party 
officials and approximately 11,000 salaried employees. The 
election results of 1912 had made the SPD a parliamentary power 
of the first order, and its 94 newspapers assured the party of con­
tinuous influence in large segments of the population. By 1914 
the SPD had an investment of 20,000,000 Marks and thereby 
had given evidence of the confidence the party had in the stability 
of the state and economy.11 
It has also been asserted that in spite of the great expansion of 
the party organization and its increased membership, the SPD 
had lost none of its efficiency.12 Organizational efficiency is not, 
however, the only yardstick for measuring the effectiveness of a 
political party. The tremendous growth of the SPD and the trade 
unions plus their widespread vested interests were of utmost con­
sequence for many of the changes within the party and for the 
emergence of a revolutionary opposition faction fighting from 
within against the increasingly pronounced middle class attitude 
of the party aristocracy. 
2. The Emergence of Different Factions Within the SPD
The anti-socialist legislation of 1878 caused considerable 
difficulties for the SPD. Party leaders were arrested and numer­
ous limitations and restrictions were placed upon party news­
papers and other activities. However, the strong-arm methods 
Revolution (Berlin: Internationaler 
Arbeiterverlag, 1929), p. 58 [hereafter 
cited as lllustrierte Geschichte]. 
11 William Maehl, "The Triumph of 
Nationalism in the German Socialist 
Party on the Eve of the First World 
War," The Journal of Modern History, 
XXIV (1952), pp. 25, 27. See also: 
Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 5. 
12 Halperin, op. cit., p. 17
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used by the German government to suppress the socialists demon­
strated to the workers better than any socialist propaganda could 
to what extent Bismarck's state served the ruling classes 
and perpetuated the status quo. Thus, one of the major factors 
which transformed the SPD into a genuine revolutionary Marxist 
party was this period of suppression of the socialists. 
After the lapse of the anti-socialist law in 1890, the SPD felt 
a necessity of restating its objectives as well as of clarifying the 
methods to be used in the Party's coming struggle. At the Party 
Congress held in Erfurt in 18 91, the SPD developed a program 
which incorporated many more basic Marxist dogmas than had 
the Gotha Program of 1875, which at one time had been heavily 
attacked by Marx himself. A materialistic interpretation of his­
tory supplied the basis for many parts of the program, which as­
serted that the class-character of the state determined the political 
actions of the proletariat. The workers, it was emphasized, must 
seize political control of the state in order to transform the capi­
talist economy into a socialist one. The seizure of political power 
as a prerequisite for the expropriation of the means of production 
and redistribution of wealth was adopted as a tenet by the Con­
gress.13 
The formulation of the revolutionary Erfurt Program did not 
go unchallenged. For example, the Bavarian party leader Georg 
von Vollmar strongly opposed the revolutionary policies approved 
by the Congress. He and his followers advocated without much 
success a program directed at gradual reforms of the existing 
social, political, and economic institutions. From the fact that 
the SPD had again become a legal political party within the exist­
ing state they concluded that it should fight for reforms in a1liance 
with some of the political parties of the middle classes. Von 
Vollmar's approach was rejected by the Erfurt Congress; thus de­
feating this early attempt to revert to some of the reformistic 
13 For a detailed discussion and lau, op. cit., pp. 39-45. 
analysis of the Erfurt Program see Ber-
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Lassallean concepts "revisionism" as this school of thought 
was later called. u
Just before the turn of the century another attack was made 
by the reformists against the adherents of the revolutionary tac­
tical principles inherent in the Marxist theories officially incor­
porated in the party's program. This time the attack against Marx­
ist dogmas was better organized and more systematized. At least 
three factors contributed to the success which revisionism was 
able to achieve as a result. First, there was the substantial attempt 
by Eduard Bernstein and a number of other socialist leaders to 
bring Marx's teaching up to date and into harmony with the ex­
periences gained by the SPD. After Friedrich Engel's death in 
1895, Bernstein started in the theoretical journal Neue Zeit a 
literary offensive with the purpose of "revising" and "modern­
izing" Marxism.13 Bernstein's criticism centered on certain pre­
dictions which Marx derived from his analysis of the "bourgeois, 
capitalist society." He contended that Marx was only partly cor­
rect in his prediction concerning the pauperization of the masses 
and the inevitable cycle of economic crises. The social legislation 
supported and often initiated by the growing parliamentary fac­
tion of the SPD coupled with the tactical successes of the trade 
unions in the period of general prosperity had materially im­
proved the over-all social and economic situation of the workers. 
This improvement of the workers' living standard together 
with the general optimism caused by the industrial and economic 
boom form the second reason for Bernstein's eventual success in 
superimposing the views of the revisionists upon the revolutionary 
tradition of the party. The revisionists held that society can gra-
14 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 61-62. 
15 Bertram D. Wolfe, Three Who
Made a Revolution (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1948), p. 142. See also: Peter 
Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic So­
cialism; Eduard Bernstein's Challenge 
to Marx (New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 1952); Vladimir G. Sim­
khovitch, Marxism Versus Socialism 
(New York: Ginn & Co., 1912); Evan 
F. M. Durbin, The Politics of Demo­
cratic Socialism (London: G. Rout­
ledge, 1940); and Carl E. Schorske,
German S o c i a l  Democracy, 1905-
1917; The Development of the Great
Schism (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1955).
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dually grow into socialism and that the improvement of conditions 
for the workers does not have to wait until the advent of a violent 
revolution. This view found increased acceptance among a large 
number of German socialists who came to believe in the SPD as 
a "democratic-socialist reform party."16 
A third factor contributing to the success of the revisionist 
view was the changed social composition of the SPD. After the re­
vocation of the anti-socialist law, the party broadened its base and 
numerous non-proletarians, bourgeois elements, especially intel­
lectuals, were able to enter the party.11 
Thus, the concept of evolutionary methods as a means of rea­
lizing socialism was the result of the revisionist position. The aim 
of the party henceforth was to be not armed uprising but the ob­
taining of a majority in order to take control of parliament.18 
The revisionists, or reformists, formed the right wing of the 
SPD. Bernstein and other leading revisionists such as Richard 
Calwer, Eduard David, and Georg von Vollmar urged the SPD 
16 See Berlau, op. cit., pp. 55-66; and 
lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 62-63; Hugh 
Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Malen­
kov (New York: Praeger, 1953), p. 
17; Wolfe, op. cit., p. 143. 
According to Paul Froelich, in order 
to prove the correctness of their 
changed interpretation of Marx, the re­
visionists invoked Engels' introduction 
to Marx's The Civil War in France. 
Froelich accuses the reformists of fal­
sifying the statements of Engels by 
omitting certain important phases of 
the original text. Thus, Engels is quoted 
as saying that German experience with 
elections and the great technological 
advances made in weapons force a 
change in revolutionary tactics. The 
struggle for a majority in the legislature 
replaces the armed uprising. (Paul 
Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, Gedanke 
und Tat [Hamburg: Verlag Friedrich 
Oetinger, 1949], pp. 64-66.) 
17 It has been asserted that skilled 
workers, of whom the SPD had a con­
siderable number, as a rule influence 
the nature of a labor party in the di­
rection of a peaceful and democratic 
movement. By contrast, when the so­
cial structure is based on a primitive 
and poor peasantry and on a small and 
unskilled labor group, a revolutionary 
and fanatical labor movement is likely 
to develop. (Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 
11.) 
Professor William Maehl believes 
that four factors were responsible for 
the victory of reformism within the 
SPD. These were: ( 1) the rapid growth 
of the party, (2) the rapid growth 
of the trade unions, ( 3) the lack of 
class-consciousness among the workers 
the result of a peculiar German his­
torical development, and ( 4) the suc­
cessful growth of German capitalism 
prior to World War I. (Maehl, op. cit., 
pp. 22-23.) 
is Walter Tormin, Zwischen Raete­
diktatur und sozialer De mo k r a t  i e 
(Duesseldorf: Droste-Verlag, 1954), 
pp. 21-22. 
-
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to give up its revolutionary theories and to concentrate instead on 
objectives within the party's capabilities. These objectives ranged 
from the abolition of the three-class electoral system in Prussia to 
a popular control over the formulation and conduct of Germany's 
foreign policy.19 
The party center or the so-called orthodox Marxist center led 
by Karl Kautsky opposed the revisionists' theories. These cen­
trists were well entrenched in the party's Executive Committee 
and consequently controlled the actual policies of the SPD. As a 
result, no changes in the official position of the party occurred 
because of Bernstein's attack upon the revolutionary heritage of 
the socialist movement, or at least none could be detected in the 
public utterances of the party leaders. 
The initial opposition of the orthodox Marxists to the op­
portunism of the right wing gradually gave way to a more con­
ciliatory attitude, and the political views of the revisionists were 
judged by the party leadership on the basis of tactical considera­
tions and not as symptoms of a basic cleavage. Kautsky, for ex­
ample, regarded Bernstein's revisionism as a purely tactical prob­
lem. 20 
This approach to revisionism allowed the party center under 
certain circumstances to adopt some of the revisionist tactical 
principles, such as advocating and fighting for specific reforms, 
without the necessity of justifying these actions with a new set 
of theories. 21
Within a few years after the emergence of the reformists in the 
SPD, another faction appeared. This group was the numerically 
weak but extremely active radical left which formed itself around 
those socialists who continued to advocate strict adherence to 
Marxist principles. The outstanding leaders of the left wing were 
Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Clara Zetkin, and Franz 
19 Halperin, op. cit., p. 18. 
20 Berlau, op. cit., p. 63.
21 Berlau analyzes this situation as
follows: 
"The implications of the SPD atti-
tude toward revisionism indicated that 
the party was, under certain conditions, 
ready to jettison not only the practice 
of political radicalism, but the Marxian 
essence of its theory as well. All that 
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Mehring. The radicals of the left accused the so-called orthodox 
Marxists of the party center of following the opportunist program 
in practice in spite of their revolutionary terminology and their 
alleged opposition to the reformists. Thus, the radicals were 
strictly opposed to the revisionists around Bernstein and to the 
party centrists led by Kautsky. 22
The left wing of the SPD was by no means a homogeneous 
group; important differences in Marxist interpretation were the 
rule rather than the exception. Nevertheless all of its members 
held certain views in common. All had the absolute conviction 
that only a proletarian revolution would end the existing social 
order and bring about socialism. All were more or less preoccu­
pied with studying the means by which a socialist proletarian party 
could accelerate the revolution. Finally, all were aware of the 
contradictions existing between the official socialist theories pro­
claimed by the SPD and the prevailing tactical moves of the 
party.23
3. The Influence of the Trade Unions
Within the trade unions there were tendencies similar to those 
motivating the revisionist wing of the SPD. The continuous growth 
of the unions gave their leaders confidence that it was possible to 
fight for the economic objectives of the worker within the existing 
framework of the state. Improvement of material conditions for 
the workers was the main interest of the union leaders, who be­
lieved that the achievement of this aim was not intrinsically con-
was needed was an impelling external 
stimulus, a sound need for a change in 
tactics." (Berlau, op. cit., p. 65.) 
22 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 6; lllus­
trierte Geschichte, pp. 81-82. 
23 Tormin, op. cit., p. 23. 
Otto Grotewohl furnishes a Com­
munist post-World War II interpreta­
tion of the reasons behind the emer­
gence of three factions within the SPD 
in the early part of this century. Ac­
cording to the Communists, the ap-
pearance of the revisionists triggered 
the threeway split within the party. The 
strict followers of the Marxist revolu­
tionary doctrines were forced to fight 
against the heretics and against the 
conciliatory attitude of the majority of 
the SPD and its leadership. In the pro­
cess of this internal party struggle, the 
three wings developed. (Otto Grote­
wohl, Dreissig Jahre Spaeter [Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1948], pp. 37-42.) 
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nected with the revolutionary struggle. Violent revolutionary ac­
tion might even endanger the economic and social gains made so 
far. The union leaders thus developed strong opposition to the 
party's attempt to keep the unions as appendices to the political 
organization. Gradually they achieved complete independence 
from the political leadership of the SPD. Union animosity was 
strongest toward the radical left group within the party, because 
of their so-called revolutionary romanticism which, it was feared, 
might disturb the gradual but steady improvement of the workers' 
lot. 2, 
In other words, the immediate interests of the workers were 
of greater concern to the union leaders than was the emergence 
of the socialist society of the future. This conservatism was not 
restricted to political questions; other union decisions took a 
progressively moderate turn. The unions eventually tried to avoid 
large-scale strikes in order not to deplete their funds. Simultane­
ously, internal bureaucracy developed into an autocratic ma­
chinery denying the individual members certain democratic 
rights. 25 Indeed, the union leaders came to regard the SPD as an
agency of political interest for the trade unions and not as a move­
ment dedicated to the socialist revolution.26
Rosa Luxemburg analyzed the interrelation of the unions' 
views and those of the revisionists. The reasoning behind the 
unions' claim for a position of equality, according to her, had a 
familiar ring; it was based on the illusion that in peaceful periods 
of the bourgeois society the entire struggle of the workers was re-
24 Halperin, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 
25 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 61. The 
attempt of the unions to reverse the 
situation and to control the actions of 
the SPD was ridiculed by Rosa Luxem­
burg in a speech at the Party Congress 
in Mannheim in 1906. She compared 
the union-party relationship with a 
curious marriage contract of a peasant 
couple. This contract stated that the 
will of the husband was to be carried 
out in all cases in which the wife agreed 
with him; however, when her will dif-
fered from his, then action would have 
to be taken in accordance with her 
views. (Rosa Luxemburg, "Reden auf 
dem Mannheimer Parteitag der SPD, 
1906," quoted in Rosa Luxemburg, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden und Schriften 
[Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1951], [here­
after cited as: Ausgewaehlte Reden], 
II, p. 260.) 
26 John L. Snell, "Socialist Unions 
and Socialist Patriotism in Germany, 
1914-1918," The American Historical 
Review, LIX (1953-54), p. 67. 
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duced to the SPD's parliamentary fight for political reforms and 
the unions' endeavors to obtain economic advantages for their 
workers. 
The theory of "equality" of the unions with the Social Democ­
racy is then not a simple misunderstanding or confusion of terms, 
but is the expression of the known position of the opportunistic 
wing of the Social Democracy which indeed wishes to transform the 
Social Democracy from a revolutionary proletarian party into a 
middle-class reform party. 27 
The opposition of the radical left to this development proved 
to be futile. The weight of the unions was felt increasingly not 
only in the period pr�eding August, 1914, but also during the 
war. As a matter of fact, the attitude of the trade unions backed 
by numerical and financial power proved to be one of the decisive 
influences in the victory of revisionism over radicalism within the 
SPD.28 
4. Principal Political Concepts of the Left Wing
The process of challenging revisionist ideas played an im­
portant part in the formulation of the political thought of the 
radical left. However, the claim made by Communist interpreters 
of the history of the German socialist movement that left wing 
theories were primarily the result of the emergence and activities 
of the revisionists cannot be supported by factual evidence. The 
purpose behind this Communist effort to present the development 
of theoretical concepts as specific responses to revisionist attempts 
to falsify and dilute Marxist doctrines was to assert that the Com­
munists alone were true followers of "scientific" Marxism as origi­
nated by Marx and Engels. 
At least three other major factors contributed to the growth 
of the left wing faction and its body of revolutionary theories. 
First, there was the preoccupation of socialists with a number of 
27 Rosa Luxemburg, Massenstreik, Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, I, 
Partei wzd Gewerkschaft, quoted in pp. 237-38. 28 Halperin, op. cit., p. 19. 
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theoretical and tactical problems. They were concerned with the 
type of organization best suited for a socialist party devoted to the 
idea of changing the existing society. They wondered what part 
the party was to play in a bourgeois state and what position it 
should take toward liberal elements. They were further occupied 
with an analysis of the practical means - available or potential 
- to be used in the revolutionary struggle aimed at establishing
a socialist society. The revolutionary theories resulting from this
preoccupation were not caused primarily by polemics against re­
visionism but by the interpretation given by revolutionary social­
ists to the teachings of Marx and Engels. It appears, for example,
that Marx's doctrine of economic determinism had a much greater
influence on these theories than the fight against such concepts
of Bernstein's as the gradual or evolutionary change of society.
Secondly, the Russian Revolution of 1905 - especially the 
mass action of the Russian workers and peasants - had a marked 
impact on the political thinking of socialists everywhere. The 
entire problem of the political mass strike or general strike as a 
modern method in the revolutionary struggle was re-examined. 
The creation of local revolutionary workers' councils as instru­
ments for conducting revolutionary action was analyzed. 
Finally, specific experiences of socialist parties in various 
countries contributed to the development of radical theories, es­
pecially those dealing with tactical methods in the fight for the 
intermediate and ultimate aims of socialism. For example, in 
Germany the fight for election reforms and the resistance offered 
by the German government tended to give emphasis to the tac­
tical doctrines developed by the left wing of the SPD. The radicals 
were able to conclude that there was no real substitute for the 
revolutionary struggle as conceived by Marx and Engels as soon 
as proposed changes affected the prevailing power relations. Con­
tinued oppression of the Social Democrats by the German gov­
ernment served to prove the points made by the leftists. 29 
29 As late as April, 1908, the German persons of twenty years or younger to 
Government passed a law prohibiting attend political or trade union meet-
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The German example also indicated that a study of revolu­
tionary theories must take into account the fact that varying con­
ditions in different countries generate specific problems for the 
socialist movement. In Russia, the severe oppression and social 
stratification, particularly the large segment of unskilled laborers 
and peasants, favored the development of conspiratorial ideas 
rather than the legal recognition granted the SPD after the repeal 
of the anti-socialist legislation. 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, the left wing 
of the SPD developed a number of important revolutionary con­
cepts. These concepts were significant for two major reasons. 
First, they determined to a considerable extent the political ac­
tions of the left faction and subsequently those of the Spartacists. 
Secondly, they had an important impact upon the official policies 
of the SPD, which at times, at least in resolutions at party con­
gresses and at international conferences, was forced to incorporate 
revolutionary-sounding principles. 
Many of the revolutionary theories of the German left were 
clarified, formulated, and defended by Rosa Luxemburg, one of 
the outstanding leftists within the German Social Democracy. Her 
political thought was characteristic of many of the left-wingers 
who, as pr<?fessed revolutionaries, subordinated all tactical and 
strategic considerations to the final aim of the socialist movement, 
the realization of socialism. This ultimate aim furnished the yard­
stick for judging the usefulness of theories and actions. Even the 
seizure of political power and the socialization of the means of 
production were regarded only as a means serving the highest pos­
sible end, the creation of the classless, socialist society. 30 
Rosa Luxemburg's attitude toward reforms of any kind was 
clearly influenced by this basic conviction. She strongly opposed 
Bernstein's view that reform work within a bourgeois democracy 
ings. The Social Democratic Youth or­
ganization was dissolved, and political 
work among the youth became illegal 
from this time until the Revolution of 
November 1918. (Wolfe, op. cit., p. 
600.) 
3° Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
13-14.
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was a substitute for the proletarian revolution, that in fact it was 
a sort of "slow" revolution. The fallacy of this revisionist ap­
proach, according to her, was that the ultimate aim of the socialist 
movement - the socialist society - was lost in preoccupation 
with reforming the existing capitalist society. Rosa Luxemburg 
was not opposed to reforms as a matter of principle; she realized 
that the fight for reforms could be used as a means of organizing 
and training the workers. Her position was not reforms or revolu­
tion but reforms and revolution. Important for her was that the 
daily fight remain organically connected with the ultimate aim. 31
Karl Liebknecht was equally opposed to substituting for the 
revolutionary aim the reform of existing conditions. He attacked 
the so-called new method on three grounds. First, he pointed out 
that this new method overestimated the benefits which the bour­
geois democracy could bestow on the workers; secondly, it un­
derestimated the irreconcilable cleavage between proletariat and 
bourgeoisie; and finally, it limited the class struggle by the ab­
solute non-violence principle which constituted a surrender of the 
revolutionary method to the process of gradual reforms. Accord­
ing to Liebknecht, it was foolhardy to believe that the capitalists 
would •ever agree voluntarily to restrictions affecting their vital 
positions. The so-called peaceful method was dangerous utopian­
ism. He was convinced that as long as the government functioned 
as "the executive committee of the ruling class" the state would 
remain an instrument serving the perpetuation of existing power 
relations. 32 
Completely in agreement with the leftists' position with re­
gard to reforms were their views concerning parliamentarianism 
31 Rosa Luxemburg, Sozialreform
oder Revolution, quoted in Luxemburg, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, ll, pp. 126-28, 
137; Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
70-74. Luxemburg's strong opposi­
tion to Bernstein's conscious intention
of transforming the SPD into a liberal
reform party led to her futile demands
for his expulsion from the party. (Froe­
lich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 96.) 
s2 Karl Liebknecht, Reden und Auf­
saetze (Hamburg: Verlag d. Kommu­
nistischen Internationale, 1921), [here­
after cited as: Liebknecht, Reden], pp. 
80-87.
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as a means for the class struggle. Again it was not absolute op­
position which motivated Rosa Luxemburg; she regarded par­
liamentarianism as one more way for the SPD to propagandize 
the workers. Elections for parliamentary representatives were es­
pecially suited for this purpose, and parliament itself could be 
used as a convenient platform for reaching a great number of 
people. But there were some restrictions on how far participation 
could go without compromising the revolutionary creed. As a 
matter of principle, the party was to remain in opposition under 
all circumstances. Participation of socialists in a bourgeois gov­
ernment, as practiced by Alexandre Millerand in France, was 
treason to the working class. Representatives of the workers were 
permitted to enter a bourgeois government only if they intended 
to take over political power. Millerand's entry into the French 
government of Waldeck-Rousseau highlighted the problem of 
socialist participation in a bourgeois government. For the re­
visionists this was no problem at all. It was perfectly in agree­
ment with their theory of gradual introduction of socialism 
through reforms. Revolutionary socialists who believed that so­
cialism could come only after the breakdown .of the capitalist 
order could hardly conceive of entering a bourgeois govemment 
. for any purpose other than to destroy it from within. The ac­
ceptance by a socialist of a position in the executive branch of the 
government was considered impossible, because it was held that 
oppositional policies could not be pursued within tl;le executive. 
This limitation did not apply to the legislature. Rosa Luxemburg's 
position toward parliamentarianism was in complete agreement 
with her revolutionary concepts: the SPD in a bourgeois society 
must remain the opposition party under all circumstances; it may 
take over the government only when the bourgeois state breaks 
down."4 
33 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. Frage," quoted in Luxemburg, Ausge-
83-87. waehlte Reden, II, pp. 60-64. 
a4 Rosa Luxemburg, "Eine taktische
LEFT WING PRIOR TO WORLD WAR 1 19 
Thus, the invasion of parliament was not a device to replace 
the necessity of forceful revolution. Rosa Luxemburg followed 
completely the doctrines of Marx and Engels concerning the 
revolutionary method of seizing political power by the working 
class. She claimed that only people like Bernstein wished to ac­
complish the greatest change in world history, the change from 
capitalism to socialism, by means of the bourgeois parliament. 
Rosa Luxemburg's evaluation of parliament was based on her in­
terpretation of the Marxist doctrines pertaining to the nature of 
society and the state. Any bourgeois state, regardless of its form, 
was an instrument of the ruling class and therefore directly op­
posed to the interests of the working class. 
Karl Liebknecht insisted on subordination of the parliament­
ary struggle to the fight of the party and the workers outside the 
legislature. He held that the party's power came not from the 
representatives in parliament but from the masses directly. 35 The 
real power relations operated outside parliament. The legislature 
could serve as an excellent platform for addressing the masses, 
but it was dangerous to create among the workers the illusion 
that the class struggle could be carried on within parliament and 
thus to replace the need for mass action in streets and factories. 3" 
Rosa Luxemburg also stressed these same points. The real 
power of the SPD was not the effect the representatives had in 
the Reichstag but the power the people could muster in the streets. 
She sympathized with the Social Democratic representatives who 
had the difficult task not only of acting as instruments of an arti­
culate opposition to the bourgeois government but also as repre­
sentatives of a revolutionary class which intended to upset the 
existing political, economic, and social arrangements. 37 
35 Karl Liebknecht, "Gegen den Re­
formismus," quoted in Karl Lieb­
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, Briefe 
und Aufsaetze (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 
1952), [hereafter cited as: Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden], p. 169. 
:;6 Liebknecht, Reden, pp. 22-26. 
37 Rosa Luxemburg, "Sozialdemo­
kratie und Parliamentarismus," quoted 
in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, 
II, pp. 198-99. 
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The great power embodied in the masses was demonstrated 
in the fight for a new Prussian election law. For the first time the 
SPD mobilized the German workers for a political offensive. The 
masses responded to the call and held street demonstrations. But 
the party became afraid of its own enterprising spirit and discon­
tinued the mass action simply by failing to provide further direc­
tives. Mass strikes, the logical sequence to the street demonstra­
tions, could have pressed further the demands for election reforms. 
But they were vigorously opposed by the trade unions which did 
not sanction using the strike as a political weapon. 38
An analysis of the Russian Revolution of 1905 provided the 
leftist, and particularly Rosa Luxemburg, with a basis for re­
evaluating the mass strike as a method of furthering the class 
struggle and the socialist revolution. Prior to 1905, the mass 
strike was regarded by the international Social Democracy and 
the SPD as a purely anarchistic and utopian concept. 39 Accord­
ing to Rosa Luxemburg, the Russian Revolution had reversed 
this view. In_ fact, the mass strike as used in Russia had opened 
an entirely new era for the labor movement, because it had placed 
a new and more powerful weapon in the hands of the workers.40 
Under the impact of the Russian Revolution, discussions on the 
mass strike as a possible means in the revolutionary struggle be­
came widespread in Social Democratic organizations. This in­
terest proved to Rosa Luxemburg that the methods employed by 
the SPD up to then had not achieved sufficient results nor satis­
fied the revolutionary spirit of the party members. New methods 
were needed to advance the cause. 41
38 The inequality of the election law 
provisions is best illustrated by the 
election results of 1908 when the SPD 
received 6 seats with over 600,000 votes 
while the Conservatives obtained 212 
seats with over 400,000 votes. (Rosa 
Luxemburg, "Was weiter?" quoted in 
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, 
pp. 324-28; Froelich, Rosa Luxem­
burg, pp. 205-06. 
39 Rosa Luxemburg, "Reden auf dem 
L o n d o n e r  Parteitag der SDAPR," 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, II, p. 275. 
-1° Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp. 157-
58. Rosa Luxemburg even thought at
one time that the mass strike might
have replaced the need for fighting at
the barricades, the means used by the
bourgeoisie in its revolts against feu­
dalism. (Ibid., pp. 227-30.)
41 Luxemburg, "Der politische Mas-
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Many SPD leaders, revisionists, and trade unionists did not 
share this interpretation of the Russian experience. Labor leaders 
claimed that a mass strike entailed too many risks for the trade 
unions. Rosa Luxemburg responded that all actions of a fighting 
organization involve risks. She reminded the reluctant union 
leaders that the trade unions gained in strength during the chal­
lenging period of the anti-socialist law.42 Karl Legien's opinion 
was typical of the union leaders' position. For him mass strikes 
and general strikes were one and the same. He called them general 
nonsense and regarded them as undertakings which could en­
danger the very existence of the unions. Rosa Luxemburg, vigor­
ously opposing this opinion, pointed out that the Russian experi­
ence showed that the Russian unions were actually an outgrowth 
of the revolution. 43 
Liebknecht also endorsed the mass strike as an important 
weapon for the workers. He asserted that election victories were 
not enough and that mass actions were also needed. If strikes 
proved themselves valuable in the economic struggle then there 
should be no doubt that they could also serve political purposes. 
He saw in the mass strike, which he believed to be the outgrowth 
of the realization by the working class of its economic power, the 
specific proletarian means of combat suitable for all phases of 
the class struggle ... 
Rosa Luxemburg gained at least a formal victory when her 
resolutions concerning mass strikes were adopted at the party 
congresses in Jena ( 1905) and in Mannheim ( 1906) against the 
opposition of the trade unions. The political strike was thus 
sanctioned as a weapon of the SPD.45 Legien claimed that the 
acceptance of the mass strike resolution was a careless move be­
cause it revealed tactical plans to the enemies of the working class. 
senstreik," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus­
gewaehlte Reden, JI, pp. 442-43. 
42 Luxemburg, Was Weiter? pp. 333-
34; and Massenstreik, p. 220. 
43 Luxemburg, Reden auf dem Mann­
heimer Parteitag, pp. 236-57. 
44 Karl Liebknecht, "Ueber den po-
Iitischen Massenstreik," quoted in Lieb­
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 89-
90; and Karl Liebknecht, "Fuer den po­
litischen Massenstreik," quoted in Lieb­
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden. p. 99. 
45 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
124-25, 164, 166-69. In these resolu-
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Rosa Luxemburg countered that a modern proletarian mass move­
ment does not decide secretly on its tactics.46
From the Russian events of 1905 Rosa Luxemburg inferred 
the following characteristics of the mass strike. First, a mass 
strike is not artificially created but comes as the result of a parti­
cular situation during a specific phase of the class struggle. A 
mass strike cannot be called by a decision of the party's executive 
committee, just as revolution cannot take place upon command. 
Second, a mass strike is not a substitute should parliamentary 
action fail. Mass strikes are revolutionary weapons and cannot 
be made harmonious with policies which place primary emphasis 
upon parliamentary action. 41 Third, if a mass strike is to be suc­
cessful, the broad masses must be drawn into the fight in order to 
make it a real mass movement. It cannot be carried out by or­
ganized workers alone. The trade unions must assist the party. 
The mass strike is also not just a question of discipline and esti­
mated costs but a genuine revolutionary class action. It is unwise 
to overestimat� the role of the party and to underestimate the 
revolutionary actions of the unorganized masses:•s The Russian 
Revolution had shown that the mass strike was influenced by the 
Social Democratic organizations, but that neither the party nor 
the masses followed a pre-arranged plan. It was not an organized 
action but rather a spontaneous uprising of the masses.4° 
Nonetheless, Rosa Luxemburg emphasized the importance of 
political leadership not only for the period of actual revolutionary 
mass strikes but also for the valuable training which would pay 
off in serious revolutionary situations. She synthesized her ap-
tions, the mass strike was conceived 
only as a defense against a possible 
further limitation of voting rights. 
Therefore, the mass strike still re­
mained subordinate to the parliament­
ary work of the party. (Luxemburg, 
M assenstreik, p. 167.) 
40 Luxemburg, Reden auf dem Mann­
heimer Parteitag, p. 258. 
47 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp. 
163-66; and Der politische Massen-
streik, pp. 444-45. 
48 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp. 
220-22; and Was weiter? pp. 331-32.
49 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
179-88. By referring to the Russian
events, Rosa Luxemburg even attempt­
ed to prove that it was not dialectical
to believe that strong organizations
must be available before the revolu­
tion. In Russia the masses went into
the revolution with almost no unions
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predation of the "element of mass spontaneity" with that of the 
role of the party."0 
Rosa Luxemburg's confidence in the creative power of the 
masses, expressed for example in spontaneous mass actions, has 
provoked many attacks especially from recent Communist inter­
preters. She was accused of "worshipping spontaneity and negat­
ing the role of the party."51
Paul Froelich, her biographer, claimed that her ideas were 
purposely misinterpreted, that she never excluded the conscious 
political leadership of the party; on the contrary, she desired it. 
Possibly her mistake was that she did not grasp the extent of the 
retarding influence which an organization, led by persons opposed 
to revolutionary methods in the class struggle, could exert. Her 
overconfidence in the masses is explained by Froelich as a typical 
mistake of a genuine revolutionary. 52
Rosa Luxemburg's confidence in mass spontaneity and her 
opposition to Lenin's ultra-centralism and conspiratorial concepts 
as guiding principles for the organization of the party led to sharp 
controversies between the two revolutionary leaders.53 Her en­
dorsement of the use of force in the revolutionary struggle brought 
her into sharp opposition with the official policy of the SPD and 
in particular with the revisionists who, like Eduard David, as-
and with only small socialist organi­
zations. (Rosa Luxemburg, Reden auf 
dem lenaer Parteitag der SPD, 1905, 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte, 
Red en, II, p. 246.) 
50 Luxemburg, Massenstreik, pp.
205-8, 223-25.
s1 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 257; Rosa Lu­
xemburg, "Nach dem ersten Akt," 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, II, pp. 217-18; Fred Oelssner, 
Rosa Luxemburg, eine kritische bio­
graphische Skizze (Berlin: Dietz Ver­
lag, 1951), pp. 50-52. Grotewohl, op. 
cit., p. 41. 
52 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
173-76.
s3 Ibid., pp. 107-09. Rosa Luxem­
burg had fought Lenin's party theory 
since the split of the Russian party in 
1903, believing that this split was detri­
mental to the furtherance of the Rus­
sian Revolution. (Franz Borkenau, Der 
europaeische Kommunismus [B e r n : 
Francke-Verlag, 1952], p. 25; Luxem­
burg, Reden auf dem Londoner Partei­
tag, p. 284.) For a brief discussion of 
the differences between Rosa Luxem­
burg and Lenin on party organization, 
see Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German 
Communism (Cambridge: Ha r v a r d  
University Press, 1948), pp. 17-20. 
Lenin's position is explained fully in 
his What ls To Be Done? (Moscow: 
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serted that the SPD must use only legal, parliamentary means in 
its political fight. 54
5. Nationalism Versus Internationalism
Some of the revisionists and many of the trade union leaders 
had jumped on the German imperialist bandwagon. Their actions 
were completely in accord with their acceptance of the bourgeois 
state as the proper framework for their political, social, and eco­
nomic reform policies. In addition to these nationalistic socialists, 
many of the other SPD leaders also supported the expansionist 
foreign policies of the German government. The SPD believed, 
for example, that there was nothing objectionable to peaceful 
penetration of colonial areas. Only the leftists retained an inter­
nationalist position and continued to oppose the government's 
nationalism and the nationalistic tendencies within the party. Rosa 
Luxemburg declared that the Social Democracy must never par­
ticipate in the foreign affairs of the Great Powers. The working 
class and its representatives in all countries had their own foreign 
policies based on revolutionary, international concepts which 
certainly had nothing in common with the imperialistic plans of 
their various governments.55 
The intensification of imperialist designs displayed by the 
Lierman government and by the governments of several other 
countries alarmed the international Social Democracy or at least 
parts of it, and made the socialists aware of the danger of an out­
break of a large-scale European or world war. The Socialist and 
Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1947) 
and One Step Forward, Two Steps Back 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., 
1941.) For the views of Rosa Luxem­
burg, see her Reden auf dem Londoner 
Parteitag. Lenin's concepts on party 
tactics are contained in his Two Tac­
tics of Social-Democracy in the Demo­
cratic Revolution (New York: Interna­
tional Publishers. 1935). 
54 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
91-93. Luxemburg, Reden auf dem
Mannheimer Parteitag, p. 261. One of 
the clearest formulations of the re­
visionist position towar(j the bourgeois 
state and the proletarian revolution is 
a resolution prepared by Dr. Eduard 
David and presented for approval to a 
party meeting in Mainz on September 
JO, 1906 (Luxemburg, Massenstreik, 
pp. 238-39). 
Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
199-202.
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Labor International dealt with the war danger at its international 
congresses held in Stuttgart ( 1907) and in Basel ( 1912). 56 
At the Stuttgart Conference, the position of the international 
Social Democracy regarding the war issue was debated and clari­
fied considerably. The decision that socialist deputies in the par­
liaments of all countries were unconditionally pledged to vote 
against any military expenditure required for colonial expeditions 
had been on the records of the International since its conference 
at Paris in 1900. 57 The socialists felt that stronger measures and 
threats of actions were necessary to prevent an outbreak of a gen­
eral war. The French and English delegates proposed the calling 
of a general strike as a countermeasure in case of war. Rosa 
Luxemburg opposed this motion, insisting that this type of action 
program would remain only a resolution at best. She maintained 
that individual Social Democratic parties would undoubtedly fail
to act in accordance with the Conference resolutions even though 
they could expect support from the masses which were much 
afraid of a war.58 
The resolution eventually adopted by the Stuttgart Congress 
called upon all Social Democratic parties to employ every means 
available to fight against the outbreak of war and for the preserva­
tion of world peace.59 This resolution did not seem adequate nor 
realistic enough to Rosa Luxemburg. She therefore proposed an 
important amendment which she had worked out with Lenin and 
5r; The correct name for the Interna­
tional was Socialist and Labor Interna­
tional. Only after the Communist In­
ternational was founded in March, 1919, 
did the Socialist International become 
referred to as the Second International 
and the Communist International as the 
Third. (Wolfe, op. cit., p. 92.) For a 
brief sketch of the Second Interna­
tional, see Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 
15-16, and Paul Froelich, Zehn Jahre
Krieg und Buergerkrieg (2d ed.; Ber­
lin: Vereinigung Internationaler Ver­
lags-Anstalten), I, pp. 27-29.
57 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 598.
58 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 204. 
For example, in debates at the interna­
tional conferences many d e l e g a t e s  
stressed the right to defend themselves 
against an attack from without. The 
recognized leader of the German So­
cial Democrats, August Bebe!, stated 
in Stuttgart that he did not see how the 
SPD could get people for a mass strike 
if, on the day the war breaks out, six 
million men would be mobilized im­
mediately. (Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 
44-45.)
09 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 79-80.
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Martov. After some initial .difficulties with Bebel were ironed 
out, the amendment was adopted. It read as follows: 
If a war threatens to break out, it is the duty of the working class 
and of its parliamentary representatives in the countries involved, sup­
ported by the consolidating activity of the International Bureau, to 
exert every effort to prevent the outbreak of war by means they con­
sider most effective; which naturally vary according to the sharpening 
of the class struggle and of the general political situation. 
Should war break out nonetheless, it is their duty to intervene in 
favor of its speedy termination and to do all in their power to utilize 
the economic and political crisis caused by the war to rouse the peoples 
and,thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.00 
The position taken by the radical left of the SPD in regard to 
the danger of a war and to the means designed to avert it was a 
matter of record at the international congresses. Rosa Luxem­
burg included in the immediate tasks of the Social Democracy the 
propaganda activities directed at the working class in order to 
make it aware of its historic mission in the class struggle and to 
prepare it· to fight if necessary against war and militarism. 61
Because the reformists held an opposite view on the issues of 
nationalism and war, a new type of cleavage developed within 
the SPD. The nationalistic attitude of some of the SPD leaders 
had been apparent at the various conferences of the Second In­
ternational. "2 
William Maehl traces the change of the SPD from its revo­
lutionary and internationalist platform to its identification with 
the interests of the German nation. At the party congresses of the 
SPD at Chemnitz in 1912 and at Jena in 1 913, the left wing 
00 Wolfe, op. cit., p. 600. For an in­
teresting discussion of the anti-war is­
sue at the Stuttgart Congress, see ibid., 
pp. 591-600. Cf. also Rosa Luxemburg, 
"Rede auf dem Internationalen Sozia• 
listenkongress zu Stuttgart," quoted in 
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, 
pp. 308-10. For information on the 
International Congress at Basel in 1912 
see Rosa Luxemburg, Die Krise der 
Sozialdemokratie, quoted in Luxem­
burg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, I, pp. 266-
68. 
61 Rosa Luxemburg, "Militarismus, 
Krieg und Arbeiterklasse," quoted in 
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, 
p. 493.
62 Maehl, op. cit., pp. 28-29.
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radicals ( among them Kurt Geyer, Georg Ledebour, Wilhelm 
Dittmann, Hugo Haase, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Clara 
Zetkin, and Franz Mehring) fought vigorously against the na­
tionalistic trend of the party. They fought a losing battle. In 
Chemnitz the Party Congress approved the concept of national 
defense measures because of the "Russian peril." At the Party 
Congress in Jena, only six years after the International Congress 
at Stuttgart, the SPD decided that it was not required under all 
circumstances to vote against military appropriations. This com­
plete reversal of the Stuttgart resolution was adopted by a vote 
of 336 to 140. The other major issue, the general strike resolu­
tion recommended by Rosa Luxemburg, was defated, 333 to 142. 
Maehl correctly asserts that the SPD had made its great policy 
change - the adoption of nationalism - long before the fatal 
August of 1914.63 
6. General Characteristics of the SPD on the Eve of
World War I
In the course of time, reformist concepts and trade union ob­
jectives had come to determine the official policies of the SPD. 
Under this influence, the party had undergone a gradual meta-
GB [bid., pp. 32-41. An excellent ex­
ample of the "patriotic attitude" of the 
SPD during the pre-war years was a 
speech made in 1907 by the Social 
Democratic Reichstag representative 
Gustav Noske in a debate about the 
military budget. Noske declared that 
the SPD recognized the peace policy 
the German Government was trying to 
pursue. The SPD also wished to make 
known that it was not the intent of the 
party to undermine the discipline of the 
Herve will Soldatenstreik, 
Liebknecht spricht so aehnlich, 
Ledebour zeigt sich dem Heer 
Auch nicht sehr versoehnlich; 
Doch der Hoffnung Jetzten Rest 
Soll man nicht verlieren. 
Eins steht heute bombenfest: 
Noske wird parieren. 
Germany army. On the contrary, the 
Social Democrats wished to see Ger­
many militarily strong, and Noske gave 
the assurance that, in case of war, the 
Social Democratic workers would take 
up arms and their patriotism would 
not be surpassed by that of any other 
class. A satirical German periodical, 
the Lustigen Blaetter, published on 
October 8, 1907, a poem dedicated to 
the "new patriot," Noske. 
Herve wants a mutiny 
Within the army's frame; 
Liebknecht talks along this line 
And Ledebour's the same. 
But do not lose all rays of hope, 
One thing stands firm today: 
If army orders are sent out, 
Then Noske will obey. 
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morphosis from a revolutionary, proletarian party strictly opposed 
to the bourgeois class state to a kind of liberal, working-class 
party content with working for reform and political democracy 
within the framework of the existing state. It had become a party 
which had great respect for law and state authority, and even 
an admiration for force. 64 
Its leaders shunned serious political struggles fearing to de­
stroy the advantages so laboriously acquired. Revolutionary 
phrases were still heard at party congresses as part of the tra­
ditional ritual, but the idea of a violent struggle would have hor­
rified most of the party leaders. The SPD had become a power 
in its own right. It could reward disciplined followers with po­
sitions and promotions, and it could punish violators of party 
Geht es mal in ferner Frist 
Ans Kanonenfuttern, 
Denkt so mancher Reservist: 
"Nee,-ick bleib bei Muttern!" 
Doch das soll uns Kampf und Schlacht 
Nimmermehr vergaellen, 
Denn es istheut' ausgemacht: 
Noske wird sich stellen. 
Kommandiert der Herr Maior: 
"Feuer vorn und hinten!" 
. Ruft ein arbeitsscheues Korps: 
"Schmeiss mer fort die Flinten!" 
Aber dennoch, Mut fuer Mut! 
Lasst's euch nicht verdriessen, 
Denn wir wissen absolut: 
Noske, der wird schiessen! 
Noske schnallt den Saebel um, 
Noske geht aufs Ganze, 
Noske feuert bum bum bum, 
Noske stuermt die Schanze, 
Noske schreit: Hurra! Hurra! 
Noske haelt die Wachen, 
Noske schiesst Victoria, 
Noske wirds schon machen. 
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 80.) 
64 Maehl, op. cit., p. 15; Carlo Sforza,
Europe and Europeans (London: Har-
If cannon-fodder is required 
At distant time or tide, 
Quite a few Reservists think: 
"With mother I shall bide." 
On this account our battle strength 
Will not lack in beauty, 
Because today we're sure that Noske 
Will report for duty. 
And if a Major then commands: 
"Fire front and rear!" 
But "Throw away the rifles," 
Shouts a unit filled with fear; 
Then do not be downhearted, 
Then do not show dismay, 
Because we're absolutely sure 
That Noske'll fire away. 
Noske straps his sabre on, 
Noske's fire and vim; 
Noske shoo�,bang,bang,bang,bang; 
He storms the bulwark grim. 
Noske shouts: Hurrah! Hurrah! 
He guards us in the night; 
Noske'll bring the Victory, 
He'll fix things up all right. 
( translation by Robert Simmons, 
Modern Language Department, 
Marquette University) 
rap&Co., 1936),pp. 82-85. 
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discipline. Leftists such as Mehring and Liebknecht were dis­
trusted, and revolutionaries of the caliber of Rosa Luxemburg 
were regarded as sources of great annoyance and as alien intel­
lectual trouble-makers. 65
No public repudiation of the old revolutionary doctrines of the 
Marxian tradition was made by the party leadership, and the 
controversies and factional strife were hidden behind a fac;ade of 
party unity. To the non-socialist world the SPD appeared to be 
a strong and unified party, while in truth it was composed of 
three factions of unequal size and influence on party policies. 
The party center continued to enjoy the unwavering loyalty of 
the overwhelming number of German Socialists and party sym­
pathizers. It was known neither to them nor to outsiders that 
the SPD had assumed the characteristics of a reform party and 
was using revolutionary terminology only to appeal to the workers. 
The party was not anxious to assume political power, and was 
content to criticize the existing situation without proposing a 
political plan of its own. 66 The SPD became the party of the 
"permanent loyal opposition," actually borrowing this term from 
British political usage. Some leaders even came to believe that 
the aims of the Social Democracy could be realized under a 
monarchical form of government just as well as they could under 
a republican system. 
The tremendous growth in the number of party adherents re­
sulted in the loss of its exclusive proletarian base. It has been 
suggested that the SPD had developed into the only democratic 
65 Sforza, op. cit., pp. 86-87. Noske's 
views on the "foreign" influence in the 
SPD are illuminating: 
"The attempt made by a number of 
foreigners from Poland and Russia to 
set themselves up as teachers of the 
German workers caused resentment. 
... It has nothing to do with anti­
Semitism when one points out that the 
'Marxists' of East European Jewish 
background had a special aptitude for 
transforming socialism into a dogma 
and changing popular views into con­
fessions of faith. They plotted a secret 
[mysterious] science which always re­
mained incomprehensible to the Ger­
man workers. Only a few half-intel­
lectuals brought discredit upon the 
labor movement by their idle talk about 
Marxism. I do not believe that I have 
ever mentioned Marxism in a speech 
or in an article .... " (Noske, Erlebtes, 
p. 27.)
66 Rosenberg, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
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people's party since Germany lacked a genuinely liberal middle­
class party. "7 
It has been mentioned above that the SPD also showed con­
siderable nationalistic tendencies. These flourished in spite of 
SPD approval of resolutions at international socialist conferences 
expressing opposite views. 
Three major reasons have been suggested for the change of 
character of the SPD during the period preceding August 1914. 
( 1 ) With the ultimate aim set far in the future, the natural, human 
reaction was to transform the social revolutionary movement into 
a reform movement; (2) the realization of some demands in­
evitably led to a more conciliatory attitude toward the ruling 
group; ( 3) the highly institutionalized character of the organiza­
tion resulted in its becoming the major concern of party officials 
interested in perpetuating the existing situation and thus it lost 
much of its revolutionary spirit. 68 All three of these factors 
exerted influence. Count Sforza on the eve of the European war, 
interestingly �escribed the SPD as nothing but "a gigantic ad­
ministrative organization - the body tremendous, but the soul 
very puny."09
67 Maehl, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Count 
Sforza, the internationally k now n 
Italian statesman, would not honor the 
SPD with the designation of a genuine 
democratic people's party. He em­
phasized that the SPD had absorbed 
so much Hegelian thought with its 
characteristic adoration of the state 
that "the 'rights of man and of citizen' 
faded into abstract 'principles' .... " 
"Indeed, under the cover of the Marx­
ist formula, considered more revolu-
tionary than any others, the German 
Social Democracy merely continued 
the special mentality of the old Ger­
man imperialism. Just like the Liberals 
who preceded them, the socialists were 
so full of reverence for the technical 
bounties of the state that they held any 
encroachments on the personal rights 
of citizens to be bearable annoyances." 
(Sforza, op. cit., pp. 83, 84.)
es Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 4.
69 Sforza, op. cit., p. 85. 
The Impact of World War I 
on the German Socialist 
Movement 
1. Support of the War Effort by the SPD and the
Trade Unions
The unanimous vote of the Social Democratic Reichstag fac­
tion on August 4, 1914, in favor of granting the war appropri­
ation requested by the German government indicated either that 
the nationalistic elements within the SPD had succeeded in taking 
control of the party or that the party had become overwhelmingly 
patriotic. The vote was a strong declaration of faith in the exist­
ing state. It also implied the belief prevalent among Social Demo­
cratic leaders that the fate of the German workers was intimately 
connected with the fate of the national state. The nationalistically 
inclined socialists were convinced that military def eat would bring 
disastrous results to the working class.1 
Prior to the outbreak of the war, the SPD expressed out­
spokenly anti-war sentiments in its official pronouncements and 
party newspapers. As late as the end of July, after Austria-Hun­
gary had served its ultimatum on Serbia, V orwaerts - the official 
organ of the SPD - called on the workers to demonstrate against 
the war danger and to exert public pressure on the German gov­
ernment to desist from going to the aid of its Austrian ally. 2 
1 Ludwig Bergstraesser, Die Ge­
schichte der politischen Parteien in 
Deutsch/and (Munich: Isar Verlag, 
1952), pp. 187-88. 
2 For the text of the anti-war pro-
clamation in the July 25, 1914, issue of 
V orwaerts see, lllustrierte Geschichte, 
p. 91. The Austrian-Hungarian ulti­
matum to Serbia was dated July 23.
It was followed by a declaration of
31 
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The International Bureau of the Socialist International met 
in emergency sessions in Brussels on July 29 and 30. The war 
had already started in the Balkans. The German socialists were 
represented at the meetings by Karl Kautsky and Hugo Haase. 
The assembled delegates unanimously adopted a resolution call­
ing on the workers of all countries to intensify their demonstra­
tions for peace. The International Congress, planned for August 
23, 1914, in Vienna, was changed to August 9 and was to meet 
in Paris. This was the total business accomplished at these meet­
ings. 
The last diplomatic meetings of the German and French so­
cialists took place on August 1, 1914. The Executive Committee 
of the SPD had sent Hermann Mueller to Paris to negotiate with 
the French socialist leaders on coordinating party action in their 
respective parliaments in order to prevent an outbreak of war 
between the two countries.3 No results were achieved at these 
conferences either. The French labor leaders requested assurance 
from Hermann Mueller that the German trade unions and the 
SPD would call a general strike and thus force the Kaiser to 
keep Germany out of-the war. The French, in turn, promised to 
do everything in their power to keep the French government from 
· declaring war. Mueller was 1.mable to make these commitments
for the trade unions and the SPD. He was fearful that the German
government had already succeeded in convincing the German
people that their country was threatened by the "Russian peril."•
Besides not all SPD party leaders were opposed to Germany's
going to war. Some of the nationalistic revisionists supported the
German war policy even before August 1914. 5 
war on July 28. Germany declared war 
against Russia on August 1, shortly 
after Russia had begun to mobilize its 
military forces. War against France 
was declared on August 3, and England 
entered the conflict with a declaration 
of war against Germany on August 4, 
after German violation of Belgian neu­
trality. 
s Froelich, R o s a Luxemburg, pp. 
237-42; Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 63-
64.
4 Albert C. Grzesinski, Inside Ger• 
many (New York: Dutton & Co., 
1939). pp. 32-33. 
5 Maehl, op. cit., p. 41. Among this 
group of revisionists were such well­
known leaders as Eduard David, Hein­
rich Cunow, Wilhelm Kolb, Paul 
Lensch, and Philip Scheidemann. 
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When Germany declared war against Russia, the anti-war 
faction within the Social Democratic leadership decreased con­
siderably. The war appropriation question was discussed at a 
meeting of the Executive Committee of the party on August 2, 
1914. Scheidemann, David, and others were for the approval of 
the government's forthcoming request; Haase and Ledebour op­
posed it. No decision was reached. The decisive turn came the 
following day in an executive meeting of the Social Democratic 
members of the Reichstag. Eduard David argued that the fight 
against Tsarism must be supported, for it might materially assist 
the Russian Revolution. Of the one hundred and ten Social Demo­
cratic deputies, only fourteen favored a policy of opposition to 
the war. This minority was led by Hugo Haase, the chairman 
of the SPD Reichstag faction. The opposition submitted reluc­
tantly to the majority in the interest of party discipline and unity. 
Thus, on August 4, 1914, the Social Democrats unanimously ap­
proved the war appropriation. Even Karl Liebknecht, whose po­
sition as an extreme leftist set him apart from the others, voted 
with the majority. Haase read a statement on the floor of the 
Reichstag explaining the action of the SPD. He declared that the 
Social Democrats had worked against the international arma­
ments race and imperialistic policies in general and that the re­
sponsibility for the outbreak of the war rested entirely with those 
who had pursued such policies. The present problem for the 
Social Democrats was no longer the question of war or peace but 
the danger which Germany faced because of the threat of foreign 
invasion.6 
An example of pre-war nationalist 
sentiments displayed by leading Social 
Democrats is an article written by 
Friedrich Stampfer ( later editor-in­
chief of Vorwaerts) which circulated 
in many party newspapers on July 31 
and August I. 1914. The article con­
tained the following significant state­
ment: "When the fateful hour strikes, 
the workers will redeem the pledges 
given on their behalf by their repre­
sentatives; the vaterlandlosen Gesellen 
will fulfill their duties and will in no 
respect be surpassed by the patriots." 
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 97.) The 
term "vaterlandlose Geselle" means a 
person without a country. It is used by 
Stampfer sarcastically. The socialists 
were frequently accused by their po­
litical opponents as "persons without 
a country" because of their interna­
tional ties and obligations. 
G Maehl, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Halperin, 
op. cit., p. 20; Froelich, Zehn Jahre, 
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The majority of the SPD deputies who decided in favor of 
the war appropriation may have been influenced by three im­
portant factors. First of all, a wave of intense nationalism had 
seized the German people of all social classes. The population 
had fallen under a chauvinistic spell. No one seemed willing or 
able to tell the people the truth about this "defensive" war. 1 Au­
gust Winnig, the chairman of the construction workers' union 
and a radical reformist ( who eventually was forced out of the 
SPD), claimed that the attitude of the German workers actually 
forced the SPD leaders, the Social Democratic Reichstag faction, 
and the trade unions to support the nationalistic effort. 8 
Secondly, there was the fear that the German government 
would dissolve the party and the trade unions if the SPD should 
oppose a war. This was a key argument in Eduard David's efforts 
to get his fell ow deputies to vote for the war appropriation. The 
loss of legality was the worst thing that could happen to the 
party bureaucracy. An order to dissolve the Social Democratic 
organizations ':"as actually under consideration by the govern­
ment as early as the spring of 1914.9 Original plans of the War 
Ministry included the arrest of all Social Democratic deputies at 
the moment when a state of siege would be proclaimed.10 
pp. 67-70. For the text of the SPD 
resolution, see lllustrierte Geschichte, 
pp. 98-99. 
7 Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 33; Maehl,
op. cit., pp. 40-41; lllustrierte Ge­
schichte, pp. 95-96. 
8 Tormin, op. cit., p. 33. August 
Winnig, Das Reich als Republik (Stutt­
gart and Berlin: Cotta'sche Buchhand­
lung, J 930), pp. 99-100. Flechtheim as­
serts that the action taken by the SPD 
was not "treason pure and simple" 
against the working class. as persist­
ently claimed by the left wing radicals, 
because the patriotic wave had broken 
down all class barriers. (Flechtheim, 
op. cit., p. 11.) Indeed, Social Demo­
crats of all ages followed the call to 
the colors and speedily enlisted. (Grze• 
sinski, op. cit., pp. 33-34.) 
9 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 98; Grze• 
sinski, op. cit., p. 34. 
10 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 96. In
spite of their strong aversion to il­
legality, the Executive Committee of 
the SPD believed that some precautions 
should be taken. In August of 1914, 
it sent the party treasurer, Otto Braun, 
and Friedrich Ebert to Zurich, Switzer­
land. with instructions to await further 
development of the domestic political 
situation in Germany. Should the party 
be dissolved and the Social Democratic 
leaders arrested, these two were free 
to act on behalf of the party. Ebert and 
Braun returned to Berlin a few weeks 
later. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 35; Wolfe, 
op. cit., p. 634.) 
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The general nationalistic attitude of the trade unions was the 
third factor. On August 2, 1914, before the SPD had decided on 
its final position toward the war, an Executive Committee of the 
trade unions agreed to stop all economic demands on behalf of 
the workers for the duration of the war. To enforce this policy 
of economic truce, the union leaders declared that no financial 
support would be rendered to strikers.11 
The approval of the war appropriation and the non-strike 
proclamation of the trade unions in August 1914 were only the 
first steps made by the German socialists in support of the war. 
Additional war appropriations were approved as the war pro­
gressed.12 
The SPD proudly proclaimed that it had done everything 
within its power to support national defense. By its silence the 
party had acquiesced in the proclamation on August 1, 1914, of 
a state of siege which entailed such political restrictions as strict­
est censorship. It had voted on August 4, 1914, for a whole 
series of emergency laws, suspending the most important labor 
protection laws, including the regulation of work for women 
and children. In 1916, Social Democratic deputies voted for the 
compulsory labor mobilization law ( Vaterlaendisches Hilfsge­
setz) which aimed at forcing into the war economy all men be­
tween the ages of seventeen and sixty who were not serving in 
the army.13 Most important was the so-called Burgfrieden, the 
voluntary cessation of political party strife for the duration of 
11 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 98. Ber­
lau believes that the action of the party 
was "dictated by the pressure of pub­
lic opinion, by the fear of governmental 
retaliation, and by a sincere belief that 
Germany was faced with foreign ag­
gression." (Berlau, op. cit., p. 135.) 
12 The approval of further war cred­
its on December 2, 1914, was justified 
by the fact that the borders of the 
country were still endangered by enemy 
troops. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 46.) David 
even claimed that the situation of Ger-
many was then more precarious than it 
had been in August. (Eduard David, 
Die Sozialdemokratie im Weltkriege 
[Berlin: Vorwaerts Verlag, 1915], pp. 
12-13.) War credits were also ap­
proved on March 20, 1915, with the
justification that neither the aim of
security for Germany was reached nor
did the enemies show any peace ten­
dencies. (/ bid., pp. 16-17.)
13 Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 94-106; 
lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 128. 
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the war. For a socialist party this also meant the cessation of 
the traditional class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. 14 
The trade unions and their leaders also contributed whole­
heartedly to the war effort. The early proclamation of the eco­
nomic truce by the General Commission had a tremendous im­
pact on the nationalistic attitude of the rank-and-file German 
worker. In the course of the war, the union leaders were able to 
prove valuable to the German war machine in a variety of ways. 
During the first weeks of the war an economic crisis developed 
following the sudden interruption of economic relations with 
foreign countries. Unemployment rose in spite of the increased 
draft for the army. The unions stepped in and made payments 
to workers who were temporarily unemployed because of the war, 
thus preventing the spread of mass disaff ection. 15 The union 
leaders discouraged economic and political strikes. The fact that 
the economic truce brought very high profits to the manufacturers 
did not seem to concern them. 16 
The uni�ns also proved to be one of the most effective instru­
ments in the pro-war publicity campaign designed for domestic 
consumption. The purpose of the propaganda effort was to keep 
the workers' morale at the highest possible level in spite of the 
deprivations imposed by the prolonged war. The Leitmotif was 
the complete interdependence of the outcome of the war and the 
living standard of the German worker. It was emphasized that a 
military defeat would bring unemployment, destruction of the 
trade unions, and reduction or complete loss of all social insurance 
benefits. In recognition of the contributions rendered by the 
union leaders, the German government exempted them from 
military conscription. Their work within the unions was con-
14 The cooperation of the SPD was 
the most important single contribution 
to the establishment of the domestic 
political and economic truce of the 
Burgfrieden. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 
178.) 
13 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 107; 
Snell, op. cit., p. 69. 
16 Froelich, Zehn Jahre. pp. 97-100.
The union leaders' lack of attention to 
the high profits made by the industrial­
ists was possibly caused by ignorance 
or inexperience. 
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sidered of greater significance to the over-all war effort than their 
military service. 11 
The original hostile attitude of the German government toward 
the trade unions underwent a thorough-going change. An official 
press communique of November 1915 illustrates this shift in 
sentiment: 
The free trade-unions have proved a valuable aid ... and [are] 
almost indispensable to the economic and communal life of the nation. 
They have made numerous valuable suggestions in the military, eco­
nomic, and social fields, some of which were carried out. Their co­
operation and advice were placed at the disposal of the military and 
civil authorities, and were gladly accepted. The gratitude of the na­
tion for the patriotic efforts of organized labor has been frequently 
expressed by the responsible authorities .... 1• 
Justifying their support of the German war effort on strictly 
utilitarian and opportunistic grounds did not satisfy the SPD's
right faction which had achieved a position of predominance. 
Exponents of this group were determined to prove that coopera-
11 Snell, op. cit., p. 71. 
1a Quoted in Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 
35. Another illustration of the pro-war
attitude of the trade union leaders is
given by Emil Barth who asserts that a
union functionary of the Berlin Metal
Workers, a certain Cohen, declared in
October 1914 that war meant salvation
for the union. Without war the ex­
pected unemployment in the winter of
1914-1915 would have caused the fi.
nancial ruin of the organization. (Emil
Barth, Aus der Werkstatt der deutschen
R e v o l u t ion [Berlin: A. Hoffmann's
Verlag, 1919], p. 11.) An interesting
account on the nationalism of the trade
unions comes from John L. Snell who 
investigated the causes for the well­
known patriotic attitude of the SPD
during the war. He traced much of
this patriotism to the socialist trade
unions. There was a very close con­
nection between the unions and the
party even though the unions claimed 
to be independent of the SPD. The 
General Commission of the trade 
unions of Germany, the agency which 
managed most of the activities of its 
member unions, was composed of 
thirteen members. Six of the thirteen, 
including its chairman Carl Legien and 
its vice-chairman Gustav Bauer, were 
Social Democratic Reichstag deputies. 
Of the 110 SPD deputies, at least 45 
had held union positions and 19 were 
full-time professional union function­
aries. The trade unions attempted to 
take a direct hand in party affairs when 
anti-war radicalism emerged within the 
SPD in 1915. Carl Legien requested 
that union officials be given more func­
tions within the party in order to fore­
stall the spread of anti-war attitudes 
among the workers. ( Snell, op. cit., pp. 
66-67.)
38 THE SPARTAClST UPRISING OF 1919 
tion with the government on many war-time problems was not 
nationalistic opportunism but was in complete agreement with 
established Social Democratic principles. For example, by re­
ferring to statements made by Marx, Engels, and Lassalle con­
cerning the German cause in the war of 1871, Eduard David at­
tempted to demonstrate that national and international concepts 
were not mutually exclusive and that internationalism does not 
necessarily involve anti-nationalism. 19 
Throughout the war the majority of the SPD deputies and high­
level party functionaries continued to support the German war 
effort. They kept repeating the claim that Germany was fighting 
a defensive war. They assured the workers that various long­
postponed domestic political reforms, such as democratization 
of the government and a badly needed election reform for Prussia, 
would be forthcoming in the immediate future. However, when 
dissatisfaction and unrest within the party became increasingly 
stronger because of the effects of the prolonged war, many of the 
SPD deputies in the Reichstag became more articulate in their 
demands for a just peace without annexations. 
In 191 7, one of the most significant domestic political events 
in war-time Germany occurred. A coalition of several political 
parties including the SPD was formed. Its ambitious program 
was the draft of a peace resolution and proposals for immediate 
constitutional reforms. 20
19 He pointed out further that the
Socialist International was organ1zed 
on the basis of recognition of different 
nations and was conceived as a de­
fensive organization against the "gold­
en international" of the bourgeoisie. 
(David, op. cit., pp. 174, 181.) David's 
entire book is dedicated to the purpose 
of justifying the actions of the nation­
alistic elements of the SPD on the war 
issue. Other socialists of the same type 
even went so far as to interpret state 
intervention into the war-time economy 
as steps in the direction of socialism. 
(Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 188; Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 106-08, 137.) For 
the views of Paul Lensch, see his Drei 
Jahre Weltrevolution (Berlin: S. Fi­
scher Verlag, 1917). 
20 Bruno Stuemke, Die Emstehung
der deutschen Republik (Frankfurt am 
Main: Ehrig Verlag, 1923), p. 41. 
This coalition can be considered as the 
embryonic form of the Weimar Coali­
tion which later was vital in adminis­
tering the affairs of the new German 
Republic SPD, Centrists, and Pro­
gressives. For a discussion of the 
"Peace Resolution of July, 1917," see 
Halperin, op. cit., pp. 26-31. Professor 
Friedrich Meinecke also observed that 
the growing dissatisfaction among the 
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The German government failed to take action on the pro­
posals of the new parliamentary coalition. The opposition ele­
ments took advantage of this situation to enhance their influence 
among the dissatisfied population. 
2. The Opposition to the War Policies of the SPD
Within the framework of this study, it is not possible to trace 
the genesis of all the groups which were opposed to the war poli­
cies of the majority of the SPD leaders. It suffices to recognize 
that the unanimity of the Social Democratic vote for the war ap­
propriation on August 4, 1914, was the product of party dis­
cipline only, and that from the very beginning of the war, dis­
satisfaction with official policies was prevalent among certain lead­
ers as well as among many local party units.21 
At the outbreak of the war and for some time thereafter, the 
oppositional elements within the SPD lacked organization and 
found it difficult to carry on their work under the state of siege. 
In the course of the war, however, these groups acquired their 
own organizational identities, and by 191 7, in the third war year, 
the German socialist labor movement retained little of its former 
unity. The party had split into three major divisions. In spite 
of changes in the grouping of personnel, these new divisions were 
analogous to the three pre-war tendencies within the SPD.22 
In opposition to the program and actions of the Majority So­
cialists ( as the members of the SPD became known because the 
majority of the party leaders remained with the original organi-
workers required continuous reassur­
ance that Germany was fighting a de­
fensive war and had no annexation 
plans. Meinecke also stressed that from 
a psychological point of view drastic 
changes of the Prussian three-class 
election system were required. The 
working class felt that it was intoler­
able that a rich war profiteer had a 
more influential vote than a poor com­
bat soldier returning from the front. 
(Friedrich Meinecke, "Die Revolution; 
Ursachen und Tatsachen," Handbuch 
des Deutschen Staatsrechts, ed. by Ger­
hard Anschuetz und Richard Thoma 
[Tuebingen: Mohr, 1930], I, pp. 97-
98.) 
21 The opposition certainly was not 
limited during the first few months of 
the war to a small group of "SPD in­
tellectuals" whose oppositional work 
"was carried on unnoticed by out­
siders," as Berlau claims. (Berlau, op. 
cit., p. 138) See also Snell, op. cit., p. 
72. 
22 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 24. 
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zation) were the powerful group of Independent Socialists and 
various groups of revolutionary radicals. The most important 
group among these radicals was the Spartacist League. Thus, the 
left wing radicals were not the only socialists opposed to the war 
policies of the SPD, and the division of the German Social Demo­
cratic movement into anti-militarists and war supporters did not 
follow the familiar line of demarkation between "revisionist op­
portunists" and "revolutionary Marxists." This division into "so­
cial patriots," pacifists, and revolutionaries was experienced by 
all socialist parties of the belligerent countries of 1914. The social 
patriots managed to form the overwhelming majority at the be­
ginning of the war. The pacifists of the left and right wings con­
stituted a much smaller group. However, as the war progressed, 
this group increased in strength and significance as the population 
and especially the working class became more and more dis­
appointed with the war. The revolutionaries were a very small and 
insignificant faction in all countries. 23 To understand the develop­
ments within. the German labor movement, however, one must 
realize that the split in the German Social Democracy was not 
caused by the war alone. This issue only brought the pre-war 
ideological controversies of the party to a climax.24 
By the middle of 191 7, the SP D war policies were opposed by 
a new Social Democratic mass organization, the Independent So­
cial Democratic Party of Germany (USPD). 25 This center of op­
position developed within the Social Democratic Reichstag fac­
tion among the deputies who were against supporting the Gov­
ernment's war policies. Originally these deputies were not op­
posed to what they thought was a defensive war, but when the 
imperialistic and annexationist designs of the German govern­
ment became increasingly obvious, they first abstained from voting 
and eventually cast their votes against further war credits. It has 
been observed by some analysts of the German labor movement 
23 Seton-Watson, op. cit., pp. 50-51.
24 Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
25 Unabhaengige Sozialdemokrati­
sche Partei Deutsch/ands, abbreviated 
USPD. The abbreviation or the term 
Independent Socialist will be used for 
this party hereinafter. 
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that there was really no fundamental difference between the po­
litical outlook of the USPD and the SPD except in matters of 
foreign affairs. Both were revisionists in practice, and neither had 
repudiated the old Marxist concepts which were still useful in 
appealing to the German workers. 
The Independent Socialists were not a monolithic party but 
were composed of several groups of various political shadings, 
and personalities with such different political backgrounds as 
Haase, Bernstein, and Kautsky.26
Even though the break between the Haase group and the 
SPD was primarily over the war issue, as soon as the USPD de­
veloped a program of its own, it expressed not only strong op­
position to the government's war policy but also the existing 
autocratic regime. 21 
26 Leonore O'Boyle, "The German 
Independent Socialists during the First 
World War," The American Historical 
Review, LVI, No. 4 (July, 1951), p. 
828; Meinecke, op. cit., p. 100. It is 
doubtful if these Social Democrats 
really intended to initiate a split from 
the SPD, but their determination to 
vote against the war credits which 
caused a break in party discipline made 
this development a necessity. For an 
example, see the manifesto published 
in the Leipziger Volkszeitung in June, 
1915, signed by Haase, Kautsky, and 
Bernstein, entitled "The Demand of 
the Hour." In this article, the authors 
requested a reversal in the policy of 
war credit approval because of the an­
nexationist plans the government was 
pursuing. (Illu strierte Geschichte, p.
133.) For the development of the 
voting record of the oppositional So­
cial Democratic deputies, see Stuemke, 
op. cit., pp. 21-28. The executive com­
mittee of the SPD eventually expelled 
the dissenters who then proceeded to 
found their own party on April 6-7, 
1917, at Gotha. Even before this time, 
the oppositional deputies under Haase's 
leadership had activated the Social 
Democratic Cooperative Group (So-
zialdemokratische A r b e  i t s  ge m  e in -
schaft) in order to protect their right
to meet in committees. The importance 
of this step was that the anti-war pro­
tagonists had parliamentary unity for 
the first time. (Berlau, op. cit., pp. 144-
46; Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 30-31; Hal­
perin, op. cit., p. 23.) 
N oske did not regard the expulsion 
of the Haase group as a split in the 
party, although of course it became 
that as soon as the USPD was formed. 
Both Legien, the trade union leader, 
and he appeared to be satisfied to sever 
the ties with the oppositional elements. 
Noske commented on the expulsion as 
follows: "The German Social Demo­
cratic Party did not break into pieces 
when under the leadership of Haase a 
part of the [Reichstag] faction left [the 
party] because of the question of fur­
ther war credits. The large majority 
of the deputies remained steadfast to 
the position [they had taken] in August, 
1914. The seed, however, for the de­
struction of the party had been sown." 
(Noske, Erlebtes, p. 50.) 
27 For a comprehensive account of 
the history of the USPD, see Eugen 
Prager, Geschichte der U.S.P.D. (Ber­
lin: Verlagsgenossenschaft "Freiheit," 
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Because of the growing dissatisfaction among the Social 
Democratic masses, the USPD rapidly became a second Social 
Democratic mass party. The growth of the USPD was not greatly 
influenced by the hostile attitude of the trade unions. After the 
split occurred, the Genera] Commission quickly declared that 
the unions would recognize only the old SPD. The USPD was 
handicapped in its efforts to establish official control over the 
unions because no general trade union congress was called during 
the war. The only way it could gain control was from within. It 
succeeded in this attempt in certain localities; for example, in Ber­
lin and in Leipzig it was able to gain strong influence among the 
unions. In other places, the hostile union officials managed to 
keep USPD influence to a minimum.28 
The anti-war issue had worked within the SPD to break up 
the unity of the party. The pre-war theoretical and tactical dif­
ferences among the various factions had not seriously threatened 
party unity. Once the question of supporting the war had divided 
the German S9cial Democracy, however, many other items of dis­
agreement re-em�rged and helped create different political plat-
1921). This shift in the domestic pol­
icy of the USPD is interesting because 
as late as December, 1916, when twen­
ty of the oppositional deputies voted 
against the war credits their justifica­
tion for the negative vote revealed no 
revolutionary motivation. They ex­
plained that the general war situation 
was such that Germany was secure 
from enemy invasion. In other words, 
ii was not their basic anti-war concept 
which prompted them to vote against 
the credits but the fact that the borders 
of Germany were secure. (Bergstraes­
ser, op. cit., p. I 85; Rosa Luxemburg, 
Entweder-oder, quoted in Luxemburg, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 535-36; 
Karl Liebknecht, "Die Dezembermaen­
ner von 1915," quoted in Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 336-43.) 
28 Snell, op. cit., p. 72. There are no 
reliable figures available for the war 
period which might permit a compari­
son of the strength of the SPD and the 
USPD. The SPb's membership has 
decreased considerably - primarily 
because of military service before 
the USPD became a competitive or­
ganization. Flechtheim c o  Il e c t  e d 
strength e s t i m a t e s  from various 
sources. According to one source, the 
SPD had about 248,000 members and 
the USPD about 100,000 after the 
split. Another source estimates the 
respective membership figures as 170,-
000 for the SPD and 120,000 for the 
USPD. The number of newspapers 
and subscription figures which changed 
sides after the split relates only part 
of the shift. The SPD possibly was 
able to hold on to many more papers 
than its actual strength because its 
officials were in strategic controlling 
positions. Flechtheim relates that from 
88 SPD newspapers with 870,000 sub­
scribers, 14 newspapers with about 
125,000 subscribers changed to the 
USPD. (Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 28.) 
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forms and tactical concepts for the various parts of the former 
SPD. The critical war-time conditions tended to speed up this 
process and accelerate the development of pre-war political fac­
tions into full-fledged political organizations and parties. 
At the time of the break between the oppositional Reichstag 
deputies and the SPD which led to the founding of the USPD in 
April 1917, the revolutionary or left wing opposition also emerged 
as several small organizations. All of them together could not 
approximate the size of either of the two major Social Democratic 
mass parties. Throughout the war, these revolutionary groups 
remained insignificant in membership, and had very little influence 
upon the masses of the German workers, with the possible ex­
ception of the Spartacists and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. 
The left wing opposition to the war policies of the SPD was 
of a different kind from that of the USPD. The revolutionaries 
did not regard the actions of the SPD leadership as tactical mis­
takes. The leftist opposition evaluated the actions of the party 
and their justifications by people like David as the final and ulti­
mate proof that the SPD had completely accepted the revisionist 
concepts, even though it still had failed to repudiate its Marxian 
camouflage. All of these revolutionary groups shared a professed 
confidence in international socialism in contrast to the narrow 
nationalism which had taken possession of the SPD leadership. 
Even after the left wing opposition had recognized this definite 
change in the SPD, its adherents did not leave in order to form 
a new party which would be guided by the old revolutionary con­
cepts and by those which developed as the result of the changing 
situation. They remained, electing to work within the party to 
bring it back to pre-war platforms which had been codified at the 
various party congresses. When these attempts failed, however, 
they either joined the new USPD or remained as unattached revo­
lutionary socialist groups. None of them, with the exception of 
the Spartacists and the Left Radicals ( Linksradikalen) who 
joined the Spartaci-;ts in October 1918, ever formed a political 
party of any significance. Even the Spartacists did not become a 
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party until two months after the German Revolution had started. 
The failure of the left wing opposition to create a revolutionary 
mass party prior to that time was later sharply criticized by Com­
munists of the Lenin school. They asserted that this omission de­
prived the German workers of the leadership of a revolutionary 
party during the initial period of their social and political up­
heaval. 
Among the revolutionary oppositional groups was the Spar­
tacist League (Spartakusbund). In spite of its relatively small 
numbers, it was a nation-wide organization, and was led by such 
outstanding pre-war revolutionary leaders as Rosa Luxemburg 
and Karl Liebknecht. It was probably the most articulate and ac­
tive of the several leftist oppositional groups. On December 31, 
1918, the Spartacist League became the German Communist 
Party which, in turn, played a decisive part during the period of 
consolidation of the German Revolution. 29
The Spartacists met in January 1916 for their first national 
conference. At this time they adopted a program which subse­
quently guided their policies and activities. 30 At this conference, 
it was decided to publish the political tracts which subsequently 
became known as the Spartacist Letters. 31
29 The estimates of Spartacist mem• 
bership vary from several hundreds to 
several thousands. (Ibid., p. 29.) The 
origin of the Spartacists goes back to 
shortly after the outbreak of the war 
and the collapse of the Socialist Inter• 
national. On August 4, 1914, a num­
ber of revolutionaries gathered around 
Rosa Luxemburg and decided to con­
tinue their fight against the imperialist 
war, against the war policies of the 
SPD, and for the principles of the Jn. 
ternational. One of the first actions of 
this group was the publication of a 
declaration signed by Rosa Luxem­
burg, Karl Liebknecht, Franz Mehring, 
and Clara Zetkin, in the Swiss Social 
Democratic press (September, 1914) 
announcing to the world that not all 
the German Social Democrats had suc­
cumbed to the war policies of the SPD. 
(Liebknecht, Reden, p. 363; 11/ustrierte 
Geschichte, p. 115.) 
so Ibid., pp. 135-37; for a discussion
of this program see below pp. 55-56: 
31 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 18. The 
Spartacist Letters eventually gave the 
group its name. Before their appear­
ance, the group was called "Group Jn. 
ternational." This latter designation 
was derived from the publication, The 
Internationale, which appeared only 
once in April, 1915 and then was pro­
hibited under the censorship. (Berg­
straesser, op. cit., pp. 180-8 l.) For a 
description of its contents see ll/us­
trierte Geschichte, pp. 130-3 l, and 
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 148-49. 
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Prior to this time, the group around Rosa Luxemburg and 
Liebknecht attempted to provide political guidance for opposi­
tional elements within local party organizations. The dissemina­
tion of propaganda material was a most difficult task considering 
the restrictions imposed by the state of siege. Nevertheless, some 
Social Democratic newspapers and periodicals which happened 
to be under the management of radicals continued for some time 
to print articles inspired by the opposition. 32 Until the fall of 1915 
collaboration with the group around Ledebour and Kautsky was 
maintained. 33 
The Spartacist League joined the USPD but only because it 
felt that the new party would afford a protecting roof to the illegal 
organization of the Spartacists. The League representatives who 
participated in the founding congress made certain that it was 
clearly understood that the Spartacists would retain their own or­
ganizational identity as well as their freedom of action. 3• 
Another group in opposition to the SPD policies was the 
organization of Julian Borchardt, the International Socialists 
of Germany (Internationale Sozialisten Deutsch/ands- ISD). 
Their official organ was the Lichtstrahlen which Borchardt started 
in 1914. In April 1916, it was prohibited. 
32 lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 114-16. 
33 This collaboration was not in­
tended to consolidate the opposition to 
the official war policies of the SPD, but 
was to provide the left wing radicals 
with a better opportunity to gain in­
fluence among the workers. ([bid., pp. 
131-34.) The practice of penetrating
other organizations for the purpose of 
recruiting members from within is still
a standard operating procedure of the
Communists.
34 (Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 23. ll­
lustrierte Geschichte, pp. 147-48.) Per­
tinent are the contents of a letter written 
by Leo Jogiches, who had taken over 
the leadership of the Spartacists after 
the arrest of Rosa Luxemburg and the 
induction of Liebknecht into the army. 
The letter was addressed to members 
of the Spartacist group in Wuertten­
berg who were reluctant to join the 
USPD. Jogiches frankly explained to 
the Wuerttenberg comrades what ad­
vantages the new party provided for 
the Spartacists. They could work un­
der the cover of the party, undermine 
its leadership, and submit its members 
to the influence of the Spartacist 
League. (Ibid.) 
Liebknecht was even more blunt in 
stating why the Spartacists had joined: 
"We belonged to the USPD in order 
to drive forth [the party], to keep it 
within the reach of our whip, [and] to 
pull the best elements out [for us]." 
(Karl Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Re­
den, p. 522.) 
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The International Socialists were a small group of radical so­
cialists who never assumed any particular significance in the revo­
lutionary movement in Germany. Borchardt believed that he 
had views similar to the Bolsheviks led by Lenin; however, his 
theoretical concepts were much more in line with those of the 
anarchists. He was convinced of the futility of parliamentarianism 
and of the inadequacy of any type of political leadership. The 
masses themselves, he asserted, were capable of handling all po­
litical matters. Eventually he despaired because he had become 
convinced that the masses lacked revolutionary initiative."" 
Most of his followers moved over to the Left Radicals ( Links­
radikalen), a group very active in Bremen under the leadership 
of Johann Knief. This group consisted of several hundred mem­
bers who originally came from a radical faction of the SPD or­
ganization in Bremen. Even before the war, they were strongly 
under the influence of Karl Radek and Anton Pannekoek. In 
May 1916, Paul Froelich and Johann Knief started the legal 
weekly pubHcation, the Arbeiterpolitik, whose main contributor 
was Radek. Through Radek, this group maintained close re­
lations with the Central Committee of the Bolsheviks, in parti­
cular with Lenin and Zinoviev. The Left Radicals, like the ISD,
stressed revolutionary mass action as the means for political and 
social changes. In contrast to the latter they did not reject par­
liamentarianism entirely but considered it as auxiliary to mass 
action. Unlike the Spartacists, who for a long time attempted to 
influence the party from within, the Left Radicals advocated from 
the beginning a split of the revolutionary socialists from the re­
formist SPD. In this respect, their views were much closer to the 
Bolshevik ideas than those of the Luxemburg-Liebknecht group. 
(After the Russian October Revolution the Left Radicals immedi­
ately declared their approval of the revolutionary practices of the 
Bolsheviks.) The Left Radicals were opposed to the new USPD 
and refused to join forces. 
35 Tormin, op. cit., p. 40 Froelich, 36 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 40-41; Froe-
Zehn Jahre, p. 155. lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 155-56; Berg-
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The differences between the Spartacists and the Bremen Group 
did not prevent the two organizations from cooperating. The 
legal weekly paper of the Bremen Group, the Arbeiterpolitik was 
used by the Spartacists in political discussions. The underground 
Spartacist Letters were utilized by both groups for active revo­
lutionary propaganda among the masses. In questions of tactics, 
the numerically weaker Left Radicals subordinated themselves to 
the Spartacist League. 37 
In contrast to the revolutionary groups discussed above, the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards (Revolutionaere Obleute) emerged 
not from the SPD but from the trade unions. As early as 1914, 
union functionaries in certain Berlin factories who were opposed 
to the official policies of the SPD and the trade unions organized 
themselves into small groups. Their purpose was to work from 
within the unions, mobilizing the workers to fight for a termination 
of the war. Their membership was highly selective and restricted 
to union functionaries with adminstrative and political experi­
ence. 38 
Experiences gained through the political mass strikes during 
the war and the spread of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards to 
other industrial centers resulted in an elaborate clandestine or­
ganization which advocated increasingly the use of conspiratorial 
methods for the coming revolutionary struggle. Until his induc­
tion into the German army, Richard Mueller was the leader of 
the Shop Stewards. In February 1918, he was succeeded by a 
revolutionary hothead, Emil Barth, who was replaced in the sum-
straesser, op. cit .. p. 183; Illustrierte 
Geschichte, pp. 142-45. 
Eventually on October 7, 1918, the 
Left Radicals consolidated with the 
Spartacists in a "combat partnership" 
(Kampfgemeinschaft) for the forth­
coming revolution. (Froelich, Zehn 
Jahre, p. 222.) 
"7 Froelich suggests that the dif­
ferences between the two groups arose 
from certain characteristics of their 
respective leaders. The Left Radicals 
were of the younger generation who 
had no personal connection with the 
veteran leaders of the SPD and there­
fore did not hesitate to sever relations. 
On the other hand, the leaders of the 
Spartacists were personalities of the 
old International who were not ready 
to break the ties with their comrades 
so quickly even though they might 
deeply disagree with them. (Ibid., p. 
156.) 
38 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser­
reich :wr Republik {Berlin: Malik-Ver­
lag, 1925), I, p. 125. 
48 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
mer of the same year by Ernst Daeumig. The latter was simul­
taneously a leading member of the USPD and of the Shop Stew­
ards. It was the intention of the Shop Stewards to remain the 
cadre of leaders for the future socialist revolution and not to be­
come a mass organization. 39 
Politically, the Shop Stewards occupied a position between the 
USPD and the Spartacist League. Originally they retained their 
individual memberships in their respective unions; later they also 
joined the USPD. The Shop Stewards intended to remain the 
revolutionary activists and therefore avoided ( unlike the Sparta­
cists and Independent Socialists) lengthy, theoretical discussions. •0 
The differences between them and the Spartacists were primarily 
of a tactical nature. They were opposed to mass actions and dis­
carded them as useless "revolutionary gymnastics."41 
In order to strengthen their influence on the USPD and the 
Spartacists, the Shop Stewards pressed for a common meeting of 
the revolutionary opposition. The Executive Committee of the 
USPD delayed. such a meeting for some time. Eventually the 
persistence of the Shop Stewards - and possibly the general 
revolutionary climate - led certain USPD leadets to participate 
in the secret meetings of the Shop Steward organization in Berlin. 
· From October 1918, representatives of the Spartacist League also
attended these meetings. •2 
39 Ibid., pp. 125-27. The influence
of the Shop Stewards upon the events 
of November, 1918 has been greatly 
exaggerated as the result of Emil 
Barth's Aus der Werkstatt der deut­
schen Revolution. For example, see 
Erich Otto Volkmann, Der Marxismus 
und das deutsche Heer im Weltkrieg 
(Berlin: Verlag Hobbing, 1925), pp. 
210-13. Volkmann bases many of his
views on the information obtained from
Barth's book. Barth describes in de­
tail the revolutionary preparations
made by his group, the organization of
highly d i s  c i  p 1 i n  e d and well-armed
shock troops, the procurement of
weapons, and the placement of confi-
deuce men in sensitive strategic posi­
tions. Richard Mueller d i s m i s s e s  
Barth's claims as pure nonsense. (Rich­
ard Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 126-
27.) 
40 Volkmann, op. cit., p. 210; Hal­
perin, op. cit., p. 79. 
41 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 42-44. 
42 Rosenberg, Die Entstehung, p. 
245. While Barth's statements must be
read with great caution, his descrip­
tion of his attempts to bring unity into
the revolutionary movement prior to
November, 1918 are of interest: "The
most difficult position was in relation
to the Spartacists and Left Radicals.
They believed that revolutionary per-
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3. The International Anti-War Effort
Although the Socialist International had collapsed at the out­
break of war, European socialists who continued to oppose 
their countries' war efforts had not given up hope that some com­
mon international action might help bring an early end to hos­
tilities.43 Nothing ever came of the various international efforts, 
although discussions at conferences did help clarify the political 
alignment within the socialist movement and possibly laid the 
foundation for the Third International. 
The anti-war protagonists among the international Social 
Democracy were divided into the social pacifists and the revolu­
tionary anti-militarists. The pacifists, who included such well­
known personalities as Eduard Bernstein (German) and Ramsay 
MacDonald (British), wished only a return to the peaceful co­
existence of nations and classes in order to continue their "peace­
ful" struggle for social reforms. By contrast, the revolutionaries 
declared themselves not satisfied with a compromise peace 
solution between the warring countries since this would only 
strengthen the bourgeois rule. The revolutionaries intended to 
exploit the situation created by the war to overthrow the existing 
power relations and to bring an end to the hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie.•• 
The "revolutionary anti-militarists" were divided into two fac­
tions. The left wing under the leadership of Lenin and Zinoviev 
advocated the "transformation of the present imperialist war into 
ception, motivation, and action can be 
produced by leaflets and revolutionary 
gymnastics .... Conspiratorial activity 
was not to their liking." (Barth, op.
cit., p. 29.) 
43 Even the social patriots pretended 
that the International was continuing. 
Possibly they were satisfied with the 
explanation offered by Kautsky who 
stated that the International was an in­
strument of peace and not war. (Rosa 
Luxemburg, "Der Wiederaufbau der 
Internationale," quoted in Luxemburg, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, p. 518.) 
Shortly after the beginning of hostili­
ties, the Socialist Bureau was moved 
from Brussels to Amsterdam and 
claimed that it was continuing the busi­
ness of the old International. It was 
headed by the Belgian socialist Vander­
velde who became Belgian Minister of 
War a few weeks later. This new office 
did not require him to give up his po­
sition in the Socialist Bureau. (Volk­
mann, Der Marxismus, p. 114.) 
H Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. 50. 
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civil war" aimed at the overthrow of the bourgeoisie!" Lenin also 
proposed severing relations with the social patriots within the na­
tional parties as well as with the remnants of the Socialist Inter­
national as soon as possible. 4G Lenin's opponents among the 
revolutionary antagonists to the war held views similar to those 
of Rosa Luxemburg. Luxemburg, like the pacifists, emphasized 
the fight for peace, although she understood peace as that which 
would serve the interest of the working class and therefore ipso
facto would have to be achieved through the proletariat itself. 
She stressed neither revolution nor civil war as the method to be 
used in achieving this kind of peace. Her reference was to the 
revolutionary class struggle only. Rosa Luxemburg found her­
self in disagreement with Lenin on the question of breaking off 
relations with the moderate pacifists or even with the social 
patriots. She believed that as long as the party provided enough 
internal freedom of action which could be used to enlighten mem­
bers and make them return to the socialist internaHonal concepts, 
such a break would hurt the revolutionaries. She was convinced 
that the . propaganda work, especially that directed at the Social 
Democrats, was far more effective from within the.party than from 
outside. On the other hand, she believed the split between war 
. supporters and revolutionaries to be inevitable, although she 
placed the time of this event after the end of the war.47 
The three-fold division of the anti-war socialists became quite 
apparent at the two international conferences held in Switzerland: 
( 1 ) The social pacifists of the type of the German representatives 
45 Lenin made this statement as
early as November 1, 1914, in an ar­
ticle entitled "The War and Russian 
Social-Democracy," Selected Wo rks 
(Moscow, Leningrad: Co-op. Pub. So­
ciety, 1935), V, pp. 123-30. 
46 See V. I. Lenin, The Collapse of
the Second International (Moscow: 
Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1949). 
47 In her views concerning the re­
storation of the International, Rosa 
Luxemburg also emphasized the fight 
for peace: " ... the first step in this di-
rection is action for a quick end to the 
war ... " (Luxemburg, Der Wieder­
aufbau, p. 526.) Luxemburg con­
sidered the fight for peace the essence 
of her political actions while Lenin re­
fused to accept this. Luxemburg was 
thinking in terms of mass appeal, while 
Lenin restricted his concepts to the 
small group of revolutionaries trained 
to deal with theoretical problems. 
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 248-
253.) 
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from the Ledebour-Bernstein group; (2) the revolutionary anti­
militarists of the Lenin-Zinoviev faction (subsequently known as 
the Zimmerwald Left) ; and ( 3) the anti-militarists who placed 
the class struggle for the proletarian type of international peace 
at the center of their program. The Spartacist delegates belonged 
to this last group. 
The first of the two international conferences took place at 
Zimmerwald from September 5 to 8, 1915. The German dele­
gation included Georg Ledebour and Adolf Hoffmann, Social 
Democratic opposition; Ernst Meyer and Bertha Thalheimer, 
Luxemburg-Liebknecht group; and Julian Borchardt, Interna­
tional Socialists of Germany. Only Borchardt joined the Zimmer­
wald Left, the radical group sponsored by the Russian Bolsheviks. 
The Spartacist delegates did not give their support to the resolu­
tion of the Zimmerwald Left which demanded an immediate break 
from the reformists of the Social Democrats. 48
At the second Zimmerwald Conference at Kienthal during 
Easter of 1916 a decisive shift toward the left was apparent. A 
resolution was adopted making it obligatory for the participating 
organizations to vote in their respective parliaments against fur­
ther war appropriations. The main debate, however, centered 
around the question of whether or not a break should be made 
with the Socialist International. No final decision was reached. 
48 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 134-37.
For part of the resolution of the Zim­
merwald Left see ibid., p. 136; Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 158-59. Accord­
ing to Liebknecht, the delegates to the 
Zimmerwald Conference had two im­
portant missions to fulfill; (1 ) to settle 
accounts with the deserters of the In­
ternational; (2) to clarify the position 
of the revolutionary proletariat in re­
gard to the war. In his letter to the 
Zimmerwald Conference, he expressed 
his concept of an action program: 
"Civil war, not Burgfriede (armistice)! 
Practice international proletarian soli­
darity, fight against the pseudo-nation-
alistic, pseudo-patriotic class harmony, 
utilize the international class struggle 
to achieve peace and realize the so­
cialist revolution." (Karl Liebknecht, 
"An die Z i m m e r w a l d  Konferenz," 
quoted in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, pp. 315-17.) 
Also see: Merle Fainsod, Interna­
tional Socialism and the World War 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1935); Eduard Bernstein, Die Inter­
nationale der Arbeiterklasse und der 
europaeische Krieg (Tuebingen: Mohr, 
1916); Karl Kautsky, Die Interna­
tionale und der Krieg (Berlin: Buch­
handlung Vorwaerts, 1915); and Ray-
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In a compromise solution, the social patriots were severely con­
demned.49 
4. Characteristic Political Thought of the Spartacists
In the preceding pages of this chapter an attempt has been 
made to examine the reactions of the oppositional socialists to 
the war-time policies and actions of the SPD. This analysis has 
shown that the fundamental diversity of basic principles eventu­
ally destroyed the organizational monopoly of the SPD within the 
German labor movement. A few new organizations emerged. 
For the Spartacists, the question of organization - beyond 
the point of getting established as an entity of some kind - did 
not become a problem until almost two months after the begin­
ning of the German Revolution when the Communist Party of 
Germany was founded. In spite of their distinct revolutionary 
concepts, they preferred to remain within the fold of a Social 
Democratic party. (First, the SPD; later, the USPD.) 50 
mond W. Postgate, The International 
during the ·War (London: The Herald, 
1918). 
49 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 148;
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 1.59-60. For 
the text of the Kienthal resolution see 
Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 238-40. There 
was a third Zimmerwald Conference 
at Stockholm in September, 1917. The 
differences between the pacifists and 
the revolutionaries could not be re­
solved any longer. No results could be 
achieved. In the meantime, the fight 
in Russia between the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks had almost reached its cli­
max. The Zimmerwald International 
continued to exist in name only until 
it was dissolved when the Communist 
lnternational was founded in March of 
1919. The above described Stockholm 
Conference must not be confused with 
another international conference held 
in Stockholm about the same time. The 
latter conference was arranged by neu­
tral Dutch and Scandinavian socialists 
and was eventually called by the Exe­
cutive Committee of the Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council of Petersburg for the 
purpose of unifying the international 
proletariat for a peace without annexa­
tion and compensations and based up­
on the right of national self-determina­
tion. None of the aims the conference 
had set for itself were accomplished. 
(Ibid., pp. 196-98; Fischer, op. cit., 
p. 12.)
50 There were also impatient Spar­
tacists who believed that remaining in 
the SPD had become intolerable. They 
wanted to form a new revolutionary 
party. Rosa Luxemburg was strongly 
opposed to this. She admitted that the 
aim must be a revolutionary party, but 
she emphasized that the Social Demo­
cratic masses must not be abandoned 
and left to the treacherous leaders. Her 
organizational aim was not the creation 
of a revolutionary sect separated from 
the masses but the maintenance of a 
strong faction comprised of the revo­
lutionary elements working for their 
aims from within the party. (Froelich, 
Rosa Luxemburg, p. 26.5.) 
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An analysis of the political thought of the Spartacists as it 
crystallized in the course of the war is essential for an understand­
ing of their actions and views in relation both to pre-revolutionary 
mass events and to the German Revolution. The political con­
cepts of the Spartacists during the war were the product of several 
factors. First and most fundamental was the revolutionary Marx­
ism of the Spartacist leaders as early as the pre-war period. 51
Second, there was the influence of the war-time experiences. This 
factor included the support of the war by the SPD as well as the 
various challenges which a crisis situation presents. Germany 
experienced an economic crisis resulting from the continuous 
drain caused by the war. Politically, the country was ruled by a 
military dictatorship. A growing revolutionary attitude strength­
ened the desire to change the situation quickly because of de­
privations, inefficient management of practically everything, loss 
of confidence in the government, in military leadership, and in 
political parties, and finally the abandonment of hope in ultimate 
victory. The third factor was the impact of international events, 
primarily the Russian Revolutions of March and October 1917 
and the international conferences mentioned before. 
Oppositional views were reflected in articles appearing during 
the early part of the war ( e.g., the articles in the Internationale), 
speeches made by Liebknecht in the Reichstag, and leaflets dis­
seminated among the SPD members. As early as August 1914 
Liebknecht attacked the axiomatic party unity, declaring that 
clearness of concepts was more important than unity.52 In May 
1915, the important underground leaflet "The Main Enemy Is In 
Our Own Country" attempted to explain to the masses that the 
war must be fought on an international basis. 
The main enemy of the German people is in Germany: German 
imperialism, the German war party, German secret diplomacy. The 
German people must wage a political fight against this enemy in its 
51 Cf. above, chap. I, sec. 4. 52 Liebknecht, Reden, pp. 109-11.
. 
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own country in cooperation with the proletariat of other countries 
whose fight must be directed against their own native imperialists. 53
For Liebknecht the focal point of revolutionary activity was the 
struggle against war itself. " ... the anti-militarist fight is the in­
tensified form of the class struggle against the war and against the 
violent domestic power politics of capitalism. "54 
The principal political impulses, however, came from Rosa 
Luxemburg. The fact. that she spent most of the war years in 
prison did not reduce her influence among the left wing radicals.55
Rosa Luxemburg was strongly opposed to the notion expounded 
by some Social Democratic leaders that the war had changed the 
entire concept of the class struggle. 
The proletarian tactics before and after the outbreak of war are 
supposed to be totally different; they are even to pursue opposite pur­
poses. That presumes that the social conditions [ which constitute] 
the bases for o�r tactics, are basically different during peace and war. 
According ro historic materialism, as expounded by Marx, history is 
the history of class struggles. According to Kautsky's revised ma­
terialism, it must be added: except during war times .... The political 
class rule of the bourgeoisie does not cease during the war; on the con­
trary, because of the suspension of constitutional rights it develops 
into brutal class dictatorship. 56
53 Karl Liebknecht, Der Hauptfeind
steht im eigenen Land, quoted in Lieb­
knecht, A usgewaehlte Reden, p. 301. 
The great aim of the international pro­
letariat must be the international gen­
eral strike, at least an international 
strike in the ammunition and armament 
industries. (Karl Liebknecht, "Anti­
militarismus," quoted in Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 333.) 
04 Liebknecht, Antimilitarismus, p. 
323. 
55 Fischer, op. cit., p. 14. A contem­
porary Communist evaluation of Rosa 
Luxemburg's h i s t o r i c  revolutionary 
mission during the war summarized it 
as follows; "Her first task was to tear 
apart the falsehood of the defense of 
the Fatherland which the Social Demo­
cratic leaders used to cover up their 
betrayal. ... The second task consisted 
of exposing the untmth of the alleged° 
war against Tsarism ... her third mis­
sion was to reveal the betrayal of the 
Burgfrieden. (Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 
I 10-112.) 
56 Luxemburg, Der Wiederaufbau,
pp. 523-25. 
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Not until January 1, 1916 when the "Guiding Principles for 
the Tasks of the International Social Democracy" were adopted 
at a secret meeting of the opposition in Liebknecht's apartment 
in Berlin, did the Group International have a program which in­
corporated their theoretical concepts as conceived by Rosa 
Luxemburg. 57 
The Junius pamphlet is the most concise statement of Rosa 
Luxemburg's anti-war views. In it she also re-emphasized many 
of her previously expressed political concepts which according to 
her were confirmed by the experiences of the first war years. She 
stressed the fact that one of the most important lessons was that 
the proletariat in this war could not identify itself with any military 
side. According to her, there was no such thing as a "national" 
defensive war: 
. . . in the present imperialistic milieu, a defensive war fought on 
a national basis is completely impossible; any socialist policy which 
disregards this detem1ining [ influence of the] historical milieu and 
which in the midst of the world chaos permits itself to be guided by 
the isolated point of view of one country, is a priori built on sand.58 
While it might not be possible under the existing circumstances 
to start a revolution or even to incite mass strikes because "great 
popular movements are not made with technical recipes from the 
pocket of the party offices . . . .  " the party must provide the 
masses with clear political directives and make them understand 
their political mission and interest. Most important is her distinct 
07 Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 16-18. 
Fischer, op. cit., p. 13. The "'Guiding 
Principles" were the annex to Rosa 
Luxemburg's most significant political 
writing during the war, "The Crisis of 
the Social Democracy." This piece was 
written in April, 1915 while she was in 
prison but was not printed and circu­
lated until one year later. "The Crisis 
of the Social Democracy" is also known 
under the pseudonym used by Lu-
xemburg, "Junius," the name of the de­
fender of the English Constitution 
against the attacks of the absolutist 
George III. (Froelich, Rosa Luxem­
burg, pp. 257-58; Luxemburg, Die 
Krise.) 
58 Ibid., pp. 359, 386-97. For an ex­
planation of Rosa Luxemburg's con­
cept concerning the historic necessity 
of imperialism, see ibid., pp. 389-91. 
--
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restatement of the interrelation of political mass activity with the 
over-all situation: 
When large mass demonstrations and mass actions in one form 
or other transpire, they depend upon many economical, political, and 
psychological factors, upon the prevailing tension [ created by J class 
antagonism, the degree of political understanding [ of the masses] , and 
the intensity of the fighting spirit of the masses, something impossible 
to figure out or to create artificially through party [commands] .59 
The "Guiding Principles" asserted that these were not new 
concepts but actually "apply the principles of the Erfurt Program 
to the present problems confronted by international socialism." 
Thus, the international proletariat must base its revolutionary 
fight upon the class struggle within each country regardless of 
peace or war. It must fight against imperialism through par­
liamentary means and labor union action. In fact, all activities 
of the labor movement must be synchronized with the interna­
tional class struggle against imperialism.60
The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in October 1917 trans­
formed many of the theoretical problems of the European so­
cialists into burning issues. All Social Democratic factions felt 
pressed to take a position toward the events in Russia and toward 
59 lbid., pp. 374-75. This concept
was never repudiated by Rosa Luxem­
burg. She always remained opposed to 
any form of Putsche. According to 
her, they were bound to fail because 
they were isolated events superimposed 
on existing social, political, and eco­
nomic realities. 
60 Ibid., pp. 394, 398-99. The men­
tion of parliamentary means in the 
class struggle against imperialism was 
clearly a reference to voting against 
further war appropriations and to 
making use of parliament as a platform 
from which the masses could be 
reached. Liebknecht used both types 
of parliamentary fight. His basic po-
sition in regard to parliamentarianism 
as a substitute for other means in the 
revolutionary struggle became appar­
ent in his opposition to the Haase-Le­
debour group whom he accused of hav­
ing too much confidence in the par­
liamentary approach and of "parlia­
mentary cretenism." (Karl Liebknecht, 
"Nicht die alte Leier, sondern das neue 
Schwert," in Spartakusbrief, No. 2., 
November, 1916, quoted inLiebknecht, 
A usgewaehlte Re den, p. 4 5 l.) See also 
Karl Liebknecht, "Liebknechts kleine 
Anfrage," in Politische Briefe des Spar­
takusbundes, No. la, January, 1916, 
quoted in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, pp. 346-47. 
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the methods employed by the Bolsheviks in establishing and 
maintaining their power. For the right wing socialists, this posed 
no particular problem, since they were opposed to anything con­
nected with violent revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Within the left wing groups, however, heated discussions took 
place on two interrelated questions: the first was to what extent 
could Bolshevik policies and actions be accepted as valid for 
Russia; the second was to what extent - if at all could Bol­
shevik strategy be used in other countries. Gl 
The Spartacists themselves were divided on these issues. Some 
of the ultra-radical members were eager to give approval to every­
thing the Bolsheviks did; others were more reserved and were 
reluctant to approve, for example, the dissolution of the Russian 
Constituent Assembly by the Bolsheviks. Clara Zetkin and Franz 
Mehring belonged to the first group.'32 Rosa Luxemburg was 
critical of parts of the Bolshevik program. In the fall of 1918 
while still in prison, she started a comprehensive critique of Bol­
shevik policies. The outbreak of the German Revolution and her 
own intense participation in it prevented her from finishing it.03
Her critique concentrated on four specific issues: ( 1) the 
agrarian question, (2) the Bolsheviks' nationality policy, (3) the 
problem of democracy, and ( 4) the use of terror. Rosa Luxem­
burg argued that the distribution of land immediately achieved 
two things of benefit to the revolution: the destruction of large 
estates and the support of the peasants. On the other hand, this 
tactic would make it much more difficult later on to nationalize 
61 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 26.
62 Ibid., p. 28. 
63 Paul Levi, who in the spring of
1918 assumed leadership of the Spar­
tacist League after the arrest of Leo 
Jogiches, published the fragments of 
the critique in 1922. He was violently 
attacked for this action by the Com­
munists; they alleged that it helped the 
charges of the right wing socialists 
against the Soviet system. The Com­
munists furthermore asserted that Rosa 
Luxemburg subsequently changed some 
of the views expressed in this paper 
when, in the course of the German 
Revolution, she became convinced of 
the correctness of the Bolshevik ap­
proach. This assertion was made par­
ticularly in reference to her opposition 
to the Bolshevik dissolution of the con­
stitutent assembly, since she eventually 
fought against the USPD's views of co­
existence of the council system with the 
parliament. (Froelich, Rosa Luxem­
burg, pp. 284-91; Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 
125-26.)
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the agricultural holdings and, therefore, the original measure was 
wrong. She ventured to predict that Lenin's agrarian reform cre­
ated a new and powerful social class which constituted a strong 
potential enemy to socialism. Its resistance to nationalization 
would be much more dangerous and tenacious than that encoun­
tered from the former aristocratic land owners. 
Her opposition to the national self-determination policy of 
the Bolsheviks was of long standing. She had already fought this 
doctrine in the program of the Russian Social Democracy.6' 
The most significant part of her critique dealt with the prob­
lem of democracy. Rosa Luxemburg was greatly alarmed by the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and by Bolshevik state­
ments on the uselessness of any popular representation elected 
during a revolution. The Bolsheviks claimed that democratic in­
stitutions were slow and could not keep pace with political de­
velopments. Rosa Luxemburg disagreed, and countered that the 
sluggish mechanism of democratic institutions had a powerful 
corrector in the constant pressure of the active mass movement: 
". . . the cure· which Trotsky and Lenin found putting an end 
to democracy - is much worse than the evil .it is supposed to 
correct." 
Lenin and Trotsky have put the Soviets as the only true repre­
sentatives of the working masses in the place of representative bodies 
produced by popular election. However, with the suppression of po­
litical life in the entire country, the life within the Soviets, i.e., within 
the councils must also become weaker and weaker. Without popular 
elections, unrestricted freedom of the press and assembly, free ex­
pression of opinion, life dies in any public institution; it becomes a 
semblance of life wherein only the bureaucracy remains the active 
element.65
There can be no doubt that Rosa Luxemburg was greatly op­
posed to the concentration of power in the hands of the few Bol-
64 Rosa Luxemburg, Die russiche schaft u. Erziehung, 1922), pp. 81-97. 
Revolution ([Berlin]: Verlag Gesell- 65 Ibid., pp. 97-117.
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shevik politicians ( she referred to this situation as "the dictator­
ship of a handful of politicians") and to the exclusion of the 
initiative and control of the masses.6G 
Finally, she turned against the "extensive use of terror by the 
Soviet government." She recognized the need for strong measures 
during revolutionary upheavals directed against domestic and 
foreign counter-revolutionary efforts. However, she considered it 
dangerous to make a virtue of necessity and to offer it  to the in­
ternational proletariat as a model of socialist tactics. 67
Rosa Luxemburg shared the opinion of Lenin and Trotsky 
that the Russian Revolution could not survive without the help 
of the international proletariat. In the Spartacist Letter No. 8 
published in January 1918, this same view was expressed. 08 The 
Spartacists readily admitted that the Russian Revolution had 
given them considerable moral support and had inspired them to 
follow the Russian example. 
The acceptance of the Russian pattern also became apparent 
at the Reich Conference of Spartacists and Left Radical delegates 
held in Berlin on October 7, 1918. Under the impact of the Soviet 
example, the delegates decided to work for the establishment of 
workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany which, following the 
Russian experience, were to serve as the main revolutionary agen­
cies in the period of transition. 69 
66 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 291.
67 Luxemburg, Die russiche Revolu­
tion, pp. 117-18. For a pro-Luxemburg 
analysis of her "Die russiche Revolu­
tion," see Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, 
pp. 284-97. For an anti-Luxemburg 
view, see Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 122-26. 
68 Kommunistische Partei Deutsch­
lands, Spartakusbriefe (Berlin, 1920), 
pp. 154-55. Hereafter cited as Sparta­
kusbriefe. In the Spartacist Letter No. 
11 of September, 1918 entitled 'The 
Russian Tragedy," it was asserted that 
only a revolt of the German proletariat 
could save the situation in Russia. 
(Spartakusbriefe, p. 186.) Cf. the text 
of a Spartacist leaflet quoted in Walter 
Ulbricht, D e r  Z u s a  m m  enb r u c h  
Deutsch/ands im ersten Weltkrieg und 
die Novemberrevolution (Berlin: Dietz 
Verlag, 1951), p. 11. While the Spar­
tacists were eager to point out that 
they were not imitating the Russian 
Bolsheviks, they did look upon the Bol­
shevik Revolution as the beginning of 
the proletarian world revolution. (Spar­
takusbriefe, p. iv.) 
69 A very comprehensive evaluation 
of the entire problem of the council 
system in Germany and the part it 
played in the revolutionary period pre­
ceding the military collapse and during 
the Revolution proper may be found 
in Tormin, op. cit. The Reich Confer­
ence led to a consolidation of the forces 
of the Spartacists and Left Radicals. 
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5. The Relation of the Spartacists to the Major Revolution­
ary Events During the War
Throughout the war, the Spartacists remained a very small 
and uninfluential group of revolutionaries who advocated the 
revolutionary method of bringing the war to an end. They wished 
to utilize the intensified class struggle, brought about by the crisis 
conditions, to achieve their next aim, the seizure of political power 
by the workers. However, because of the great influence of the 
two major Social Democratic parties, the SPD and the USPD, the 
Spartacists were able to reach only a relatively small segment of 
the population.70 Thus, the major revolutionary events in war­
time Germany which became progressively more challenging for 
the government and the military leaders, were only slightly, if at 
all, influenced by Spartacist propaganda. These events occurred 
as the result of such external circumstances as the deterioration 
of the economic situation or the increasingly hopeless situation at 
the front, rather than as a result of a revolutionary propaganda. 71 
The anti-war demonstration led by Liebknecht on May 1, 
1916, was one of the very few independent Spartacist actions. 
Even the few protest strikes which followed his arrest were di­
rected not by the Spartacists but by Richard Mueller and a num-
. ber of Revolutionary Shop Stewards from some large factories 
in Berlin. 12 
It was generally agreed among the dele­
gates that the revolutionary fermenta­
tion in Germany had entered its last 
phase and therefore the left radical 
groups should work harmoniously for 
the revolution. In addition to the 
adoption of a resolution to create work­
ers' and soldiers' councils all over Ger­
many, the delegates further decided to 
increase their propaganda among the 
armed forces and to work out a com­
mon program of action. The proclama­
tion of the Reich Conference which 
was widely distributed contained the 
action program discussed in Chapter 
III, Section 1. (Ibid., pp. 193-94; Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, p. 222; lllustrierte 
Geschichte, pp. 176-78.) For the text 
of the proclamation of the Reich Con­
ference signed by the Spartacists and 
the Left Radicals, see Ibid., pp. 176-78. 
There seems to be a difference of opin­
ion as to when this conference took 
place. The II I u s  t r i e r  t e Geschichte 
places it on October 1, 1918; however, 
most other sources such as the Spar­
tacist Letter No. 12 give October 7, 
1918, as the date. 
70 Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 182. 
71 Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 100. 
72 Barth, op. cit., pp. 15-16; lllus-
trierte Geschichte, pp. 140-42; Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 151-53. 
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The extensive leaflet propaganda of the Spartacists was in­
tended to familiarize the workers with the political concepts of 
the radical left. It also served to "enlighten" the people on how 
the Spartacists interpreted the war and the actions of competitive 
socialist organizations. Some of the leaflets used current, sharply­
debated issues, such as the arrest of Liebknecht or a strike, as a 
point of departure for a discussion of political concepts.73 After 
the Russian Revolution, Spartacist propaganda was further inten­
sified, partly because of the material assistance given by the 
Bolsheviks."' 
Spartacist participation in the revolutionary events in Ger­
many was motivated and conditioned by ideological concepts. 
Those events began in 1915 on a very moderate scale and grew 
in frequency and intensity until they culminated in the November 
Revolution of 1918. 75 The first major work stoppage occurred 
73 For examples of Spartacist leaflets 
see: "2½ Jahre Zuchthaus" and "Auf• 
ruf zum Proteststreik" quoted in Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 242-43. Rosa 
Luxemburg, "Was ist mit Liebknecht!" 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, II, pp. 563-66. Rosa Luxem­
burg, "Wofuer kaempfte Liebknecht 
und weshalb wurde er zu Zuchthaus 
verurteilt?" quoted in Luxemburg, Aus­
gewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 572-80. Ernst 
Meyer, Spartakus im Kriege (Berlin: 
Vereinigung Internationaler Verlags­
anstalten, 1927), contains a very ex­
tensive collection of these leaflets. 
74 Froelich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 189-92.
For a thorough survey of Bolshevik 
propaganda disseminated with the as­
sistance of German radical socialists, 
see E. Drahn and S. Leonard, U nter� 
irdische Literatur im revolutionaeren 
Deutsch/and waehrend des Weltkrieges 
(Berlin: Verlag Gesellschaft u. Erzie­
hung, 1920). Included in the Russian 
activity was a large-scale effort at front­
line propaganda by means of news­
papers and leaflets. (Ibid., pp. 139-40.) 
The following are a few examples of 
this type of literature which reached 
Germany in considerable quantities: 
"Thesis about the socialist revolution 
and the missions of the proletariat dur­
ing its dictatorship in Russia"; "The 
councils - the form of government of 
the workers"; "The bloody monster is 
dying. Kill it, you German workers, 
you German Soldiers." (Ibid., pp. 151-
58; 167-68; 171-77.) It is also noted 
that not all revolutionary propaganda 
from outside Germany came from Bol­
shevik Russia. The Western Allies re­
sorted to revolutionary socialist pro­
paganda in order to break down Ger­
man resistance. (Ibid., pp. 188-89.) 
75 Barth reported that as early as 
1915 the workers in Berlin had dis­
carded the idea of an economic truce 
for the duration. He believed that this 
development was significant because it 
placed the workers in opposition to 
their leadership. (Barth, op. cit., p. 
12.) In the course of 1915, there were 
several demonstrations against food 
shortages: in October the so-called 
"butter revolt" and in December the 
"potato unrest." (Froelich, Zehn Jahre, 
p. 185.)
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in April 1917, when 300,000 workers went on strike in Berlin 
alone. The immediate cause was the reduction of the bread ration. 
The Spartacists tried to capitalize on this strike, formalizing the 
workers' demands and combining them in a leaflet with political 
demands: 
1. The release of all political prisoners and persons kept in cus­
tody for political reasons as well as the abrogation of all po­
litical trials.
2. The end of the compulsory labor service law.
3. The end of the state of siege.
4. The restoration of unrestricted freedom of association, press,
and assembly.
5. The creation of a representative body composed of delegates
of all factories to direct the fight of the workers and to or­
ganize the working class in order to enforce peace and genuine
political freedom.76 
The next major revolutionary event in war-time Germany was 
the revolt of the German navy at Kiel in Augus� 1917. The ad­
miralty dealt most severely with the mutinous sailors. Their two 
ring leaders were executed. The Spartacists claimed that the 
sailors had maintained contact with members of the Group In­
ternational even before Reichpietsch, one of the executed leaders, 
established liaison with the USPD. 77 
The largest German war-time strike occurred in January 1918. 
The struggle against the continuation of the war had become a 
genuine mass movement. In Vienna, a general strike had broken 
out on January 14. Workers' councils were elected which di­
rected the strike operations. One week later, on January 28, the 
general strike of the Berlin armament industry started. Over 
70 I/lustrierte Geschichte, p. 154. 
77 Ibid., pp. 157-59. Professor Mei­
necke stated that the revolutionary im­
pact of the USPD upon the sailors has 
not been proved. However, the Rus-
sian example and the tendency to lean 
toward the party with the most radical 
peace program were of influence. 
(Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 104.)
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500,000 workers participated in Berlin alone. The strike spread 
quickly to other industrial centers. The organizational prepara­
tion was chiefly in the hands of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards 
and the USPD.78 The strike had two significant aspects. Poli­
tically, it was a protest against German policies in the peace nego­
tiations in Brest-Litovsk and against the official attitude toward 
the peace feelers extended by the Western Allies. Secondly, the 
workers struck without consulting their union leaders, who found 
themselves in a difficult position. They wished to remain neutral 
but were afraid that they would thereby permanently lose their 
leadership to the USPD. Eventually union officials managed to 
take over the strike movement and to push the newly-formed 
workers' councils aside. The General Commission of the trade 
unions, however, refused to take part in it and declared its strict 
neutrality. The strike movement broke down, and by February 
3, 1918, the government had the situation well in hand. Large 
numbers of strikers were drafted and sent to the front where they 
assisted in spreading defeatist propaganda among the soldiers. 79 
The masses of the German workers had proved that they could 
start a large-scale mass action without their traditional organiza­
tions. It was a demonstration of the changed attitude of the Ger­
man people toward the war and everything connected with it. It 
is interesting to note, moreover, that the early resistance move-
78 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 25. 
79 Snell, op. cit., p. 73; lllustrierte 
Geschichte, pp. 160-63. In addition to 
the demands for an immediate peace 
without annexations and indemnities 
- as proposed by the Bolshevik peace
d e  I e g a  t i o n  at Brest-Litovsk- the
strikers also requested domestic poli­
tical changes. For the text of the sum­
mons to the general strike, see Froe­
lich, Zehn Jahre, pp. 245-46; and
Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 72-73. These de­
mands are similar to those made dur­
ing the April strike of 1917. It is often
asserted that one of the reasons why
the strike failed so quickly was that the
SPD participated in the strike com­
mand. As a matter of fact, Ebert later 
claimed that the SPD had entered the 
strike with the express purpose of end­
ing the strike promptly. (Hermann Ma­
tern, "Die Politik der KPD und der 
SPD in der Zeit der Weimarer Re­
publik" [Wissenschaftliche Beilage des 
Forum (Berlin)], Teil I [September 15, 
1952], p. 3); lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 
162. Also see Barth, op. cit., pp. 20-23
for an interesting account of the J anu­
ary strike, which could have been in­
terpreted as a warning sign for coming
events. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 76.)
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ment in Germany grew independently in form and content from 
the Russian Bolshevik ideas. 80
The failure of the strike movement in January 1918 greatly 
impressed the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and certain leftist 
elements within the USPD with the fact that other means of class 
combat were required. 81 
By October, 1918, the revolutionary fermentation had be­
come visible all over Germany. Demonstrations, stormy meet­
ings, and political strikes showed the growing strength of the dis­
satisfied population and the declining power of the government 
forces. 82 General opposition to the war had not remained with 
the socialist workers alone. As early as 191 7, the Catholic work­
ers in various parts of Germany ( e.g., the Ruhr and the Rhine­
land), who formed the bulk of the Center Party, had begun to 
conduct active propaganda for an immediate peace settlement. 
The Spartacists did not agree with the conspiratorial prepa­
ration of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. They did not share 
the belief that a handful of well-armed and well-disciplined revo­
lutionaries could start a revolution. During the various meetings 
between the Spartacists and the Shop Stewards which occurred 
with greater frequency throughout 1918, the Spartacists declared 
. themselves for mass actions. The Shop Stewards, in turn, accused 
the Spartacists of "revolutionary gymnastics."83 
On the other hand, the Russian Revolution exerted both di­
rect and indirect influences on later revolutionary developments 
in Germany. It set the pattern of the workers' and soldiers' coun­
cils as revolutionary agencies. It also encouraged the German 
strike movement which gradually changed its emphasis from eco­
nomic to political issues. 84 Much has been written about the sup-
so Fischer, op. cit., p. 16. 
81 Berlau, op. cit., pp. 162-63. For
information concerning the prepara­
tion for the revolution by the Revolu­
tionary Shop Stewards, see Barth, op. 
cit., pp. 46-53. 
82 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 181.
83 Barth, op. cit., pp. 30, 36-40.
s4 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 65, 68. 
Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der 
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Berlin: 
Dietz Verlag, 1953), I, pp. 16-19. A 
study of the strikes which occurred 
during World War I was made by the 
German Labor Front of the Nazi gov­
ernment in 1943. This study examines 
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port given to the revolutionary groups by the Bolshevik ambas­
sador in Berlin, A. A. Joffe. It appears that Joffe not only dis­
tributed revolutionary literature but also allotted considerable 
sums of money to the USPD. 85 He was formally expelled from
Germany on November 5, 1918; he and his staff left the following 
the number of strikes in the various in­
dustries and locales during the war. 
For example, in 1917 Berlin led with 
one-third of all strikers; in 1918, per­
sons who participated in political 
strikes outnumbered those who en­
gaged in economic strikes. (Arbeitswis­
senschaftliches Institut der Deutschen 
Arbeitsfront. Die Strei ks im 1. Welt­
krieg 1914-1918 [Berlin: Deutsche Ar­
beitsfront, January, 1943].) 
85 Arthur Rosenberg. A History of
the German Republic (London: Me­
thuen & Co., 1936), p. 326; Eduard 
Bernstein, Die deutsche Revolution 
(Berlin: Verlag fuer Gesellschaft u. 
Erziehung, 1921), pp. 22-23. Diplo­
matic relations had been established 
under the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. 
Louis Fischer admits that Joffe's mis­
sion was not merely diplomatic. More 
than ten Social Democratic newspapers 
were directed and supported by the 
Soviet e m b a s s y  in Berlin. (Louis 
Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs 
[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1951], I, p. 75.) Fischer describes the 
activities of the Soviet Ambassador as 
follows: "The embassy bought infor­
mation from officials in various Ger­
man ministries and passed it on to 
radical leaders for use in Reichstag 
speeches, in workers' meetings and in 
the Press. Anti-war and anti-govern­
ment literature was sent to all parts of 
the country and to the front. Tons of 
literature were printed and clandestine­
ly distributed by Joffe's office. 'It is 
necessary to emphasize most cate­
gorically,' Joffe wrote in an almost un­
known memorandum, 'that in the pre­
paration of the German revolution, the 
Russian Embassy worked all the time 
in close contact with the German So­
cialists.' Leaders of the German In-
dependents discussed most matters of 
revolutionary tactics with Joffe, who 
was an experienced conspirator. In a 
radio message, dated December 15, 
1918, broadcast by Joffe to the revo­
lutionary soviets of Germany, he ad­
mitted having paid 100,000 marks for 
the purchase of arms for the revolu­
tionaries and announced that he had 
established in Germany a 10.000,000 
ruble fund for the support of the revo­
lution, which was entrusted to Oskar 
Cohn, a Socialist deputy." (Ibid., pp. 
75-76.) For the text of Joffe's radio
message see Bernstein, op. cit., p. 69.
Louis Fischer's information about 
Joffe's activities is partly based on a 
_personal meeting with Joffe and about 
which Fischer reports in an earlier 
book. 
"Lenin's envoy, Adolf A. Joffe, was 
new as a diplomat but experienced as 
a revolutionary, one of the founders 
of the Soviet regime. According to the 
cold official formula, he was persona 
grata to the German imperial govern­
ment. Actually, he endeavored to over­
throw it. . . Years later he told me the 
story; it was in 1927 when Joffe was 
forty-four years old. Soviet develop­
ments had filled him with anguish and 
he had decided to commit suicide in 
demonstrative protest against Stalin's 
policies. Before he killed himself he 
asked me to come see him. I had never 
met him, and had not requested an 
appointment. But he sent me a mes­
sage through a mutual friend. He 
wanted to talk to an outsider for the 
record. What he revealed was con­
firmed by his 1919 reports which he 
took from his files and showed me: 
His embassy in Berlin, he said, served 
as staff headquarters for a German 
revolution. . . . 'We wanted to pull 
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day.86 After the November Revolution of 1918, the policy initi­
ated by the Imperial government was continued for some time, 
and diplomatic relations with Moscow were not resumed until 
1922. 
down the monarchist state and end the 
war,' Joffe said to me. 'President Wood­
row Wilson tried to do the same in his 
own way.' ... 'In the end, however,' 
Joffe commented ruefully, 'they, we, 
accomplished little or nothing of per­
manent value. We were too weak to 
provoke a revolution.' " 
(Louis Fischer, Men and Politics. An 
Autobiography. [New York: Duell, 
Sloan and Pearce, 1941], p. 26.) 
Sb The immediate reason for the ex­
pulsion was the discovery of revolu­
tionary literature in a case of diplo­
matic mail which was purposely broken 
open at the Friedrichstrasse railroad 
station in Berlin. The Austrian Social 
Democratic publication Klassenkampf 
described this incident nine years later, 
on December 1, 1927: "[the discovered 
revolutionary circulars] were neither 
written, nor printed, nor packed, nor 
dispatched from Russia. They were, in 
fact, inserted into the diplomatic box 
by the Imperial (German) police; they 
were written in Germany by Comrade 
Levi." Louis Fischer adds: "Many 
other statements tend to confirm the 
suspicion that, although Joffe was 
heavily laden with revolutionary guilt, 
these particular circulars in his diplo­
matic mail originated with the Prus­
sian Police." (Louis Fischer, op. cit., 
p. 77.)
The November Revolution 
and the Spartacists 

The Impact of the 
November Revolution 
1. Failure of Parliamentarization, October 1918
During the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the 
November Revolution of 1918, two major domestic developments 
took place within Germany. First, under the impact of the mili­
tary reversals suffered by the German army and the continuous 
political and economic mismanagement of domestic affairs, large 
segments of the population became progressively discontented. 
The majority of the population, weary of the situation which be­
came more hopeless from day to day, desired an immediate ter­
mination of hostilities. The masses were convinced that they 
could not trust their government to bring about the desired peace, 
since in the past the government had demonstrated its lack of 
responsiveness to the people's demands. For example, various 
political promises, such as the one pertaining to the antiquated 
Prussian election law, had never been fulfilled.1 As discontent­
ment grew, so did the desire of the masses to see the situation de­
cisively altered, even if this involved the direct participation of 
the people. 
The second important development during this period was 
caused by the sudden decision of the Imperial authorities to in­
troduce significant changes in the prevailing governmental sys-
1 Reich Chancellor Herding had the requested change of the Prussian 
given his assurance to trade union election law. (Stuemke, op. cit., p. 76.) 
leaders that he would stand or fall on 
69 
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tern. These changes laid the basis for reforms which transformed 
Germany into a parliamentary monarchy similar to that in Bri­
tain. This action was a conscious attempt to ward off a revolt of 
the discontented masses by a "revolution from above," as this 
process was appropriately called by the German Foreign Secre­
tary, Admiral von Hintze.2 
Germany's military defeat had been accomplished and was 
so admitted by the two top military leaders, Hindenburg and 
Ludendorff. They succeeded in convincing the Emperor and von 
Hintze that two things had to be accomplished without delay: an 
immediate armistice and a change of the political system within 
Germany. Ludendorff, in particular, was convinced that the gov­
ernment of Hertling was not able to handle the storm expected 
from below. For all practical purposes, the government could 
assume one of two alternative forms: it could establish itself as 
a military dictatorship - a solution favored by the Conservative 
Party - or it could become a parliamentary government. The 
second alternative was adopted after Ludendorff strongly rec­
ommended it to the Emperor. Ludendorff believed that par­
liamentarization would necessarily broaden the popular base of 
the government and therefore would regain the unity and co­
.operation of the people so urgently needed to conduct the last 
phase of the war and the forthcoming peace negotiations. He 
also emphasized that a democratic form of government would 
stand a better chance of obtaining easier peace terms from the 
Allies. 
The Emperor accepted the resignation of Hertling and ap­
pointed Prince Max von Baden as the new Reich Chancellor. The 
2 Alfred Niemann, Revolution von 
Oben Umsturz von Unten (Berlin: 
Verlag fuer Kulturpolitik, 1927), pp. 
98ff. 
3 For information on the precarious 
military situation of Germany follow­
ing the summer of 1918, see Rosen­
berg, Entstehung, pp. 220-22, and Prinz 
Max von Baden, Erinnerungen und 
Dokumente (Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-
anstalt, 1927), pp. 283-88. The Con­
servative Party proposed the establish­
ment of a military dictatorship under 
a General. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 
198.) For a discussion of the decision 
concerning the parliamentarization of 
the Imperial government, see Rosen­
berg, Entstehung, pp. 226-29, and 
Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 76-79. 
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latter enjoyed a reputation of liberal-democratic leanings and was 
acceptable to liberals and socialists whose cooperation would be 
needed by the new government. 4 Thus, the first parliamentary 
government in Germany was, as Rosenberg correctly pointed out, 
not an achievement of the Reichstag, but the result of a "com­
mand" by Ludendorff. 5 
In order for the revolution from above to achieve its first major 
objective - the broadening of the base of government it was 
essential to secure the cooperation of the Majority Socialists. 
Prince Max made as a condition for his acceptance of the position 
of Reich Chancellor that the Majority Socialists join his cabinet.6 
The SPD was not unprepared for this occasion. As early as 
September 23, 1918, foreseeing the coming crisis of the Hertling 
government, the SPD Reichstag faction and the Party Committee 
had met and decided in favor of participating in a future German 
government, provided that this government would incorporate a 
number of SPD demands in its platform. 1 Prince Max agreed to 
4 Halperin, op. cit., pp. 56-57. The
letter from the Emperor accepting 
Hertling's resignation contained the 
following statement which laid the 
groundwork for the coming parlia­
mentarization: "It is my wish that the 
German people participate more ef­
fectively than heretofore in determin­
ing the fate of the Fatherland. It is 
therefore my will that men who enjoy 
the confidence of the nation should 
partake extensively of the rights and 
duties of government." (Ibid., p. 56.) 
5 Rosenberg, Entstehung, p. 227.
6 Hermann Mueller, Die November 
Revolution (2d ed.; Berlin: Verlag 
Der Buecherkreis, 1931), pp. 9-10; 
Stuemke, op. cit., p. 87. 
7 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 10-
11. Some of the Majority Socialist
leaders believed that it would be a tac­
tical mistake to join a bourgeois gov­
ernment which most likely would be­
come the caretaker government for the
defeated nation. However, Friedrich
Ebert, the leader of the SPD, declared
prior to the vote on this issue: "If, at
this time, you do not wish to come to 
an agreement with the bourgeois par­
ties and with the government, then we 
are forced to let matters take their own 
course. Then we will resort to revolu­
tionary tactics, depend solely upon 
ourselves, and leave the fate of the 
party to the outcome of the revolution. 
Whoever saw what happened in Russia 
cannot, in the interest of the proletariat, 
wish to see the same development 
here. On the contrary, we must throw 
ourselves into the gap. 1f it is possible 
for us to obtain sufficient influence to 
carry out our demands and also to 
combine them with the salvation of our 
country, then it is our damned duty 
to do it." (Froelich, Zehn lahre, p. 
220.) Also see the discussion in Ber­
lau, op. cit., pp. 198-202 pertaining to 
the SPD views concerning participa­
tion in a coalition government prior to 
the November Revolution. The de­
mands of the Majority Socialists which 
were formulated on September 23, 
1918, are discussed in Prinz Max, op. 
cit., pp. 321-322. 
--
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these demands, and, on October 4, 1918, the Majority Socialists 
formed a coalition government with the Progressives, the Center, 
and the National Liberals. The SPD sent Philip Scheidemann 
and Gustav Bauer, the deputy chairman of the General Commis­
sion of the Trade Unions, as their representatives to the cabinet. 8 
Neither Prince Max nor the SPD realized the gravity of the 
military situation. The Supreme Command had even prepared 
for the new Chancellor the wording of the request for an ar­
mistice. 9 
Therefore, the new government was faced from the begin­
ning with the two difficult problems of effecting an armistice and 
of accomplishing domestic political reforms. On the day the 
coalition government was formed, Prince Max forwarded a mes­
sage to President Wilson, formally accepting the latter's Four­
teen Points as the basis for peace negotiations and requesting the 
armistice as demanded by Ludendorff.10 Supported by the depu­
ties of the political parties in his coalition, Prince Max set about 
to accomplish. the promised democratic reforms. The reform 
work commenced on October 8, 191 8, and was completed by 
October 26. The new constitution came into force on October 
28, 1918. On that day, Germany became a parliamentary mon­
archy. Only a few powers remained with the Emperor. The 
Reich Chancellor became responsible to both houses of par­
liament (the Reichstag and the Bundesrat [Federal Council]), 
8 Stuemke, op. cit., p. 87. When the 
Majority Socialists entered the Govern­
ment of Prince Max, they demanded, 
possibly for tactical reasons, that all 
members of the USPD who were in 
prison for their radical activities be re­
leased. This demand included Lieb­
knecht. (Ibid., p. 101.) The Vorwaerts 
announced shortly and confidently 
after the coalition government was 
formed: "The aim of a German demo­
cracy will be reached within a short 
time by means of a peaceful change." 
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 172.) 
9 Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 335-52. 
Hermann Mueller even doubts that the 
majority of the SPD leaders would have 
agreed to the entry of Majority Social­
ists into the cabinet of Prince Max if 
they had known how hopeless the mili­
tary situation was at the end of Sep­
tember, 1918. (Hermann Mueller, op. 
cit., p. 12.) 
10 Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 353-509. 
Prince Max's account of the long ex­
change of notes between his govern­
ment and that of the United States is 
most detailed. His statements concern­
ing the change of the German Con­
stitution is unfortunately extremely 
brief. 
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and the military became subordinate to the civilian authorities. 
On October 27, 1918, Prince Max notified the President of the 
United States that peace negotiations could now be conducted 
by a genuine representative government of the German people.11 
The period immediately preceding the November Revolution 
witnessed another important event: the development of the SPD 
into a government party. The entrance of the Majority Socialists 
as a minority into a bourgeois coalition government headed by a 
prince can be interpreted as the culmination of the reformist poli­
cies pursued by the party throughout the war. The official SPD
explanation for this step - that the crisis situation of the German 
nation required the cooperation of all Germans regardless of 
party and class - does not change the fact that the Majority So­
cialists had become a party which participated in the formulation 
and execution of governmental policies at the highest level.12 
The SPD, like the other parties represented in the cabinet of 
Prince Max, had a proprietary interest in the perpetuation of the 
state organization they helped to create. An evaluation of the 
11 Rosenberg, Entstehung, pp. 232-
34; Stuemke, op. cit., p. 100. 
12 On October 18, 1918, the follow­
ing pronouncement of the Executive 
Committee of the SPD appeared in the 
Vorwaerts: 
"At the present time, the situation 
of our country is extremely serious. 
The South-East Front has collapsed 
and on the West Front the mass armies 
of the Allies . . . storm against our 
troops with tremendous superiority in 
manpower and material. 
"Germany and the German people 
are in danger of becoming the victims 
o f  t h e  English-French chauvinists'
thirst for conquest and of the conquest
politicians.
"We have declared on August 4, 
1914: 'In the hour of danger we do not 
leave our fatherland in the lurch' [and 
that promise] is even more valid to­
day .... " (Quoted in Prinz Max, op. 
cit., p. 451.) Noske stated in his Reichs-
tag speech of October 25, 1918: "At 
the moment we consider the collabora­
tion of the Social Democrats in the 
government as an emergency action. 
The people and the country are in the 
greatest danger. We intend to prevent 
total collapse by mustering all our 
strength. We wish to prevent the Ger­
mans from fighting against Germans, 
while the country is being attacked 
from outside." (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 
58.) An illustration of the accept­
ability of the SPD leaders even by the 
Emperor after they had joined the co­
alition government of Prince Max is 
an alleged statement by the Emperor to 
the Reich Chancellor: "I would also 
like to work together with Mr. Ebert. 
. .. I have absolutely nothing against 
the Social Democracy, only the 
name, you know, the name should be 
changed." (lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 
171.) 
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subsequent actions of the SPD must make proper allowances for 
this fact. 
The parties of the coalition were justified in considering 
October 1918 as the month in which they achieved most of the 
political objectives which the majority of the German people had 
been demanding. By the end of October the cessation of hosti­
lities was expected in a matter of days. Traditional military in­
terference in domestic affairs had been removed. Ludendorff had 
fled the country. The military leaders were divested of their for­
mer authority and had been placed under the supervision of the 
Reichstag. The new election law for Prussia was assured. A gen­
eral amnesty had liberated many political prisoners, among them 
Karl Liebknecht.18 
However, there remained an opposition to the policies of the 
Reichstag majority: the die-hard Conservatives on the right and 
the USPD and Spartacist League on the left, which was unalter­
ably opposed to any bourgeois government because of their strong 
conviction concerning the socialist state. Thus, the revolution 
against the coalition government could have originated only from 
these oppositional elements of the right or left However, since 
these forces were in a relatively small minority, their revolutionary 
attempts could have been defeated by the great masses of the 
· middle class and workers who were represented in the coalition
government and who had just experienced the realization of their
immediate political aims.
Nevertheless, a nation-wide revolution did occur. The very 
masses which one could have expected to stand behind the po­
litical parties of the coalition government, revolted. Unconscious­
ly, they revolted against their own government. For this reason, 
Rosenberg calls the November Revolution the most amazing of 
all revolutions. 14 What were the reasons or the motivating forces 
13 Liebknecht was released on Octo­
ber 23. Rosa Luxemburg was not af­
fected by the amnesty because she was 
not a political prisoner at that time. 
She was held in "protective custody." 
She was not freed until November 9, 
1918, as a result of the revolution. 
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 303. 
305.) 
14 Rosenberg, Entstehung, p. 238.
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which caused the revolutionary events of November 1918? Sev­
eral explanations have been offered.15 Numerous accounts per­
mit the conclusion that, during the month of October 1918, revo­
lutionary propaganda had been intensified but had remained con­
centrated in Berlin and in the major industrial centers where the 
radical wing of the USPD and the Spartacists already had their 
greatest influence. rn
Revolutionary activities had received impetus and direction 
from the Reich Conference of the Spartacists and Left Radicals 
which met on October 7, 1918.17 The delegates to that conference 
decided that in view of the situation, created by the growing revo­
lutionary attitude of the masses and by the attempted deception 
of the people through the parliamentarization process of the gov­
ernment, the German proletariat must fight for the following: 
( 1) Immediate release of all persons who because of their fight
for the interests of the proletariat are suffering in prisons and
jails, in protective custody or serving a sentence .... 
(2) Immediate abrogation of the state of siege.
(3) Immediate cancellation of the compulsory labor law.
Beyond these, the proletariat must request: 
( 1 ) Annulment of all war loans without compensation. 
(2) Expropriation of the entire bank capital, mines and foun­
dries; substantial reduction of working hours, establishment
of minimum wages.
( 3) Expropriation of all large estates and middle-sized estates.
Transfer of the direction of production to the delegates of
agricultural workers and small farmers.
15 At this point, the validity of the
claim that revolutionary activities con­
ducted by the left radical organizations 
caused the revolution will be evaluated. 
For a discussion of the causes and 
driving forces of the November Revo­
lution see Chapter III, Section 2. 
rn See, for example, the extract of
the Tagebuch eines Spartakisten by 
Fritz Rueck which contains interesting 
details about the propaganda work in 
Stuttgart during October and Novem­
ber, 1918. (lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 
182-84.) Rueck also refers to the pub­
lic meetings which could have been the
result of the relaxed domestic policies
of the coalition government.
11 See above, p. 59. 
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( 4) Decisive changes in military affairs, such as:
a. Granting to soldiers the right of free association and as­
sembly for matters pertaining to official and non-official
business.
b. Abrogation of the right of military superiors to discipline
subordinates; discipline will be maintained by soldier
delegates.
c. Abrogation of courts-martial.
d. Transfer of military superiors by majority decision of the
subordinates.
( 5) Transfer of the distribution of food to representatives of the
workers.
( 6) Abolition of individual states and dynasties.
Proletarians, the achievement of these demands does not mean
the realization of your aims; this is only the acid test to determine if 
the democratization which the ruling classes and their agents are tell­
ing you about is genuine. The struggle for real democratization does 
not revolve around parliament, election law or ministers who can 
simultaneously retain their deputy status in the Reichstag, and other 
swindles; [ the fight] is directed against the real foundation of all 
enemies of the people: ownership of landed property ·and capital, con­
trol over the armed forces and over the judiciary .... 18 
In the intensified propaganda carried out by leaflets, news­
papers, workers' meetings, and word of mouth, the Spartacists 
emphasized more and more the necessity of creating workers' 
and soldiers' councils as the only type of revolutionary agencies 
which could serve the interest of the proletariat. In a number of 
locations, they succeeded in establishing these councils. The 
Spartacists' demands were directed increasingly toward the trans­
fer of political power from the bourgeois government to revo­
lutionary institutions. For example, in the first issue of Die Rote
Fahne (The Red Flag) published on November 5, 1918, in Stutt-
18 /llustrierte Geschichte, pp. 177-78.
Froelich attached so much significance 
to the Reich Conference of the Spar-
tacists and Left Radicals that he called 
it the "War Council of the Revolution." 
(Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 302.) 
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gart, the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Stuttgart demanded 
an immediate armistice and peace to be obtained through the 
offices of the representatives of the proletariat. The Council also 
requested the resignation of the Emperor and of other dynasties, 
the dissolution of all legislative bodies in Germany, including the 
Reichstag, and the transfer of all power to an assembly composed 
of the elected representatives of the workers, soldiers, small farm­
ers, and agricultural laborers.19
In addition to the propaganda activities carried out by the 
left wing radical elements, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards also 
increased their conspiratorial preparation for their planned revo­
lution. They even succeeded in extending their system of con­
fidence men to the military barracks in Berlin. Beginning on 
November 1, 1918, the Shop Stewards held meetings at which 
they discussed the day they would "make" the revolution. Lieb­
knecht and Wilhelm Pieck, who represented the Spartacists at 
these meetings, and a number of USPD functionaries could not 
agree with the proposal of the Shop Stewards. The USPD wanted 
to postpone the revolution until after peace had been assured. 
Liebknecht proposed revolutionary mass actions. The Shop Stew­
ards themselves were divided as to the starting date of the revo­
lution. Their radical elements such as Barth, Daeumig, and Le­
debour wanted to set the date for November 4, while Richard 
Mueller, who represented the moderates among the Shop Stew­
ards, opted for November 11. Only the Shop Stewards were en­
titled to vote on this issue. A vote of 21 to 19 set the beginning 
of the revolution on November 11. However, because of the revo­
lutionary events in Kiel and the fact that a number of Revolution­
ary Shop Stewards were arrested in the midst of their preparatory 
work, Barth believed himself to be the only leader of the con­
spirators left on November 8. He called a meeting of the heads 
of his assault units, temporarily assumed dictatorial powers, and 
proposed that the revolution begin the next day. None of the per-
19 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 183. 
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sons present disagreed, and Barth took this as a sign of approval. 
The next day was November 9, 1918. 20
There is rather general agreement that neither the revolution­
ary preparations of the Shop Stewards nor the revolutionary pro­
paganda conducted by the Spartacists had any significance in the 
developments which led to the revolt in Kiel and from there 
throughout Germany until it reached the capital on November 9, 
1918. Berlau correctly summarizes this aspect of the German 
Revolution as follows: 
... The chronological sequence of revolutionary preparation and 
the event of the revolution is not identical with causality. No causal 
relation can in fact exist where the actual revolution took place under 
certain crucial conditions which were outside the control of the groups 
carrying on the revolutionary activity, and which could not have been 
foreseen by them. 21
It has also been _argued that if the radical movement had been the 
decisive element, the revolution would have started in Berlin 
where preparations had been made. In fact, the eapital fell after 
the revolution had been victorious throughout Germany. The re­
.volt in Kiel which started the revolution was without a leader 
until Noske was sent there from Berlin.22
20 Barth, op. cit., pp. 46-53; Froelich,
Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 304-05; Richard 
Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 138-42; 
Volkmann, Der Marxismus, pp. 206-
13. The Majority Socialists did not
participate in any revolutionary pre­
paration or propaganda activities. Au­
gust Mueller, an SPD leader, claimed
that he was thoroughly acquainted with
the aims of the SPD during the period
preceding the fall of the old regime.
He declared emphatically that the SPD
carried on absolutely no propaganda
among the soldiers, did not advocate
force, did not participate in the arming
of the workers or in any other action
which prepares for an uprising. The
SPD did nothing to bring about the fall 
of the government and considered it­
self completely innocent in regard to 
revolutionary events. {August Mueller, 
Sozialisierung oder Sozialismus? [Ber­
lin; Verlag Ullstein, 19191, pp. 27-28.) 
On the contrary, the SPD attempted to 
use its influence to pacify the workers 
as many newspaper articles, wall post­
ers, and leaflets indicate. See, for ex­
ample, lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 181. 
Cf. Rosa Luxemburg's critique on the 
SPD actions in the Spartacist Letter 
No. 12, Spartakusbriefe, pp. 193-94. 
21 Berlau, op. cit., p. 166.
22 lhid., p. 167; Stuemke, op. cit., p.
128; Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 199. 
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2. The November Revolution in the Reich
The coalition government of Prince Max could have expected 
the support of the majority of the German people provided the 
parties which were represented in his government had retained 
their influence among the electorate. Popular support of the gov­
ernment did not materialize because the people were not con­
vinced that a genuine change in the governmental system had 
taken place. 23 The fundamental changes in the domestic political 
situation remained unnoticed by the masses in spite of the fact 
that many of their demands had been fulfilled or were in the pro­
cess of being carried out.24 Tht? attitude of the people toward 
the new coalition cabinet was the product of several political and 
psychological factors: ( 1) The complete confidence of the Ger­
man people in their military leaders and Supreme Command sud­
denly vanished under the impact of the military defeat, producing 
a severe, national shock. The negative sentiments toward the 
military were transferred to the civilian governmental authori­
ties. Not only the workers but also the middle class and the civil 
servants lost their confidence in the government and therefore 
were psychologically unprepared to come to the defense of the 
old ruling group. (2) For over four years the people had been 
Erich Wollenberg is of the same 
opinion. He wrote: "The revolution 
which broke out in November, 1918 
had only very little in common with 
the conspiratorial activity [of the Shop 
Stewards and other left wing radicals]. 
Imperial Germany broke down under 
the impact of military defeat which led 
to a mass revolt of the workers and 
farmers in uniform. When millions of 
people march in the streets, storm mili­
tary barracks and governmental build­
ings, one cannot do much with a few 
hundred pistols and a few dozen rifles 
which were in the secret weapon depots 
of the conspirators." (Erich Wollen­
berg, "Der Apparat Stalins Fuenfte 
Kolonne," Ost-Prohleme, 3. Jahrgang, 
No. 12 [1951], p. 575.) Professor Mei-
necke believed that the influence of 
propaganda from the radical left began 
to have some effect after the external 
conditions, i.e., the conviction that a 
military victory was impossible, fa­
vored the reception of those ideas. 
However, he thought that the socialist 
parties contributed more to the revo­
lution through what they represented 
than what they actually did. (Meinecke, 
Die Revolution, p. 111.) 
23 The diplomatic exchange of notes 
between the German and United States 
governments during October, 1918 in­
dicated that the Entente also was not 
convinced of the basic constitutional 
changes in Germany. 
24 Tormin, op. cit., p. 54.
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totaUy absorbed with the activities of their nation. They had 
identified themselves intimately and personally with the fate of 
the state, and had willingly accepted and endured great hardships 
in its interest. The realization of military defeat drove home the 
fact that all their sacrifices were in vain. This conviction caused 
the violent reaction of demanding the immediate termination of 
hostilities and the removal of any obstacle in the way of peace. 
The people wanted peace. 25 ( 3) Until the beginning of the war,
the workers' organizations in Germany had been in continuous 
opposition to the state, and in turn had been distrusted by the 
government. This mutual lack _of confidence had changed during 
the war, although no closer relations between the workers and the 
old German state had resulted. In addition to the recognition of 
military defeat and the conviction that the workers had been de­
ceived, the traditional distrust of the workers toward governmental 
authorities returned. ( 4) the firm refusal of the government to 
carry out domestic political reforms during the war gradually 
alienated the workers. Reforms could have demonstrated that 
the workers were a part of the nation with civil and political rights 
equal to those of other social classes. When political reforms 
finally were introduced, they came too late. The revolutionary 
· fermentation had by then progressed too far and the government
had become politically isolated from the masses. 26 
The government not only failed to convince the masses of the 
great political changes which had taken place, but it actually ag­
gravated the situation by making numerous mistakes. The enu­
meration of constitutional achievements in the press and in proc­
lamations alone did not suffice to prove to the people that political 
transformation had occurred. The masses could be impressed 
25 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 16; 
Konrad Haenisch, "Die Ursachen der 
deutschen Revolution," Handbuch der
Politik (Berlin: W. Rothschild, 1920), 
II, pp. 256-57. 
26 lbid., pp. 257-58. Konrad Hae­
nisch, who later in 1918 became the 
Prussian Minister for Education and a 
leading SPD official, was convinced 
that a timely modernization of the 
German constitutional system would 
have brought an organic evolution in­
stead of a forceful revolution. 
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only by actions which would bear out these claims. The people 
saw only that Count Hertling, the Reich Chancellor, had been 
replaced by a prince. Vice-Chancellor von Payer and the Prussian 
ministers remained in office. Tue Minister of War was a general 
as in the past. No apparent changes had been made in either the 
army or navy. The successor of Ludendorff was General Groener 
who was hated by the Berlin workers from the time of the strike 
in the armament industry because of his rigorous actions which 
were evaluated by most of the Socialists as "labor-hostile" and 
not merely the acts of a policeman maintaining order. Matters 
which the people could observe daily had changed little. The 
state of siege was not abolished and censorship and political re­
strictions continued as before. In the Prussian provinces and in 
the constituent states, the commanding generals were still the 
highest authorities. In Berlin, the commanding general was von 
Linsingen, who continued to control domestic affairs, pass or­
dinances, prohibit workers' meetings, order arrests, and apply 
censorship regulations to the press until November 9, 1918. 21 
Considering the ill effects of these aspects of the rule by the 
"people's government" upon the population and especially the 
workers, one might conclude that it was a mistake to continue the 
state of siege with all its restrictive provisions. It is also difficult 
to understand why the new government permitted the long ad­
journments of the Reichstag during this transitional period. A 
Reichstag in permanent session would have added power to the 
cabinet's position.28 
27 Hermann Mueller, who was known 
as a moderate Social Democrat, refers 
to the political rule by these command­
ing generals, who implemented the 
provisions of the state of siege, as mili­
tary dictatorship. (Hermann Mueller, 
op. cit., p. 15.) An example of the 
method used by the commanding gen­
eral of the Greater Berlin District, Gen­
eral von Linsingen, is the following 
official announcement, dated Berlin, 
November 7, 1918: "Following the 
Russian example, certain circles intend 
to create workers' and soldiers' coun­
cils in violation of the law. 
"These institutions are in contradic­
tion to the existing State institutions 
and constitute a threat to public safety. 
"By authority of paragraph 9b of 
the Law Concerning the State of Siege, 
I, herewith, prohibit the organization 
of such associations and participation 
in them." 
(Froelich, Zehn Jahre, p. 224.) 
2s After the coalition cabinet was 
formed, the Reichstag adjourned from 
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Thus, the masses were not encouraged to expect radical 
changes in the prevailing domestic conditions. In regard to the 
termination of the war, the conviction developed that the people 
must take matters into their own hands the same as during the 
great strikes in January of the same year. 29 
"Germany was like a powder-keg - one spark was needed 
to set off the explosion. "'1° The revolt of the sailors in Kiel in the 
first days of November 1918 provided this spark. In spite of the 
peace offers made by the government of Prince Max, the German 
Naval Command assembled the German fleet in late October for 
an operation against the British ships off the coast of Flanders. 
The naval command officers decided to die fighting rather than 
surrender the fleet. The sailors' revolt climaxed their refusal to 
participate in this futile and costly military gesture. A general 
strike of the workers in Kiel came in support of the mutinous 
sailors. On November 4, the elected workers' and soldiers' coun­
cils seized political power from the officials of the imperial regime 
who offered very. little resistance. 31 The Majority Socialists still 
October 5 to October 22; and again 
after the passing of the constitutional 
changes, it adjourned from October 26 
until November 9. (Rosenberg, Die 
Entstehung, pp. 239-42.) 
29 Bergstraesser believed that the 
government had lost confidence in it­
self in view of imminent military de­
feat. (Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 199.) 
Troeltsch blames Prussian militar­
ism as one of the most significant con­
tributory factors in the formation of 
the revolutionary attitude from below. 
He suggests that the development of 
militarism into a dominant political 
institution was one of the main reasons 
for the lack of flexibility of the entire 
Imperial system and its resistance to 
democratization. When reforms were 
finally initiated to counteract the in­
creased pressure from below, it was too 
late to stop the growing revolutionary 
sentiments. (Ernst Troeltsch, Spek­
tator-Briefe [Tuebingen: Verlag J.C.B. 
Mohr, 1924], pp. 1-12.) 
Wilhelm Keil's description of the 
situation in Wuerttemberg at the end of 
October, 1918 is a good example for 
this period which was characterized by 
an increase in revolutionary mass ac­
tion. (Wilhelm Keil, Er/ebnisse eines 
Sozia/demokraten [Stuttgart: Deutsche 
Verlags-Anstalt, 1948], II, pp. 27-40.) 
30 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser­
reich, p. 134. 
31 Harry R. Rudin, Armistice 1918, 
pp. 246-54; Rosenberg, Die Entste­
hung, pp. 249-50; Bernstein, op. cit., 
pp. 14-16; Noske, Erlebtes, pp. 8-54; 
Prinz Max, op. cit., pp. 572-79 and 584-
88; Das Werk des Untersuchungsaus­
s c  h u s  s e  s der Verfassunggebenden 
Deutschen Nationa/versammlung und 
des Deutschen Reichstages 1919-1928 
(Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft 
fuer Kultur u. Geschichte, 1928), X, 
pp. 198-207 and 282-315. 
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remained strictly opposed to the revolutionary actions in Kiel; 
they believed that a revolution in Germany would be a great mis­
fortune. 32 The coalition government sent the Social Democratic 
Reichstag deputy Gustav Noske and the leading member of the 
Democratic Party, Secretary of State Conrad Haussmann to Kiel 
to re-establish order and to prevent the spread of the movement. 
But it was too late. The military revolution spread rapidly through­
out Germany. On November 5, it had reached Hamburg; on the 
following day, general strikes started in Bremen and Luebeck. 
Newly formed workers' and soldiers' councils assumed political 
power everywhere and encountered no real resistance. 
The revolutionary movement spread like a fire out of control. 
Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Magdeburg, Brunswick, Frankfurt, 
Cologne, Duesseldorf, Hanover, Nuremberg, and Stuttgart were in 
the hands of workers' and soldiers' councils on November 7 and 8. 
Everywhere the revolution took place without serious fighting. The 
police and military authorities surrendered without resisting and the 
bourgeoisie, who seemed paralyzed with fear, remained idle in the face 
of events. In Munich the movement went beyond [the scope of the 
revolution elsewhere] under the leadership of Kurt Eisner. During 
the night of November 7-8, the dynasty of the Wittelsbach was dis­
posed of, the republic proclaimed, and the Workers', Soldiers', and 
Peasants' Council installed. 33
The revolution, however, could not be regarded as complete 
so long as the central imperial authorities had not been replaced 
by revolutionary institutions. On November 9, the revolution 
finally reached Berlin.34 The rapid spread of the revolution, its 
uniform organizational pattern, and the orderly nature of the 
32 Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 14.
33 Prinz Max, op. cit., p. 137; Gus­
tav Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp (Berlin: 
Ve r I a g fuer Politik u. Wirtschaft, 
1920), pp. 8-50. For a detailed ac­
count of the revolutionary events dur­
ing the period from November 4 to 9, 
see Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 23-
41. See also Illustrierte Geschichte, pp.
190-94.
34 Ulbricht believed that Berlin was
"behind schedule" because of the con­
centration of imperial forces in the 
capital. He also believed that the Ma­
jority Socialists were more effective in 
Berlin than elsewhere in delaying the 
outbreak of the mass uprising. (Ul­
bricht, Zur Geschichte, p. 24.) 
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transfer of political and military powers might lead to the con­
viction that it was a centrally directed and controlled mass opera­
tion. In reality, the opposite was the case. It was a spontaneous 
mass movement lacking any central leadership. Its systematic 
creation of workers' and soldiers' councils which took possession 
of the executive power everywhere did not follow any pre-con­
ceived plans. 35 The Spartacists and radicals of the left wing of
the USPD would have liked to superimpose their revolutionary 
concepts on the mass movement during the initial phase of the 
revolution, but their influence was as negligible then as it was 
during the period immediately preceding the revolution, with the 
exception of a few localities. The position of the Majority So­
cialists, who might have been the only party with a sufficiently 
large following to bring about a mass uprising, was a matter of 
record. The SPD was a government party and remained abso­
lutely opposed to revolutionary methods. After it had failed to 
prevent the outbreak of the revoluticm, its leaders did everything 
possible to re-establish law and order quickly.36 Grzesinski, who 
held a leading party position in Kassel, summed up the situation 
as follows: 
Sheer absurdity to assume, as has so often been claimed, that the 
revolution of 1918 had been carefully planned! No agreement what­
soever existed between the leaders of the Social Democracy and of the 
trade-unions regarding the proper procedure to be followed. Nothing 
was prepared. Everything happened unexpectedly. Not even the lead­
ers of the Social Democracy, the most advanced political movement 
of Germany, had thought of an overthrow of the entire governing 
35 Berlau, op. cit., p. 193; Flecht­
heim, op. cit., p. 33. 
"6 For example, in a proclamation 
of the Executive Committee of the 
SPD dated November 4, 1918, the 
party pleaded with the workers not to 
u n d e  r t  a k e rash actions. ( Richard
Mueller, Vom Kaiserreich, pp. 218-
19.) Prince Max wrote in his memoirs:
"Day after day, the 'Vorwaerts' plead-
ed with the workers not to be drawn 
into revolts." (Prinz Max, op. cit., p. 
569.) Also see a leaflet addressed to 
the sailors and workers prepared by the 
Vorwaerts and signed by Prince Max 
as Reich Chancellor, Philip Scheide­
mann, as Secretary of State, and Ritter 
von Mann, as Secretary of State in 
charge of naval affairs. (Ibid., pp. 572-
73.) 
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system and of its replacement by a democratic republic. In truth they 
had not even desired it. 37 
The lack of political leadership also explains the vague and 
minor part political demands played during the mass uprising, a 
fact which Communist interpreters of the events completely dis­
regard. The German Revolution was definitely not inspired by 
socialist ideas. As has been pointed out before, its purpose was 
to secure peace; only as a secondary issue was it ready to destroy 
those institutions which were regarded as obstacles to the realiza­
tion of its primary goal. Gradually, the masses came to believe 
that the Emperor himself was one of the main obstructions and, 
therefore, must be removed.38 A proclamation of the Workers' 
and Soldiers' Council at Kiel, dated November 7, 1918, clarified 
its aims as follows: "Our aim is a free, social people's republic. 
. . . Our main task is to secure peace and to make up for the 
damages inflicted by the war."39 As seen in this light, the Ger­
man Revolution assumes the character of a military revolt of 
sailors and soldiers, who, under the impact of the military defeat, 
seized the initiative in order to terminate the war.40
The German Revolution was strangely enough a very orderly 
process. As soon as the workers' and soldiers' councils had es­
tablished themselves in place of the former imperial authorities, 
they used their power to re-establish and maintain law and order. 
The Soldiers' Council of Lue beck announced on November 5, 
1918: 
... the power in Luebeck is in our hands .... It had become nec­
essary to clean up the corrupt conditions and remove the military die-
37 Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 49.
3S Prince Max remarked about the 
demands of the revolting sailors: 
"Only a minor part of the demands 
of the people were of a political nature. 
They requested right of assembly, per­
mission to receive all newspapers, abo­
lition of the duty to salute superior 
ranks when not on duty, same rations 
[for officers and enlisted personnel], 
and a revision of the penal order ... " 
(Prinz Max, op. cit., p. 603.) 
39 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 37-
38. 
40 Troeltsch, op. cit., p. 26. "The 
break-down of October and November 
was in a sense a general strike of a 
hopelessly defeated army against the 
madness of its leaders." (John W. 
Wheeler-Bennett, The Nemes is of 
Power [London: MacMillan, 1953], p. 
15.) 
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tatorship of yesterday. The purpose of our action is immediate armis­
tice and peace. We shall not interfere with the organs in charge of 
maintaining order. Everything will continue in its usual manner. We 
are expecting the co-operation of the population of Luebeck. Military 
authority was transferred without bloodshed, and we hope this will 
continue. We give warning that rioting, plundering, and robbery will 
be punished by death. The distribution of food remains the task of 
the civil administration. 41 
41 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 17. The 
Workers' and Soldiers' Council of the 
town of Stendal publicly announced 
that "The council accepts its obliga­
tion to maintain law and order." (Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., p. 40.) The or­
derliness of the transfer of power in 
Kassel is also the leitmotif of Grzesin­
ski's description of the November 
events. Because of the lack of an over­
all plan and in the absence of any di­
rectives from SPD leadership, the lo­
cal party functionaries were forced to 
use their own initiative. A workers' 
and soldiers' council was also formed 
in Kassel. It was composed of 600 
delegates, half of them representing 
the SPD, USPD, and trade unions and 
the second half comprised of soldiers' 
delegates. The workers' and soldiers' 
· council was intended to function as the 
law-making body. A Workers' and
Soldiers' Committee with Grzesinski as
chairman was formed as its executive
organ. SPD and USPD shared on an
equal basis the responsibilities in the
revolutionary d i s t r i c t  government.
(Grzesinski, op. cit., pp. 49-52.)
Also see Keil, op. cit., pp. 84-122 for 
an account of the peaceful changes in 
Wuerttemberg. A provisional coalition 
government was formed there which, 
beginning with November 11, even in­
cluded members from the bourgeois 
parties. There was also a workers' and 
soldiers' council in existence. However, 
the Provisional government did not 
give much attention to its activities. 
See also the description of the Nov­
ember events in Bielefeld by Carl Se­
vering. Severing suggested the name 
"People's and Soldiers' Council" for 
the new revolutionary administrative 
body in order to indicate dedication to 
democratic principles and negation of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Se­
vering also stated that the new revolu­
tionary agency did not create difficulties 
for the regular administrative offices. 
All civil servants remained in office. 
The People's and Soldiers' Council 
acted less as an administrative agency 
than as a controlling or supervisory 
authority. (Carl Severing, Mein Le• 
bensweg [Koeln; Greven Verlag, 1950], 
I, pp. 225-29. 
A recent evaluation of the character 
of the councils was made by Walter 
Kleen, the director of the Special 
School (Sonderschule) "Rosa Luxem• 
burg" of the Socialist Unity Party SED 
located at Erfurt. Kleen also supports 
the concept that the councils were not 
socialistic institutions inspired with 
revolutionary zeal. Based on a study 
of documentary records of the council 
of Erfurt and that of Arnstadt and 
vicinity, Kleen comes to the conclusion 
that the councils were "power instru­
ments of the bourgeoisie." He con­
tends that the nature of the councils, 
except in some localities such as Leu­
na, was due to the "destructive and ef­
fective influence of the Right-wing 
leaders of the Social Democracy, which 
expressed itself among the workers and 
soldiers particularly in their parlia­
mentary illusions as well as in the lack 
of a leader of the revolution in the 
form of a Marxist-Leninist workers' 
party." The documents used by Kleen 
prove indeed that the workers' and 
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3. The November Revolution in Berlin
The revolutionary attitude of the masses in Berlin was the 
product of the same factors which created the movement else­
where in Germany. But two further aspects lent additional sig­
nificance to revolutionary developments there. In the first place, 
Berlin occupied a unique position as the capital and the seat of 
the central government of Germany; secondly, each of the so­
cialist parties and groups made a concentrated effort in Berlin to 
utilize the spontaneous mass movement for the realization of its 
specific political aim. 
The left wing radicals were not able to "make" a revolution 
in Berlin any more readily than elsewhere. The opponents of the 
revolution recognized that there was a good chance that the 
Spartacists, Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and leftist elements of 
the USPD might succeed in supplying leadership to the rebellious 
masses and subsequently might be able to drive the revolution 
further. The forces opposing the revolution were comprised not 
only of the bourgeois political parties, the military leaders, and 
the governmental officials, but also of the leaders of the Majority 
Socialists. The SPD was the only one of the opponents to the 
revolution which could claim a large following among the masses 
which had already been seized by the revolutionary fever. The 
Majority Socialist leaders soon realized that if they openly op­
posed the demands of the masses or remained neutral, they would 
most certainly alienate the people. Thus, after some initial hesi­
tation, the leaders of the SPD in Berlin decided to attempt to 
bring the mass movement under their control in order to prevent 
the radicals on the left from using it to bring about their avowed 
aim, the socialist republic. This decision was the outcome of 
soldiers' councils of Erfurt and Arn­
stadt and vicinity were not socialist 
but considered themselves as tempor­
ary authorities with the important task 
on their hands of keeping peace and 
order until the still to be elected Na­
tional Assembly would take over legi-
timately p o l i t ic a l  control. (Walter 
Kleen, "Ueber die Rolle der Raete in 
der Novemberrevolution," Zeitschrift 
fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, 4. Jahr­
gang, Heft 2 [Berlin, Soviet Sector, 
1956], pp. 326-31.) 
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lengthy deliberations among the leaders of the Executive Com­
mittee of the party and of the Reichstag faction; it was considered 
the best way out of the dilemma in which the party found itself 
as the result of the spontaneous uprising. On the one hand, the 
SPD was a party of the coalition cabinet and therefore was ex­
pected to defend the political status quo which, according to the 
sincere conviction of the Majority Socialist leaders, contained all 
the possibilities of transforming Germany into a genuine demo­
cratic system under a monarch. Furthermore, the party had em­
braced ideological reform concepts which were opposed to the use 
of violence and force in domestic politics. On the other hand, 
inaction would mean the surrender of the people to the exclusive 
influence of the left wing radical elements. Thus, the Majority 
Socialists made themselves the spokesmen for the masses, adopt­
ing their demand for the abdication of the Emperor and the Crown 
Prince. 42 From this moment on, the history of the German Revo­
lution assumed the character of a tug-of-war among the socialist 
parties and groups fighting for control over the masses. 
The Majority Socialists realized that it would not be possible 
to retain their representatives in the coalition government. They 
also knew that their withdrawal from the government of Prince 
Max would create a crisis which most likely would end with the 
fall of the cabinet. This in turn would create a situation in which 
the tasks of government would become a responsibility of the 
opposition. This was a development which the SPD did not want, 
because its leaders were neither willing nor psychologically pre­
pared to take over the responsibilities of government. An exami­
nation of the revolutionary events in Berlin must distinguish be­
tween two distinct but interrelated developments: ( 1) the with­
drawal of the Majority Socialists' support from the coalition gov­
ernment, and (2) the revolutionary uprising of November 9 as a 
42 August Winnig states that the de­
cision of the SPD was based on the 
recognition that the revolution could 
not be prevented any longer. The 
party capitulated to the principles it 
had fought for years and joined the 
revolutionary forces in order to gain 
control over them. (Winnig, op. cit., 
p. 139.)
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joint enterprise of all socialist parties and groups. The effects of 
the resignation of Gustav Bauer and Philip Scheidemann from 
the cabinet and of the pressure of the revolutionary activities con­
tributed to the first development. In the end, Prince Max ap­
pointed Friedrich Ebert as his successor as Reich Chancellor:13 
After the Majority Socialists took over the government from 
Prince Max on November 9, they were uncertain as to the strength 
of their influence among the masses. 44 They were not sure if the 
workers' and soldiers' councils - the real power factor in Ger­
many at the moment would be willing to co-operate with the 
new government or would consider the cabinet to be in unwar­
ranted competition with their own revolutionary governmental 
institutions. 45 Shortly after Ebert had assumed the chancellor­
ship, he invited the USPD to participate in a coalition cabinet. 
43 The appointment of Ebert by 
Prince Max involves a legal fiction in 
contemporaneous German constitu­
tional law. According to this fiction, 
after the abdication of the Emperor, 
Prince Max became the only authority 
vested with the power to appoint a 
Reich Chancellor. Prince Max acted 
as a trustee for the monarchy. The im­
portance of this fiction was that it gave 
a degree of legitimacy to the transfer 
of power from Prince Max to Ebert. 
This question of legitimacy was of con­
siderable significance for the numerous 
civil servants and other officials of the 
imperial authorities because it per­
mitted them to cooperate with the new 
men without having to violate their 
oaths to the Emperor. (Prinz Max, op. 
cit., p. 642.) For adequate accounts 
of the events which led to the ultimat­
um of November 7 requesting the ab­
dication of the Emperor and eventually 
the withdrawal of the SPD members 
from the coalition cabinet, see Ibid., 
pp. 605-29; Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 19-
28; Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 41-
48. A conservative point of view about
the abdication of the Emperor is pre­
sented by one who remained faithful
to him, Graf Kuno von Westarp, Das
Ende der Monarchie am 9. November 
1918 (Berlin: H. Rauschenbusch Ver­
lag, 1952). Ebert's first two proclama­
tions addressed to the German people 
and civil servants also emphasized the 
legality of the transfer of political 
power from Prince Max to the leader 
of the Majority Socialists. For the text 
of these two proclamations see Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 51-52. 
44 The interpretation s u p p l i e d  by 
Friedrich Stampfer for the Majority 
Socialists' overestimate of the strength 
of the USPD and of the radical ele­
ments which was the reason for seeking 
their collaboration is as follows: No 
general elections had taken place for 
the six preceding years. The few elec­
tions for substitutes did not permit 
conclusions about the political disposi­
tion of the people. Furthermore, po­
litical attitudes change rapidly during 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y  periods. (Friedrich 
Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre der 
Deutschen Republik [2d ed.; Offenbach 
a. M.: Bollwerk-Verlag, 1947], p. 60.)
45 F. W. von Oertzen, Die deutschen
Freikorps 19/8-1923 (2d ed.; Muen­
chen: Bruckmann, 1936), pp. 235-36; 
Stuemke, op. cit., p: 138. 
--
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He even expressed willingness to include Karl Liebknecht in the 
government.4° However, the USPD was not willing to join the 
SPD in a coalition government without first arriving at a working 
agreement with the Majority Socialists concerning political aims 
and the distribution of offices. Ebert's offer disclosed the division 
of opinion within the USPD. There was a strong minority of In­
dependent leaders in Berlin, dominated by the Revolutionary 
Shop Stewards. They sided with the Spartacists and strongly op­
posed collaboration with men like Ebert and Scheidemann, the 
revisionist "traitors" to the cause of socialism.47 
The moderates among the Independents, for example, Haase 
and Dittmann, wanted to join the SPD in an "all-socialist coalition 
government," provided the Majority Socialists would agree to 
transform Germany into a "social" republic, would drop for the 
time-being their plans for an election of a national assembly, 
would give their consent to turn over all legislative, adminis­
trative, and judicial functions to the councils, and would also agree 
to keep representatives of the bourgeois parties out of the new 
government. · The SPD replied that it also wanted a social repub­
lic, but that only the future national assembly, as the elected in­
strument of the people, could decide this issue with authority. The 
Majority Socialists plainly refused to transfer to the councils the 
functions demanded in the USPD proposal, because, according 
to the SPD, the councils represented only minority groups. Also 
the exclusion of bourgeois representatives was not feasible because 
it would aggravate the very difficult task of feeding the population. 
The negotiations between the two parties resulted in an uneasy 
4,; Rudin, op. cit., p. 375. Meinecke 
believed that Ebert's offer to include 
Liebknecht was made for tactical rea­
sons. Ebert intended thereby to neu­
tralize the radical elements. However, 
L i e b  k n  e c h  t' s counter-demands ex­
cluded any possibility of collaboration. 
(Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 113.) 
See also Willi Muenzenberg et al., Karl 
Liebknecht (Berlin: Verlag der Ju­
gendinternationale, 1931), pp. 59-60. 
47 Ledebour, Barth, and Ri c h a r d
Mueller were strongly opposed to a 
coalition government with the SPD. 
lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 210-11. In 
his book, Barth included Haase in the 
group opposed to working with the 
SPD. Barth himself advocated that the 
USPD take over the government by 
itself. (Barth, op. cit., pp. 58°59.) 
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compromise. Both parties agreed to form a provisional govern­
ment on the basis of parity. The USPD showed a conciliatory at­
titude by dropping its original three day time-limit for the coalition 
but stubbornly remained pledged to support the council system 
and to fight the summoning of a constituent assembly until after 
the gains made by the revolution were consolidated.48 
A six-man provisional cabinet, the so-called Council of 
People's Commissars, was formed on November 10. It was com­
posed of Friedrich Ebert, Philip Scheidemann, and Otto Lands­
berg, all Majority Socialists, and of Hugo Haase, Wilhelm Ditt­
mann, and Emil Barth, all lndependents.4° In addition to the 
socialists who were members of either the SPD or the USPD, the 
Centrists and the Liberals also participated in the new govern­
ment. They headed a number of important ministries, such as the 
Foreign Office ( State Secretary Dr. Solf), War Ministry ( State 
Secretary Scheuch), and Ministry of Interior (Dr. Hugo Preuss.)50
The program of the new government was published shortly 
thereafter. It clearly illustrated that Germany had in its People's 
Commissars a liberal, democratic government in spite of the oc­
casional use of socialist terminology. The significance of the proc-
48 Berlau, op. cit., pp. 222-23; Illus­
trierte Geschichte, pp. 210-11; Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Bern­
stein, op. cit., pp. 34-36, 45-49; Stamp­
fer, op. cit., pp. 60-64. The original 
conditions of the USPD are quoted in 
lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 210. For the 
text of the reply of the SPD, the state­
ment of acceptance by the USPD, and 
a complete compilation of all offices 
of the new government occupied by so­
cialists of both parties, see Bernstein, 
op. cit., pp. 35, 45ff. 
4" Bernstein, op. cit., p. 48. The 
usage of revolutionary terminology for 
the newly formed governmental agen­
cies such as the Council of People's 
Commissars was an indication of the 
Majority Socialists' intention of com­
promising with the left wing of the so­
cialist movement and with the masses 
about whose real aims very little was 
known. The choice of terms which re­
sembled closely those used in the Rus­
sian Revolution was as far as the Ma­
jority Socialists were concerned, only 
part of their over-all tactical effort of 
bringing the revolution under their 
control. 
50 Rosenberg, Die Entstehung, p. 
256; Bernstein, op. cit., p. 48. Thus, 
there was a certain amount of truth in 
the charge of the left wing radicals that 
the Provisional government failed to 
destroy the old state machinery and 
that some of the imperial ministers re­
mained in their positions. According 
to the left wing radicals, only Dr. 
Preuss could be considered a democrat 
while all the others were reactionaries 
of long standing. (Illustrierte Geschich­
te, p. 222.) 
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lamation of November 12, 1918, was that it provided the basis 
for the work of the coalition government, i.e., for the Majority 
Socialists and the moderates of the USPD, who considered this 
program as a realistic approach to the problems facing them at 
that time. 
To the German People! 
The government created by the revolution, whose political leader­
ship is purely socialist, has assumed the mission of carrying out the 
socialist program. Even at this [early] time, the government announces 
the following to be law: 
(1) The state of siege is over.
(2) The right to organize and assemble is not subject to restric-
tion, not excepting civil servants and government employees.
(3) Censorship ceases. Censorship for theaters is suspended.
( 4) Freedom of speech and press [ is guaranteed] .
(5) Freedom of religion is guaranteed. No one can be forced to
participate in religious activities.
( 6) An amnesty is granted to all political offenders. Trials pend­
ing for (political] offenses will be suspended.
(7) The compulsory labor service law is suspended, with the ex­
ception of those provisions which deal with the arbitration
of controversies.
( 8) Regulations dealing with servants and emergency law con­
cerning rural laborers are suspended.
( 9) The labor protection laws which were suspended at the be­
ginning of the war are re-instated. Additional social-political
ordinances will be forthcoming in the near future. Not later
than January 1, 1919, the eight-hour normal working day
will be in force. The government will do everything to obtain
sufficient employment opportunities. A decree concerning
unemployment insurance has been prepared. Its financial
burden is being distributed among the Reich, State, and com­
munity. In the field of health insurance, compulsory insur­
ance will be extended beyond the present limit of 2,500
Marks. The shortage of living quarters will be relieved by
making apartments available. A regulated [ system J for food
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maintenance for the population will be instituted. The gov­
ernment will keep up orderly production, protect property 
against infringement by individuals, and will protect per­
sonal freedom and safety. All elections for public offices 
will henceforth be subject to the equal, secret, direct general 
election law, based on proportional representation, for all 
men and women above twenty years of age. This election 
law will also apply to elections of the constituent assembly, 
about which further information will be forthcoming.51 
Parallel in time with the formation of the socialist coalition 
cabinet was a second development, the revolutionary mass actions 
of the workers and soldiers of Berlin. This followed the estab­
lished pattern of the German Revolution: general strike, frater­
nization of workers and soldiers, and formation of workers' and 
soldiers' councils as the organizational institutions of the revolu­
tion. 02 Many of these councils were fonned in the Greater Berlin 
area, and a great number of them were under the strong influence 
of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Spartacists. The council 
system appeared to the radical elements as better suited to carry 
the revolution further than the cabinet which was in the process 
of being organized. Therefore, the revolutionary elements, while 
trying to influence the program and aim of the cabinet during the 
51 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 83-
84. The following is a comment of one
of the leading Majority Socialists,
Friedrich Stampfer, about this procla­
mation:
"The proclamation contains at the 
beginning an unclear statement refer­
ring to the realization of the socialist 
program. Otherwise it is clear and 
simple. It does not put into effect the 
socialist program, but it brings the ful­
fillment of all the timely demands of 
the Social Democratic program ... " 
(Stampfer, op. cit., pp. 67-68.) 
52 The revolutionary events of Nov­
ember 9, 1918, in Berlin are fully de­
scribed and analyzed in the following: 
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 46-53; 
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 29-33; Rosen-
berg, Die Entstehung, pp. 254-55; 
Volkmann, Der Marxismus, pp. 232-
43; lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 204-08. 
The revolution in Berlin took place 
when the question concerning the ab­
dication of the Emperor had reached 
its climax. Thus, the Berlin revolu­
tion is usually given more credit than 
deserved for the proclamation of the 
German Republic. When Scheidemann 
announced to the people that Germany 
had become a republic, "he established 
a historical fait accompli." (Grzesinski, 
op. cit., p. 50.) However, he only rec­
ognized a situation which had become 
almost unavoidable at that time. The 
text of his famous proclamation is 
quoted in Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 
53.
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period of negotiations between the SPD and USPD, sought to 
utilize the revolutionary spirit of the councils for their own pur­
poses. Their first tactical aim was to create a central revolutionary 
government which would base its complete authority on the 
workers' and soldiers' councils. On November 9, through the 
initiative of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, a meeting of the 
left-oriented workers' and soldiers' delegates of the various coun­
cils took place in the Reichstag building. Barth was appointed 
chairman. The meeting assumed for the assembled delegates, 
which considered themselves the "Provisional Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council of Berlin," the authority to call a plenary meet­
ing of the workers' and soldiers' councils of Berlin for the follow­
ing day to elect a central provisional government for Germany. 
It was further decided that on the morning of November 10, prior 
to the plenary meeting, new delegates were to be elected, one 
deputy for each one thousand workers or soldiers. It was a serious 
attempt of a determined revolutionary minority to create another 
central govern�ent in competition to Ebert's. The Majority So­
cialists recognized the danger inherent in these moves and were 
determined to prevent the formation of another central executive 
agency.0'i 
With the substantial assistance of non-political soldiers' dele­
gates, the SPD succeeded in bringing under its control the an­
nounced plenary meeting of about 3,000 deputies at the Circus 
Busch, a large auditorium located in the eastern part of Berlin. 
Ebert's announcement that his party and the USPD had come to 
an agreement and had formed a coalition cabinet found over­
whelming approval. This completely destroyed the plans of the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Spartacists for the creation 
of a central revolutionary government. The left wing radicals, 
recognizing defeat, changed tactics. They proposed an "Execu­
tive Council of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Berlin" 
53 Stampfer, op. cit., pp. 64-65; Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 58ff; Barth, 
op. cit., pp. 60-61; Bernstein, op. cit., 
pp. 36-37, 45; Otto Braun, Von Wei­
mar zu Hitler (2d ed.; New York; Eu­
ropa Verlag, 1940), pp. 16-17. 
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composed exclusively of Independents and Spartacists as the con­
trolling body for the Provisional government of Ebert and Haase. 
Even this attempt failed because, following the example set by 
the Provisional government, the soldiers' delegates, under SPD 
leadership, insisted on an Executive Council based on parity 
among the Majority Socialists and Independents. The soldiers 
also insisted on having as many delegates as the workers. Six 
Majority Socialists, six Independents, and twelve soldiers were 
elected to the new Executive Council. The leaders of the Spar­
tacists, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, who were nominated 
as representatives for the Independents, absolutely refused to 
serve in the same body with Majority Socialists.54 The Circus 
Busch meeting then promptly gave its official sanction to the Pro­
visional government which became known as the Council of 
People's Commissars. 55 Thus, the high hopes with which the revo­
lutionary elements had approached the first assembly of the work­
ers' and soldiers' delegates had come to nothing. Even the unani­
mous adoption of a lengthy proclamation (prepared in advance 
54 The six Majority Socialists were
B u e  s c h  e 1, Heller, Hiob, Juelich, 
Maynz, and Rusch. The Independents 
were represented by Barth, Eckert, 
Ledebour, Richard Mueller, Neuen­
dorf, and Wegmann. Soldiers' repre­
sentatives were Bartusch, von Beer­
felde, Bergmann, Echtmann, Gerhardt, 
Hase, Hertel, Koehler, Lampert, Bru­
tus Molkenbuhr, Walz, and Wumpel. 
(Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 71.) 
"" Ibid., pp. 71-72. The approval of 
the coalition cabinet by the Circus 
Busch meeting provided the basis for 
the claim that the Council of People's 
Commissars had received its authority 
from the workers' and soldiers' dele­
gates of the Berlin councils. See for 
example Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, p. 
28. The Majority Socialists did not
like this interpretation and preferred
the fiction of the "legitimate" transfer.
For an illustration of this point of view
see the following quote from an article
by Friedrich Stampfer:
"It is a legend that the first socialist 
government of Germany had been ap­
pointed by the congress of workers' 
and soldiers' delegates. Ebert had 
taken over from Prince Max the Reich 
Chancellorship, appointed his Major­
ity Socialist ministers, and completed 
his cabinet on the basis of negotiations 
with the party-leadership of the Inde­
pendents. The giant meeting of the 
workers' and soldiers' delegates, which 
took place during the evening of Nov­
ember 10 in the Circus Busch, confined 
itself to giving approval to the fail ac­
compli. Nobody at that time thought 
of this as anything more than a for­
mality." 
(Friedrich Stampfer, "Nationalver­
s a m  m I u n g und Sozialdemokratie," 
Deutscher Revolutions Almanach fuer 
das Jahr 1919, ed. Ernst Drahn and 
E r n s t  Friedegg [Hamburg, Berlin: 
Hoffmann & Campe Verlag, 1919], p. 
76.) 
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by Daeumig) in which Germany was referred to as a socialist 
republic where all political power was vested in the councils and 
the provisional government, elected by the councils, had as its 
tasks the realization of peace and the socialization of the means 
of production, was hollow under the circumstances. Character­
istic of the attitude of the left wing elements was the proclamation 
containing greetings to the Russian workers and soldiers who had 
shown their German brothers the way of the revolution.56
The significance of the revolutionary development in Berlin 
on November 10 lay in the recognition and formalization of the 
two parallel governmental structures, the old state apparatus 
headed by the Provisional government and the new council sys­
tem. Of equal importance was the creation of a connecting link 
between the two systems in the form of the Executive Council 
of the Workers' and Soldiers' Council of Greater Berlin. Theo­
retically at least, the revolution in Berlin had brought into exist­
ence a revolutionary institution ( the Workers' and Soldiers' Coun­
cil of Greater Berlin) which claimed authority and jurisdiction 
over all workers' and soldiers' councils in the Reich and thereby 
over all Germany as such. An arbitrary claim lacking legal jus­
tification, it was an important development because it elected the 
. Executive Council and allegedly also the Council of People's 
Commissars which did exercise, with certain limitations, au­
thority throughout Germany.57 
The Executive Council considered itself the legislative and 
executive power for the entire Reich and for Prussia during the 
first few days of the revolution and thereby gave a clear demon-
56 Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 78; Her• 
mann Mueller, op. cit., p. 72. The text 
of this proclamation is quoted in Fer­
dinand Runkel, Die deutsche Revolu• 
tion (Leipzig: Verlag Grunow, 1919), 
pp. 150-52. 
57 Wilhelm Roemer, Die Entwick• 
lung des Raetegedankens in Deutsch­
land (Berlin: V e r l a g  E. Ebering, 
1921), p. 21. It is interesting to note 
that the Executive Council was not 
recognized as the superior authority 
for weeks by workers' and soldiers' 
councils in other parts of Germany or 
by the central soldiers' council of the 
Supreme Command of the Army. How­
ever, this lack of recognition did not 
prevent the Executive Council from 
acting as a supervisory and controlling 
agency for the new Provisional gov­
ernment. (Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 236-
37.) 
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stration of its intentions to acquire dictatorial powers. 58 The 
Executive Council's relation to the Council of People's Com­
missars was temporarily clarified during the later hours of Nov­
ember 10. The Executive Council became the controlling au­
thority of the Provisional government as originally planned, but 
because of the predominance of Majority Socialists, it actually 
became a source of support for the SPD members of the Council 
of People's Commissars.50 
Thus, the Majority Socialists were successful in reaching their 
immediate aims: ( 1) They succeeded in establishing a coalition 
cabinet with the Independents who agreed to work on the basis 
of a moderate liberal program. (2) They prevented the left 
wing radicals from setting up a competitive central revolutionary 
government during the most confused and unsettled period of the 
revolution. (3) They even succeeded in utilizing the great powers 
originally inherent in the workers' and soldiers' councils to 
strengthen the authority of the Provisional government through­
out the Reich. 
4. The Spartacists and the November Revolution
As has been pointed out before, the numerous but small and 
almost autonomous groups of Spartacists and Left Radicals were 
5s Roemer, op. cit., p. 21. See the 
first proclamation of the Executive 
Council of November 12, 1918, which 
d e c l  a r e  d that all municipal, State, 
Reich, and m i  1 i t  a r y governmental 
agencies will continue their activities, 
but will issue their ordinances in the 
name of the Executive Council. The 
text of this proclamation is quoted in 
Runkel, op. cit., pp. 152-53. 
59 Runkel, op. cit., pp. 1 5  3 -5 4; 
Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, p. 78. 
The claim of the Executive Council 
for executive powers also caused con­
siderable friction with the Council of 
People's Commissars which considered 
the exercise of executive functions as 
its exclusive prerogative. The juris­
dictional fight was not settled until De-
cember 10 when the official Gazette 
(Reichsanzeiger) announced that the 
Executive Council had the controlling 
and supervisory powers and the Coun­
cil of People's Commissars the execu­
tive powers. This announcement was 
a restatement of a previous proclama­
tion, dated November 23, which trans­
ferred all executive powers for the 
Reich and for Prussia to the Provi­
sional government which, however, 
was supposed to exercise this author­
ity under the control of the Executive 
Council. (The text of the November 
23 agreement is quoted in Hermann 
Mueller, op. cit., pp. 130-31.) The 
next change in the relation of the Pro­
visional government to the revolution­
ary institutions came as result of the 
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not able to influence substantially the growing revolutionary fer­
ment prior to the outbreak of the spontaneous mass uprising of 
November 191 8. uo After the beginning of the revolution, these 
groups, with a few exceptions, failed to become leading elements 
in the local workers' and soldiers' councils.61 Even when Sparta­
cists succeeded in getting elected to the councils, they always were 
a small minority and therefore could not exercise any real in­
fluence on local events. In most cases, they became quickly dis­
couraged and preferred to resign from the councils rather than 
serve with Majority Socialists or with representatives of bourgeois 
parties who, according to the Spartacists, did everything in their 
power to end the revolution before any decisive changes in the 
political and social conditions could be achieved."2 
The loose organizational arrangement of the Spartacists prior 
to the founding of the KPD and the influx of doubtful elements 
into the organization during the November days facilitated the 
development of ultra-radical and revolutionary-romantic views 
among some members. The differences in the political concepts 
of those ultra-left elements and those held by the old core of 
first Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' 
. Councils in the middle of December, 
1918. (See below pp. 136-144; and 
Roemer, op. cit., pp. 21-22.) 
60 See p. 78.
61 An exception was, for example, 
the situation in Hamburg where the 
Left Radicals (who had joined the 
Spartacists in October) gave the work­
ers' and soldiers' council the character 
of a genuine revolutionary agency. The 
Council took over the Hamburger 
Echo and appointed Paul Froelich as 
its editor-in-chief. From November 8 
on he published the newspaper under 
the name: Die Rote Fahne, Official 
Organ of the Hamburg Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council. (lllustrierte Ge­
schichte, pp. 191-92.) In Bremen the 
workers' and soldiers' council was also 
guided by "class conscious workers." 
All militaristically-minded teachers 
were dismissed from the schools, all 
reactionary officials were discharged 
from the police, and a Red Guard was 
organized to function as the executive 
force for the council. In Brunswick, 
the workers' and soldiers' council aso 
organized a Red Guard, purged the 
courts, and confiscated the landed 
property b e l o n g i n  g to the Duke. 
(Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 78.) A photo­
graphic reproduction of a proclamation 
of the Bremen Workers' and Soldiers' 
Council, dated November 9, 1918, is 
presented in lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 
200. It is one of the few examples of
official pronouncements of workers'
and soldiers' councils during the Nov­
ember Revolution in which the revolu­
tionary program of the Spartacists can
readily be discerned.
62 See for example the situation in
Wuerttemberg as described by Wil­
helm Keil, op. cit., pp. 84-122. 
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Marxist-trained Spartacists became most apparent in questions 
which had a direct bearing upon the revolutionary tactics of the 
Spartacist League. For example, the members of the lunatic 
fringe advocated armed uprisings conducted by minorities and 
the use of terror as an instrument of the revolution. They also 
declared that a dictatorship of a minority had become unavoid­
able because the masses continued to follow the "bureaucrats" 
and "traitors of the working class." 
Thus, they oscillated continuously between the mystical notion of 
an elite, a contempt for 'the reactionary masses,' and an equally ir­
rational belief in the genuine revolutionary character of the exploited 
and dependent people.'13 
While these "syndicalist-putschist elements" failed to gain 
the upper hand in the Spartacist League because of the over­
whelming influence of such old leaders as Rosa Luxemburg and 
Karl Liebknecht, they succeeded at times in causing local "revo­
lutionary actions" which did not receive the approval of the 
Spartacist leaders. 
Thus, most of the activities of the Spartacists during the 
November Revolution were the product of the influence of the 
Spartacist leaders, based on the latter's contemporaneous political 
concepts and evaluation of the revolutionary events. Probably 
the best source for a study of Spartacist behavior during this 
period is the various short- and long-range programs of action 
developed during that time. In fact, most of the available state­
ments and proclamations made by Rosa Luxemburg and Lieb­
knecht demonstrate the interrelation of their political concepts, 
their evaluation of the revolutionary situation, and their recom­
mendation for specific actions. 
The Spartacists were aware that neither their own strength 
nor their influence among the masses constituted real power fac­
tors at the outbreak of the uprising. Therefore during the initial 
63 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 41.
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phase of the revolution, they attempted to bring about a decision 
of the issue between bourgeois democracy and proletarian dic­
tatorship in favor of the latter by two surprise moves. 64 After the 
failure of the attempts made by the left wing radical groups in 
Berlin, Spartacist policies were directed at changing the bourgeois 
character of the German Revolution into a proletarian revolution 
like the Bolshevik revolt in Russia. The Spartacists believed that 
only a proletarian revolution could achieve the political, social, 
and economic changes required for realizing their ultimate aim, 
the socialist society. Thus, their revolutionary tactics were strong­
ly influenced by their determination to push the revolution fur­
ther. Rosa Luxemburg regarded the November Revolution as 
only the beginning. According to her, all that it had accomplished 
was the elimination of the monarchy which in itself was meaning­
less as long as the capitalist class, "the imperialist bourgeoisie," 
had not been destroyed. 
The abolition of the capitalists' rule, the realization of the socialist 
society: this and nothing less is the historical contents of the present 
revolution. A tremendous task which cannot be done quickly by means 
of a few decrees coming from above, but can only be achieved through 
. determined mass action of the working people in town and country. 
85 
Karl Liebknecht believed that the November Revolution was 
nothing more than the destruction of the old autocratic state ma­
chinery. The German Revolution could not be considered a suc­
cessful undertaking as long as the rule of the capitalists and of 
64 See above, pp. 87, 93-96. 
65 Rosa Luxemburg, "Der Anfang," 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, II, p. 594. Liebknecht sum­
marized the ultimate aim of the revolu­
tion as follows: "Abrogation of class 
rule, of exploitation, and of suppres­
sion, and realization of socialism -
that is, the proletariat's aim." (Karl 
Liebknecht, "Was ist zu tun?" quoted 
in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, 
p. 490.) "The removal of the capitalist
society, that is the only salvation for
the proletariat .... " (Karl Liebknecht, 
"Was will der Spartakusbund?" quoted 
in Liebknecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, 
p. 507.)
... 
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the socialists who had "betrayed" the International in August 
1914 continued. However, Liebknecht was convinced that the 
proletariat would eventually make use of its dormant political 
power and would end the economic class rule of the bourgeoisie. 
He referred to this part of the revolution as its social phase, and 
he confidently announced in an address to the proletarians of all 
countries ( co-signed by Rosa Luxemburg, Mehring, and Zetkin) 
that "Germany is pregnant with the social revolution ... . 66 
Under the impact of the events in Russia, the Spartacists ac­
cepted the Bolshevik example of a dictatorship of the council 
system as the proper organizational form of the proletarian revo­
lution. 67 A leaflet disseminated on November 8, 1918, on the 
eve of the mass uprising in Berlin, clearly indicated the Spar­
tacists' intention of creating a "German Socialist Soviet Republic." 
Workers and Soldiers! 
Your hour has arrived. Now you are taking matters into your own 
hands after long endurance and stagnant days. It is not an exaggera­
tion to say that in these days the world is looking at you and you are 
holding the fate of the world in your hands. 
Workers and soldiers! Since the hour of action has arrived, there 
must be no return. The same "socialists," who for four years have 
served as souteneurs for the government and who in the past weeks have 
promised you every day "government of the people," parliamentari­
zation, and other nonsense, are now doing everything to hinder you 
in your struggle in order to make the movement fade out. 
Workers and soldiers! What your comrades and colleagues in 
Kiel, Hamburg, Bremen, Luebeck, Rostock, Flensburg, Hanover, 
Magdeburg, Brunswick, Munich, and Stuttgart could do, you also can 
do. Because on what you can achieve, on your tenacity and on the 
outcome of your fight, the victory of your brothers in those places and 
the success of the proletariat of the entire world depend. 
Karl Liebknecht, "An die Pro­
letarier aller Laender," quoted in Lieb­
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 480. 
Karl Liebknecht, "Der neue Burgfrie-
den," quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge­
waehlte Reden, pp. 468-471. 
67 Tormin, op. cit., p. 70; Meinecke, 
Die Revolution, p. 113. 
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Soldiers! Act like your comrades in the navy, unite with your 
brothers in workers' clothes. Do not permit yourselves to become a 
tool against your brothers, do not obey the commands of your officers, 
do not shoot at the fighters for freedom. 
Workers and soldiers! The immediate aims of your struggle must 
be 
( 1) Liberation of all civilian and military prisoners.
(2) Abolition of all individual states [ of the German Federa­
tion] and elimination of all dynasties.
( 3) Elections of workers' and soldiers' councils, elections of
delegates [ to the councils] in all factories and military units.
( 4) Immediate establishment of relations with other German
workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 5) Assumption of governmental authority by the commissars of
the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 6) Immediate [ establishment of] contact with the international
proletariat, especially with the Russian Workers' Republic.
Workers and soldiers! Now prove that you are strong; now 
demonstrate tha� you have the sense to use your power. 
Long live the socialist Republic! 
Long live the International! 
The Group International ( Spartacist League) 
Karl Liebknecht Ernst Meyer68 
Only two days later, on November l 0, 1918, a proclamation 
in the second issue of the Berlin Rote F ahne and generally as­
cribed to Rosa Luxemburg presented a more comprehensive pro­
gram of the Spartacist League.'39 It contained the following im­
mediate demands: 
( 1 ) Disarmament of all policemen and all officers and soldiers 
who do not accept the new order; arming of the people; all 
trustworthy soldiers and proletarians who are armed retain 
their weapons. 
68 Spartakusbund [Karl Liebknecht], 
Arbeiter und Soldaten, quoted in Lieb­
knecht, Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 466-
67. 
69 During the afternoon hours of
November 9, 1918, a group of Spar­
tacists occupied the printing plant and 
the editorial offices of the Berliner Lo-
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( 2) Transfer of all military and civilian offices and headquarters
to representatives of the [Berlin] Workers' and Soldiers'
Council.
( 3) Transfer of all weapons and ammunition reserves as well as
armament factories to the Workers' and Soldiers' Council.
( 4) Control over all means of transportation by the Workers' and
Soldiers' Council.
( 5) Abolition of military justice. Replacement of brute obedi­
ence (Kadavergehorsam) by voluntary discipline for soldiers
controlled by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council.
( 6) Abolition of the Reichstag and of all parliaments as well as
of the existing Reich Government; taking over of the gov­
ernment by the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers' Council until
a Workers' and Soldiers' Council representing the entire
Reich can be formed.
(7) Nation-wide elections of workers' and soldiers' councils
which are the only agencies vested with legislative and ad­
ministrative authority. The entire rural and urban working
population, regardless of sex, is to participate in the elections
of the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 8) Abolition of all dynasties and individual states [ of the Ger­
man Federation] ; our watchword is a unitary socialist Ger­
man republic.
( 9) Immediate establishment of relations with all workers' and
soldiers' councils in Germany and with the socialist brother
parties abroad.
kal-A nzeiger and printed there the first 
few issues of Die Rote Fahne. Rosa 
Luxemburg was opposed to the force­
ful occupation of the "bourgeois" paper 
and its transformation into the Spar­
tacists' organ because she was certain 
that her group did not have enough 
strength to defend this seizure against 
its numerous enemies. As soon as dif­
ficulties developed, the Spartacists gave 
up the plant. Finally on November 18, 
arrangements were completed with an­
other printing plant and the new Rote 
Fahne was published. Rosa Luxem-
burg and Liebknecht signed as re­
sponsible editors. However, Rosa Lu­
xemburg was actually managing the 
newspaper assisted by Paul Levi, Au­
gust Thalheimer, Paul Lange, and oth­
ers. (Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
310-11; l/lustrierte Geschichte, pp. 205,
211-12.) Hermann Mueller describes
the difficulties Die Rote Fa/we experi­
enced at the Scher! publishing house of
the Berlin Lokal-Anziger as the refusal
of the workers of the printing plant to
print the paper. This resulted in the
week-long interruption in the publish-
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( 10) Immediate recall of the Russian embassy to Berlin.'°
At the end, the proclamation categorically announced that any 
collaboration with the "socialist traitors" was beyond considera­
tion.11 
In Rosa Luxemburg's first article in the new Rote F ahne of 
November 18, 1918, entitled "The Beginning," she drew up the 
main points of the Spartacists' program for transforming the 
"limited revolution" into a genuine proletarian revolution: 
The aim of the revolution [ i.e., a socialist society] clearly deter­
mines its source; the mission [ of the revolution) determines its method. 
All power in the hands of the working masses, in the hands of the 
workers' and soldiers' councils; protection of the achievements of the 
revolution from the lurking enemies: all this provides the general di­
rection for all measures the revolutionary government [ is supposed to 
undertake]. 
Every step, eyery action of the government should point in this 
direction like · a compass: 
( 1) Completion and re-election of local workers' and soldiers'
councils .... ; 
(2) permanent session for those bodies representing the masses
and transfer of the intrinsic political power from the small
committee of the Executive Council to the broader forum
represented by the Workers' and Soldiers' Council;
( 3) calling the Reich parliament of the workers' and soldiers'
councils into session as quickly as possible, in order to make
the proletarians of all Germany into one class and one com­
pact political power and to rally them behind the work of the
revolution as its defensive arm and its assault force;
( 4) [ undertaking) immediate organization not of the "farmers"
but of the rural proletarians and small farmers who as a
social class are still outside the revolution;
ing of the Spartacists' organ beginning 
with November 12. (Hermann Mueller, 
op. cit., p. 122.) 
10 See above, pp. 65-66. 
71 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 212.
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( 5) formation of a proletarian Red Guard for the permanent pro­
tection of the revolution and conscription of a workers' militia
to prepare the entire proletariat to be on the alert at all times;
( 6) removal of the agencies taken over from the absolutist mili­
tary police state, the administration, judiciary, and army;
( 7) immediate confiscation of dynastic property and estates and
landed estates as a temporary first measure to secure the
food supply for the people, because hunger is the most dan­
gerous ally of the counter-revolution;
( 8) summoning of the Workers' World Congress to meet im­
mediately in Germany in order to emphasize distinctly and
clearly the international character of the revolution; only
in the International, in the world revolution of the proletariat
is the future of the German Revolution anchored. 72 
In contrast to this program, which Rosa Luxemburg con­
sidered only as "the first and most urgent steps" of the revolution, 
were the actions and omissions of the "revolutionary government" 
of Ebert and Haase. Her attack and criticism of the proposed con­
stitutent national assembly was an important revision of her views 
as expressed in The Russian Revolution, written as late as the fall 
of the same year. The change in her opinion regarding the na­
tional assembly was probably the result of the developments of 
the first week of the German Revolution. Her criticism ran as 
follows: 73 
What is the present revolutionary government doing? 
It does not disturb the state administrative machinery from top to 
bottom, leaving it quietly in the hands of the past supporters of the 
Hohenzollern absolutism and of the future instruments of the counter­
revolution; 
it calls for the constituent national assembly [ and intends] to 
create thereby a bourgeois counter-weight to the representative body 
of the workers and soldiers; it thereby shifts the revolution onto the 
72 Luxemburg, Der Anfang, pp. 595- 73 See above, p. 57, n. 63; see also
96. Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, p. 313. 
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track of a bourgeois revolution and filches the socialist aims of the 
revolution; 
it does nothing to destroy the notorious power of the capitalist 
class rule; 
it does everything to mollify the bourgeoisie, by announcing the 
sanctity of private property, by assuring the inviolability of the capi­
talist arrangement; 
it permits the very active counterrevolution to operate and fails 
to bring this to the attention of the masses and fails to warn the 
people emphatically. 
The result of the first week of the revolution: nothing fundamental 
has been changed within the state of the Hohenzollerns, the workers' 
and soldiers' government is acting as a substitute for the imperial gov-
ernment which has gone bankrupt. .. . 
But revolutions do not stand still . .  74 
All major aspects of the revolutionary program of the Spar­
tacists were related to the strengthening of the council system 
which was regarded by the left wing radicals as the only method 
of bringing about their aim of a unitary German socialist soviet 
republic. Other points of the program which did not directly 
refer to the councils - such as the necessity of proletarian con­
trol over the means of coercion, precautions to be taken against 
reactionary assaults on revolutionary achievements, and emphasis 
on the international character of the proletarian revolution -
were conceived only as instrumental to the perpetuation and 
strengthening of the council system, the organizational manifesta­
tion of the proletarian revolution. 
The Spartacists strongly advocated the council system in pref­
erence to the "bourgeois democracy" not because they believed 
the former could produce a better representation of public opin­
ion; on the contrary, they recognized that it could be used with 
great advantage to falsify the popular sentiment, since the fran-
74 Luxemburg, Der Anfang, pp. 596-
97.
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chise was limited to the workers and soldiers. The council system 
could actually facilitate the perpetuation of a minority rule and 
still make it appear as being backed by a sizeable majority. The 
Russian manipulation of their soviets had clearly demonstrated 
their utility to the Spartacists. 75 This could be achieved only when 
the workers' and soldiers' councils were the sole organs of state 
power and were not subordinate to any other type of govern­
mental agency such as the Provisional government. 76 
Tormin uses a different approach to explain the position of 
the Spartacists toward the council system. He claims that it was 
the result of "their concept concerning the nature and aim of the 
revolution." Since the Spartacists could not hope to reach their 
aim, "the socialist and extremely democratic state," by demo­
cratic means because they were a small minority, they saw in the 
council dictatorship the best instrument for its realization. Tor­
min concludes that this was the situation which forced the Spar­
tacists to change from the concept of social democracy to the 
"dictatorship of the councils."77 
The council system, regardless of the role it was to play in the 
revolutionary program of the Spartacists, did appeal to the great 
masses of German workers and soldiers - as the spontaneous 
and rapid creation of thousands of such councils demonstrated. 
The masses which for years had been kept from active political 
participation saw in the councils a means to exert direct influence, 
at least in the formulation of local policies. 78
75 Max Weber, Gesammelte Politi­
sche Schriften (Munich: Drei Masken 
Verlag, 1921), p. 346; Berlau, op. cit., 
p. 218.
76 Roemer, op. cit., p. 19; in addi­
tion to the book by Walter Tormin re­
ferred to above, Roemer, op. cit., is 
also an excellent presentation of the 
impact of the council system upon 
revolutionary developments in Ger­
many. 
77 Tormin, op. cit., pp. 86-87.
78 Jbid., p. 56. Roemer goes one
step further in explaining the psycho-
logical motivation for the mass partic­
ipation in the council movement. He 
claims that in the past the only polit­
ical right the worker had was to join 
a party and vote. This ended all his 
political activity, because policies were 
not determined by him but by the party 
leadership. The combination of the 
political impotence of the old system 
and the desire for power by the in­
dividual worker who had been denied 
this opportunity in the past might ex­
plain his interest in the active, di­
rect participation which the councils 
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Rosa Luxemburg defined the functions and the operational 
significance of the councils as follows: 
The workers' and soldiers' councils were then the organs of the 
revolution, pillars of the newly-formed order, executors of the will of 
the masses in working clothes and soldiers' uniforms. The workers' 
and soldiers' councils had a tremendous amount of work in front of 
them. They had the task, first of all, of putting into operation the will 
of the revolutionary masses of the people and of building up the entire 
social and political state machinery in the proletarian-socialist mean­
ing [ of the term]. 79 
It was understandable, therefore, that the Spartacists did 
their utmost to support the council system against all its op­
ponents and also tried to obtain a majority of sympathetic coun­
cil delegates in order to utilize the councils "to push the revolu­
tion further."80 However, the councils remained primarily under 
the influence of the SPD and the trade unions. Even representa­
tives of the bourgeois parties found entrance. In the soldiers' 
councils, the bourgeois elements often succeeded in obtaining a 
dominant influence, simply because leaders among the soldiers 
quite frequently came from the middle classes.81 Thus, only the 
seemed to offer. (Roemer, op. cit., pp. 
1-2.)
Not only the workers but also the
soldiers and to a lesser degree the 
farmers wanted to be active in deter­
mining their own fate. (Tormin, op. 
cit., p. 61.) Walter Goerlitz reports 
that " . .. the millions of German sol­
diers [created] their own representa­
tion in approximately 10,000 soldiers' 
councils. At the end of November, a 
central soldiers' council was consti­
tuted, a kind of army parliament, such 
as the history of the German army 
had never before known:• (Walter 
Goerlitz, Der Deutsche Genera/stab 
[Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag der Frank­
furter Hefte, 1950], p. 296.) The farm­
ers' councils played a very insignific-
ant part in the German Revolution. 
Only in certain parts of the Reich, e.g., 
Bavaria, Silesia, and Hanover, they ap­
peared but hardly ever transcended 
their initial stage. They never obtained 
any real importance although in in­
dividual cases they did expropriate 
landed estates and distributed the land 
among farmers. (Roemer, op. cit., p. 
18; Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 71.) 
79 Rosa Luxemburg, "Um den Voll­
zugsrat," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus­
gewaehlte Reden, II, p. 630. 
80 Ulbricht, Der Zusammenbruch, 
pp. 24-25. 
s1 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 174; Flecht­
heim, op. cit., pp. 38-39; Grotewohl, 
op. cit., p. 72; lllustrierte Geschichte, 
pp. 216-18. It is not surprising then 
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Spartacists and certain circles among the bourgeoisie were ready 
to see in the councils the beginning of the Bolshevizing of Ger­
many.6" 
On November 12, 1918, when the People's Commissars subtly 
announced the meeting of a constituent national assembly, they 
thereby made it known that they intended to place the formulation 
of the future constitution and governmental structure of Germany 
in the hands of representatives of all social classes.83 This move 
was bound to provoke strong opposition from the Spartacists and 
other left wing radicals, who, as has been pointed out above, 
wished to transfer all political, social, and economic powers to 
the workers' and soldiers' councils. One of the most precise for­
mulations of the Spartacists' point of view in this matter was ex­
pressed by Rosa Luxemburg. Her antagonism to the national 
assembly must be seen within the context of the growing contro­
versy of national assembly versus council system. Her opposition 
to the national assembly, the "bourgeois counter-weight" to the 
councils, constituted an important point in her article "The Be-
that Max Weber was able to write in 
a letter the following remarks about 
the councils: 
"One can really be happy about the 
plain objectivity of the simple people 
from the trade unions and also of 
many soldiers, for example in the local 
workers' and soldiers' council to which 
I am attached. They have done their 
work really excellently and have done 
everything without [a lot of] talk, this 
I must admit. The nation as such is 
after all a people of discipline. . . . " 
(Weber, op. cit., p. 482.) 
82 Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 114.
83 See the contents of the govern­
mental program of the Provisional 
government on pp. 92-93 above. Cf. 
also Tormin who considers this an­
nouncement by the People's Commis­
sars as the end of the first phase of 
the German Revolution and possibly 
even the end of the entire revolution. 
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 65.) Barth, the 
left wing member of the Provisional 
government, wrote in his book that 
he requested the deletion of the sen­
tence in the governmental proclama­
tion of November 12 which made a 
reference to the constituent assembly; 
he was out-voted five to one. (Barth, 
op. cit., p. 68.) The utility of a na­
tional assembly, based on universal and 
equal franchise, for establishing a new 
constitution for Germany was already 
discussed between Prince Max and the 
SPD before the outbreak of the Nov­
ember uprising. It was agreed that 
only a caII for a constituent national 
assembly might prevent the outbreak 
of a violent revolution. (Prinz Max, 
op. cit., p. 598.) Nevertheless, after 
the outbreak of the revolution, Prince 
Max proposed on November 9 the 
summoning of a national assembly to 
serve as the representative agency 
which should decide on the future Ger­
man constiution and also on the ques­
tion of a monarchy. (Ibid., p. 616.) 
On November 9 during the nego-
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gmning," published on November 18. 84 However, in her attack 
in Die Rote Fahne on November 20 against the Independents, 
who approved of the national assembly in principle but wanted to 
postpone its formulation until the revolutionary gains had been 
consolidated, she seemed to regard this issue as the most decisive 
one for the future course of the German Revolution.85 The fol­
lowing are substantial excerpts from Rosa Luxemburg's article 
"The National Assembly." 
From the Deutschen Tageszeitung, the Vossischen, and the Vor­
waerts to the Independent [i.e., USPD] Freiheit, from von Reventlow, 
Erzberger, Scheidemann to Haase and Kautsky, a unanimous call is 
heard for the national assembly with an equally unanimous cry of an­
guish because of the plan to place the power into the hands of the 
working-class. 
The entire "people," the entire "nation" is supposed to be called 
on to decide by majority decision the future fate of the revolution. 
The solution is a foregone conclusion for the admitted, disguised 
spokesmen of the ruling classes. [However] we do not discuss things 
with the guardians of the capitalist money safes either in the national 
assembly or about the national assembly. 
The leaders of the Independents are also joining the ranks of the 
· protectors of capitalism in this issue.
As pointed out by Hilferding in Freiheit, they intend thereby [ i.e., 
by means of the national assembly] to make it unnecessary for the 
tiations conducted between Prince Max 
and Ebert which eventually led to the 
appointment of the latter as Reich 
chancellor, Prince Max suggested again 
a constituent national assembly as the 
means of working out the future con­
stitution. Ebert's answer was in the 
affirmative, "We can declare our agree­
ment with the principle of this national 
assembly." (Ibid., p. 636.) 
;,4 See above, pp. 104-6. 
s0 Tormin correctly pointed out that
the Independents were divided on this 
issue. The right wing sided with the 
SPD and the left wing with the radi­
cals. It is also interesting to note that 
officially the Independents avoided 
giving reasons of principle for their 
proposal for postponing the national 
assembly. They justified their request 
with such practical considerations as 
that prisoners of war had not yet been 
returned, political parties did not have 
enough time for their campaigns, and 
the fate of the occupied territories was 
still uncertain. (Tormin, op. cit., p. 
71 and p. 71, n. l.) See also Runkel, op. 
cit., p. I 55.
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revolution to use force [ and to eliminate] the civil war with all its 
terror. Petit-bourgeois illusions .... 
These profound Marxists have forgotten the ABC's of socialism. 
They have forgotten that the bourgeoisie is not a parliamentary 
party, but a ruling class which is in possession of economic and social 
means of coercion. 
These Junkers and capitalists will remain peaceful only as long as 
the revolutionary government is content with pasting little beauty spots 
on top of the capitalist wage arrangement. . . . 
The present idyl, where wolves and sheeps, tigers and lamb graze 
peacefully side by side as in Noah's Ark, will last only until the very 
minute when socialism becomes serious . 
. . . When the bourgeoisie is hit in its heart - and its heart beats 
in the cash register - it will put up a life and death struggle to retain 
its control and will use thousands of open and concealed means of 
resistance against socialist measures . 
. . . The "civil war" which they seek to banish from the revolution 
with uneasy anxiety, cannot be banished. Civil war is only another 
name for the class struggle, and the idea that socialism can be intro­
duced without a class struggle and through parliamentary majority 
decisions is a ridiculous petit-bourgeois illusion .... 
In the Great French Revolution, the first decisive step was taken 
in July 1789 when the three separate estates combined in a unified 
national assembly. This decision determined the entire future course 
of events; it was the symbol of victory of a new bourgeois society over 
the medieval feudal estates. 
[Thus] the national assembly is superannuated inheritance from 
the bourgeois revolutions, .... 
The fight over the national assembly is carried out under the battle 
cry, democracy or dictatorship! ... 
The question today is not democracy or dictatorship. The prob­
lem, placed on the agenda by history, is: bourgeois democracy or so­
cialist democracy. The dictatorship of the proletariat means de­
mocracy in the socialist sense. The dictatorship of the proletariat does 
not mean bombs, revolts, uproars, and "Anarchy," as the spokesmen 
of the capitalist profit system willfully falsify, but it connotes the use 
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of all political power to bring about socialism, to expropriate the capi­
talist class - and because it is based on the will of the revolutionary 
majority of the proletariat, it is within the spirit of socialist democracy. 
Without the conscious intent and action of the majority of the 
proletariat there can be no socialism. In order to clarify this con­
viction, to strengthen this will, to organize this action, a class organ 
is necessary: the Reich parliament of the urban and rural proletarians. 
The summoning of this kind of workers' representation in place of 
the traditional national assembly of the bourgeois revolutions alone 
constitutes an act of the class struggle, a break with the historic past 
of the bourgeois society, a powerful means to wake up the proletarian 
masses of the people, a first frank and blunt declaration of war against 
capitalism 
. . . Parliamentary cretinism was a weakness yesterday; today it 
is an ambiguity; tomorrow it will be treason. sn
This article was significant not only because it contained Rosa 
Luxemburg's statements on the left wing radicals' determined op­
position to th� national assembly, but also because it clarified the 
Spartacists' concepts of "socialist democracy" and "dictatorship 
of the proletariat." These terms, as defined by Rosa Luxemburg, 
were not interchangeable but applied to the same situation, the 
class rule of the proletariat. According to her, the rule of the 
proletariat was a socialist democracy because the majority de­
cisions of the working class set the over-all policies to be pursued 
by the revolutionary government and therefore did not constitute 
a rule by a majority. It was a dictatorship of the proletariat be­
cause it excluded all social classes, except the working class, from 
participating in the political process. The disenfranchised classes 
were subject to severe political, social, and economic restrictions. 
Important for examining Spartacist actions during the immediate 
post-revolutionary period is also the great emphasis placed on the 
"majority will" of the proletariat because this could mean - and 
actually did for Rosa Luxemburg and other Spartacist leaders -
86 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die National- Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 603-07. 
versammlung," quoted in Luxemburg, 
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that the Spartacists could not make their claim for power until 
they had succeeded in gaining the support of the majority of the 
working class. Thus, the primary objective of their tactics became 
their concern for gaining the patronage of the masses. Methods 
used for this purpose included various propaganda media and 
stressed the revolutionizing effects of mass strikes and street 
demonstrations.87 
Any success the Spartacists enjoyed in those endeavors was 
due not only to their own theories and related or unrelated actions 
but was influenced to a considerable degree by the prevailing ten­
dencies among the masses. The Spartacists themselves recognized 
correctly the spontaneous character of the German Revolution 
and also its primary, limited aim of ending the war. Possibly be­
cause of their great confidence in the masses, they overestimated 
the socialist potentialities of the revolutionary movement. Since 
they did not realize how weak was socialist sentiment among the 
people, they also failed to recognize the actual and potential in­
fluence of the moderate socialists and of the bourgeois parties with 
their program of political democracy.88 
87 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg in Deutsch/and (Berlin: Phoebus 
Verlag, 1925), p. 13. These aggres­
sive activities played an important part 
in the consolidation process of the 
German Revolution which was at­
tempted by the SPD and the right wing 
of the USPD. (Cf. Chapter IV.) It 
will also be of interest to examine to 
what extent these principles, formu­
lated by Rosa Luxemburg and later re-
inforced by the program of the Spar­
tacist League of December 14, 1918, 
and of the program of the KPD, were 
followed in practice. (Cf. Chapter V.) 
ss Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 35; for a 
characterization of the German Revo­
lution by Liebknecht, see Liebknecht, 
Reden, pp. 322-30; Karl Liebknecht, 
"Das, was ist," quoted in Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 473; Lieb­
knecht, Was ist zu tun? p. 485. 

Consolidation Versus 
Continuation of the 
Revolution 
1. The "Limited Revolution" of the SPD
The initial phase of the German Revolution ended when the 
SPD leaders succeeded in obtaining a strong position within the 
Provisional government and the Executive Council and began 
using their power to consolidate the political achievements 
brought about by the spontaneous mass uprising. The Majority 
Socialists in the government considered themselves only as trustees 
of the people until general elections could be held.1 This point 
of view was strongly attacked by the other socialist factions. 
1:'he next phase of the German Revolution was characterized 
by the impetuous conflict between two hostile camps. One side, 
led by the SPD, consisted of the protagonists of the constituent 
national assembly. The other was composed of the left wing 
radicals who worked for the continuation of the revolution, ex­
pecting that through the workers' and soldiers' councils and the 
use of propaganda and "revolutionary actions" they would eventu­
ally succeed in transforming the "bourgeois" revolution into its 
proletarian counterpart. The struggle between these two groups, 
each of which rallied around its respective symbol - national as­
sembly or council system - was the fight between two funda­
mentally different interpretations of the meaning of the revolu­
tion and its ultimate aims.2 
1 Stam pf er, Nationalversammlung, 2 Berlau interpreted this controversy
p. 76; see also Berlau, op. cit., p. 215. as follows: "The struggle between the 
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During this second phase of the revolution, in spite of the 
fundamental controversy raging within the socialist movement, 
the Provisional government succeeded in improving considerably 
the over-all conditions of the working class. Noske's assertion 
that "the satisfaction of all political democratic desires immedi­
ately followed the 9th of November" is an exaggerated version 
of the situation. 3 However, even Communist appraisals of the 
work of the Provisional government admit that some long­
overdue and significant changes were accomplished during this 
period.4
One of the first steps of the new government was to repeal all 
laws and ordinances which the imperial authorities had pro­
claimed during the war. The SPD members of the government 
seemed to have forgotten, as did some of their colleagues from the 
USPD, that they had originally given their approval to these re­
strictive war-time laws. 5 These first legislative acts of the revo­
lutionary government included not only repeals of laws and de­
crees considere<;l especially oppressive by the people, but also such 
new and important provisions as the eight-hour work day, the 
right to unemployment compensation payable from public funds, 
and the expansion of health insurance. All these measures "de-
, creased considerably the rule of capitalism over the workers and 
system of councils and a national con­
stitutional assembly elected on the 
wildest democratic franchise was there­
fore not so much an academic struggle 
over the comparative merits of each 
system, as it was in the last analysis, 
a struggle between two contending in­
terpretations of the purposes of the 
revolution and the mandate bestowed 
on the revolutionary government by 
the events of November 9." (Berlau, 
op. cit., p. 219.) 
3 Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 60. 
4 Otto Grotewohl, after listing the 
"social and democratic advances" made 
during the reign of the Provisional 
government, claims that these achieve-
ments should really have been the out­
come of the 1848 Revolution, The 
November Revolution stopped short 
when it did not press for such decisive 
reforms as the expropriation of large 
estates and the democratization of the 
governmental administration, school 
system, and military forces. ( Grote­
wohl, op. cit., p. 81.) Walter Ulbricht 
also states that the social reform pro• 
gram of the SPD and USPD did not 
go beyond the framework of the bour­
geois-capitalist society. (Ulbricht, Zur 
Geschichte, p. 26.) 
5 See the text of the proclamation of 
November 12, 1918, quoted above, pp. 
92-93.
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improved greatly the social position of the workers in relation to 
[ the owners of] property. "6 
Many of the workers expected that the Provisional govern­
ment would start im�ediately with the socialization of industry. 7 
These demands for socialization created a very difficult problem 
for the government because they involved a number of factors be­
yond its control. On the one hand, it was necessary that something 
be done because of public pressure; on the other, realistic consid­
erations concerning the post-war economic conditions of Germany 
seemed to indicate that it would be wise not to interfere with in­
dustry and the national economy. For example, evidence was 
available that the industrialists were reluctant to convert their 
factories to peace-time production primarily for fear of eventual 
expropriation. The Provisional government, furthermore, ques­
tioned its own authority to invade private rights as extensively 
as would be required for socialization without having the explicit 
sanction of the national assembly. 
The government tried to work its way out of the socialization 
problem at a meeting of the People's Commissars on November 
18, 1918. It was decided that only those branches of industry 
which were ripe for socialization should be socialized, and a So­
cialization Commission was appointed to investigate the situation 
and make recommendations before the government took any 
action in this matter.8 
6 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 176. For a 
full discussion of the legislative work 
of the Provisional government see [So­
cial Democratic Party of Germany,] 
Nichts getan? Die Arbeit seit dem 9. 
November 1918 (Berlin: Arbeitsge­
meinschaft fuer staatsbuergerliche u. 
wirtschaftliche Bildung [1919]. An ap­
pendix of this pamphlet contains a list­
ing of the most important decrees and 
laws for the workers promulgated by 
the government after November 9, 
1918. (Ibid., pp. 29-32.) 
7 This is not an assertion based on 
the claims of left wing radicals or of 
Communists. For example, Ulbricht 
describes this particular issue in his his­
tory of the German labor movement. 
(Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte, p. 30.) The 
demands for socialization, as part of 
the price of victory in the revolution 
made by the German workers, were 
even reported by moderate Social 
Democrats. For example, see Hermann 
Mueller, op. cit., p. 200. 
8 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 178; Hermann 
Mueller, op. cit., pp. 196-99. This 
commission was comprised of leading 
socialist economists and theorists such 
as Karl Kautsky, who was elected as 
chairman of the commission, Heinrich 
Cunow, Rudolf Hilferding, Professors 
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The Socialization Commission met tor the first time on De­
cember 5, 1918. Five days later, it published the first preliminary 
report which constituted the platform for its work. The follow­
ing significant statements were made: 
The Commission is conscious of the fact that the socialization of 
the means of production can only be accomplished during an organic 
evolution lasting for some time. The first prerequisite for any eco­
nomic re-organization is the revival of production. The economic 
situation of Germany demands, first, the re-establishment of export 
industry and foreign trade. 
The Commission is of the opinion that the present organization of 
these branches of the economy must be retained .... 
However, the Commission believes that those branches of the 
national economy in which capitalist-monopolistic arrangements have 
developed should be considered first for socialization. . . . 9 
The report of the Socialization Commission made it clear that 
the government _was not supporting indiscriminate nationalization 
of the means of production and did not intend to socialize every 
branch of the economy even in the distant future. The program 
of the Commission restored confidence among business people 
·and thereby contributed to the revival of the national economy.10 
On January 7, 1919, the Socialization Commission reported 
its preliminary findings to the government. They added nothing 
new to the work program of December 1918. The Commission 
warned of the dangers inherent in a doctrinaire transformation of 
the economy and advised that the situation of each individual 
branch of the economy be studied to determine how much sociali­
zation would be advisable.11 
Karl Ballod, E. Franke, E. Lederer, 
and several others. (Ibid., p. 197.) 
9 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 177.
10 Ibid. The Nationalzeitung wrote 
in a stock market report on December 
16, 1918: "The greatest concern of the 
[stock] exchange, i.e., the danger of 
Bolshevism and equally the danger of 
a general socialization of industry, can 
now be regarded as completely over­
come." (Quoted in Ulbricht, Zur Ges­
chichte, p. 30.) 
11 Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, pp.
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Karl Kautsky in particular tried to convince the workers that 
socialization was practically impossible because of the condition 
of Germany's post-war economy. 
The economic base on which socialism was supposed to be erected 
was the immense wealth created by capitalism and which should have 
made it possible to create a rule of well-being for everybody. This 
wealth has been almost completely destroyed during nearly five years 
of war and war-time conditions; thus the economic base of socialism 
has become extremely reduced.12
While socialization was being considered, studied, and post­
poned, the trade unions and the employers' associations arrived 
at a general agreement on November 15, 1918, which for the 
first time made the unions the official and recognized representa­
tive agencies of the workers. The employers' associations ac­
cepted another agreement which provided that henceforth col­
lective bargaining was the sole means for settling wage questions 
and for determining working conditions. This so-called November 
Agreement was celebrated by union and SPD leaders as a great 
labor victory while the left wing radicals bitterly denounced it as 
a violation of the principle of the class struggle.13
In its effort to establish law and order and to solve urgent 
do_mestic and foreign problems the Provisional government be­
lieved that it must rely on the cooperation of the well-trained and 
77-78, Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
207-08.
12 Karl Kautsky, "Aussichten der 
Revolution," ed. by E. Drahn and E. 
Friedegg, Deutscher Revolutions-Al­
manach fuer das Jahr 1919 (Hamburg­
Berlin: Hoffmann & Campe Verlag, 
1919), p. 28. Otto Grotewohl refers to 
a publication by Kautsky, Sozialdemo­
kratische Bemerkungen zur Ueber­
gangswirtschaft, Le i p z i g ,  1918, in 
which Kautsky declares that during 
the change from war-time to peace­
time economy, the prevailing system 
or organization of production should 
not be disturbed. Only after the change 
has been accomplished is it possible 
to begin transforming capitalism to so­
cialism. (Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 61-
62.) Also see the discussion concern­
ing the problems of socialization in Au­
gust Mueller, op. cit. 
13 Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, p.
75; Flechtheim, op. cit., pp. 37-38. 
Flechtheim places the date of the 
November Agreement at November 
11, while Stampfer dates it at Novem­
ber 15. 
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smoothly-functioning official bureaucracy. Hence the proclama­
tions of November 9 and 12, 1918, in which Ebert called upon 
all civil servants to support the new "legitimate" government and 
assured government officials that their previously acquired rights 
would be fully protected. 14 Most government employees continued 
in their positions, although in spirit they remained the same old 
imperial bureaucrats and never became converted, democratically­
inclined civil servants. The decision to rely on these officials, who 
by origin and tradition were reactionary and monarchist-minded, 
was one of the most significant taken by the Provisional govern­
ment. It perpetuated the autocratic spirit among the German civil 
service including the judiciary which at a later date decisively sup­
ported elements hostile to the democratic German Republic.15 
An even more significant step was the conclusion of a working 
agreement with the Supreme Command of the German Army. It 
was - and still is - generally believed that the Ebert-Groener 
Pact, as this arrangement later became known, was one of the most 
decisive influences in the period immediately following the Nov­
ember uprising. To a large extent, it directed the course of sub­
sequent revolutionary developments and also made it possible for 
the professional officer corps, symbolized by the representatives 
of the General Staff, to weather the revolutionary storm and to 
regain afterwards its influential position in German political life. 
Ebert and the Majority Socialists have been severely attac�ed 
by the political left as well as by liberal democratic circles for 
having reached an agreement with the leaders of the former im­
perial army and for having collaborated with the German General 
Staff. Communists, as a matter of course, charged that Ebert de­
liberately made common cause with the reactionary officers in 
order to destroy the revolutionary workers - in particular the 
Spartacists - and thereby to prevent developments from exceed­
ing the dimensions of a bourgeois revolution. 16 This agreement 
14 See above, p. 89, n. 43; Grzesin­
ski, op. cit., p. 80. 
15 Ibid., p. 79. 
16 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 83-84. 
Paul Froelich claims that the Ebert­
Groener Pact was concluded with the 
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was also called a "natural" alliance because both Ebert and the 
Supreme Command were opposed to real changes in Germany.11
Neither of those assertions can be supported by factual evidence. 
The real difficulties in which Ebert, as People's Commissar in 
charge of internal and military affairs, found himself as the result 
of the Allies' demands for a speedy evacuation and demobilization 
of German military forces and of his sincere intention to re­
establish law and order, were far weightier than all the sinister 
motives ascribed to him.18 Ebert could have chosen either the 
Supreme Command, which was still in control of the field armies, 
or the soldiers' councils as the instrument for carrying out the 
evacuation. However, the time limit of 30 days hardly permitted 
him any other choice than the Supreme Command.19 
Ebert also needed a reliable armed force to make law and 
order of the chaotic conditions which followed the breakdown of 
the old authority during the revolution. There were many armed 
workers and soldiers in Berlin, but the Provisional government 
could not depend on them. Many of these armed men were or­
ganized in quasi-military "revolutionary" units which fought 
against each other for supremacy; the regular army units were 
still far from the capitol. Each political faction aspired to have 
its own military formation. The Spartacists organized the Na­
tional Association of Deserters ( Reichsbund der Deserteure). 
The Independent Chief of Police, Emil Eichhorn, with the sane-
immediate aim of suppressing the 
workers in Berlin. (Froelich, Rosa 
Luxemburg, p. 318.) 
17 William Ebenstein, The German 
Record (New York-Toronto: Rine­
hart & Co., 1945), pp. 195-96. 
18 This writer agrees with Waite's
interpretation of Ebert's actions. Waite 
claims that Ebert was prompted by the 
pressure of events when he turned to 
the Supreme Command for help. 
"Ebert's real mistake was not made 
on the night of November 9. At that 
time, he made the only decision pos­
sible. His mistake and it proved to 
be a fatal one was in continuing to 
rely on the Army even after it had 
proved faithless and in failing to try 
to build an army sympathetic to the 
Republic until it was much too late." 
(Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of 
Nazism (Cambridge: Harvard Univer­
sity Press, 1952], p. 6.) 
19 Ibid., pp. 3-4. Arthur Rosenberg
calls this the first great mistake of the 
Republic. Military experts tend to be­
lieve that the former generals were es­
sential for this complicated undertak­
ing. (Ibid.; see also Goerlitz, op. cit., 
p. 296.)
122 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
tion of the Executive Council, formed from the ranks of socialist 
workers and soldiers a Security Force (Sicherheitswehr), which 
was considered the military force of the USPD. In addition there 
was the People's Naval Division (Volksmarine-Division), con­
sisting of approximately 3,200 sailors primarily from Cuxhaven 
and Kiel, which occupied and settled down in the Imperial Palace 
and the Stables (Marstall). On November 17 the City Com­
mandant of Berlin, Otto Wels, began to organize a volunteer 
army, the Republican Soldiers' Army (Republikanische Soldaten­
wehr) which eventually reached a total of 15,000 men. Ebert 
expected the Supreme Command with its regular units to assist 
him in making order of this highly explosive situation in Berlin.20 
The situation in which the Provisional government found itself 
was summarized by Otto Braun, a leading Majority Socialist and 
later Prussian Premier: 
... Many who condemn the position taken by the Reich Govern­
ment during that time overlook completely the serious situation in 
which it found itself. Without having a dependable instrument of 
power, it was supposed to control the frantic outbreaks of violence of 
the misled masses. [Military) formations which were organized to 
protect the government soon made impossible demands and threat­
ened to use force if they were not met; they even arrested the govern­
ment for a time .... Nothing else could be done but to make use of 
the remaining organized parts of the regular army which, to be sure, 
were commanded chiefly by reactionary officers. . .. 21 
20 Waite, op. cit., pp. 2-3; lllustrierte
Geschichte, pp. 234-36; Erich Otto 
Volkmann, Revolution ueber Deutsch­
land (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 
1930), p. 119. For details on the Re­
publican Soldiers' Army, see also Oert­
zen, op. cit., p. 248; Noske, Erlebtes, 
p. 80; Anton Fischer, Die Revolutions­
K o  m m a n  d a n t  u r Berlin ([Berlin,
1922]), pp. 8-11. Revealing is the ad­
mission of Lt. Anton Fischer, who later
succeeded Otto Weis as City Comman­
dant and who assisted in the organiza-
tion of the Republikanische Soldaten­
wehr, that the so-called volunteers 
were quite interested in the monetary 
aspect of their services. Since the funds 
available at the Kommandantur were 
not sufficient, large amounts of money 
came from bourgeois circles which 
were interested in supporting a mili­
tary force serving the moderate Ma• 
jority Socialists against the dangers 
from the radical left. (1 bid.) 
21 Braun, op. cit., p. 84. 
CONSOLIDATION VS. CONTINUATION 123 
The motives behind the willingness of the military to col­
laborate with Ebert and the Majority Socialists during this period 
of flux were primarily to safeguard the unity and integrity of the 
Reich against a possible Bolshevik assault and to preserve the au­
thority, prestige, and reputation of the professional German officer 
corps. 22 The specific demands which the military made in return
for their assistance to the Provisional government were: ( 1) sum­
moning of the national assembly, (2) disarming of the civilian 
population, and ( 3) abolition of all workers' and soldiers' coun­
cils. 23
The "Ebert-Groener Deal" did not work out satisfactorily for 
Ebert. The Supreme Command recognized that while it was still 
in control of the field army it had strong bargaining power, but 
that as soon as the troops were in Germany for any length of time 
they would inevitably disperse. Therefore, Groener and Hinden­
burg soon pressed Ebert to fulfill their demands, in particular the 
disarmament of the workers, the abolition of the workers' and 
soldiers' councils, and the ousting of the Independents from the 
22 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 22; 
Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 297. For detailed 
information on the establishment of 
contact between Ebert and Groener 
over a secret telephone line running 
from the Reich Chancellery to Army 
headquarters at Spa and on their con­
versation and agreement, see Waite, 
op. cit., pp. 4-9; Volkmann, Revolu­
tion, pp. 67-68. Also see lllustrierte 
Geschichte, p. 233 for an extract of 
Groener's statement in the Munich 
Dolchstossprozess in 1925. 
General von Luettwitz explained the 
background of the collaboration of the 
military leaders with the Provisional 
government as follows: "The old offi­
cer corps gave its support to the 
People's Commissars not because of 
its admiration or its political convic­
tion, but because of the pressure of 
time which categorically demanded 
the prevention of [duplicating] Russian 
conditions [in Germany]. The situ­
ation during the early part of Decem-
ber, 1918 was such that this could be 
done only in collaboration with the 
Ebert government. The time had defi­
nitely passed when the troops, inde­
pendently and on their own, could pos­
sibly have nipped the revolt in the bud 
and could have suppressed it." (Frei­
herr Walter von Luettwitz, lm Kampf 
gegen die November-Revolution [Ber­
lin: Vorhut Verlag, 1934], p. 17.) 
23 Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 298; Wheeler­
Bennett, op. cit., pp. 28-29. Wheeler­
Bennett describes the intimate contact 
between Ebert and Groener as fol­
lows: "Each night between eleven and 
one, the two men in whose hands the 
destiny of Germany rested talked to­
gether without fear of being overheard 
and, in Groener's words, 'reviewed the 
situation from day to day according 
to developments.' Indeed this secret 
wire became a kind of umbilical cord 
which bound the infant German Re­
public to its progenitor and protector, 
the German Army.'' ([bid., p. 28.) 
124 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
Provisional government - if necessary with the use of armed 
force which they were ready to supply. Ebert believed that this 
action might bring about a civil war which he wished to avoid 
under all circumstances.24 
When the long-promised front divisions finally arrived in Ber­
lin - the troops which were to empower the Provisional govern­
ment to deal forcefully with the difficult situation in the capital -
they dispersed rapidly, partly because of the effective leftist prop­
aganda and partly because the soldiers wanted to be home for 
Christmas. Shortly after the first troops arrived on December 11, 
roughly only 1,400 men of the original nine or ten divisions re­
mained. 25 As early as December 16, the military leaders as well 
as Ebert realized that the plans based on the returning field army 
had failed. 20
In order to provide the government with reliable troops, Major 
von Schleicher's suggestion was accepted. He had recommended 
the organization of volunteer corps recruited from among veteran 
army men and _non-commissioned officers and commanded by 
imperial officers. 21
24 Jbid., pp. 28-29. According to
Walter Goerlitz, Ebert" ... was afraid 
-of a civil war with all its horrible con­
sequences, the same civil war which
the General Staff regarded as indis­
pensable to the clarification of power
relations and to the re-establishment
of order." ( Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 300.)
20 illustrierte Geschichte, p. 234. 
See also Edgar von Schmidt-Pauli, Ge­
schichte der Freikorps I 9 I 8 -192 4 
(Stuttgart: Robert Lutz Nachfolger 
Otto Schramm, 1936), pp. 178-79; 
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 125-35; 
Noske, Erlebtes, p. 81; Wheeler-Ben­
nett, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
2o Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 135-
36. 
21 This proposal by Schleicher was 
made December 20, 1918, during a 
meeting of the General Staff officers 
in Berlin. It followed the example set 
by volunteer corps organized for the 
defense of the eastern border of the 
Reich and authorized by Hindenburg 
as early as November 24. (Goerlitz, 
op. cit., pp. 300-01; Konrad Heiden, 
Der Fuehrer [Boston: Houghton Miff­
lin Co., 1944], p. 243.) There appears 
to be some willful distortion of the 
beginning date of the formation of the 
notorious Free Corps. Many of their 
units were organized during the later 
part of December, 1918. Ebert and 
Noske, for example, visited the "Free 
Corps Maercker" on January 4, 1919. 
( V o  I k m  a n n, Revolution, p. 171.) 
Therefore, Hermann Mueller is ab­
solutely incorrect when he asserts that 
the Free Corps were organized after 
the outbreak on January 4, 1919, of 
the s o-c a l l e d  "January Uprising." 
Mueller claims that these voluntary 
formations were supposed to provide 
the government with the necessary 
freedom of action in order to carry 
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Simultaneously with the build-up of a military force by former 
imperial officers with the sanction of the Majority Socialists, 
several propaganda organizations financed by reactionary circles 
operated a vicious campaign against the radical left. For example, 
the Anti-Bolshevik Liga disseminated hate literature against the 
Spartacists and in particular against Rosa Luxemberg and Lieb­
knecht. These activities, organized primarily by extremists of the 
right, were designed to get mob action against the revolutionary 
workers. The propaganda was also very strongly anti-Semitic. 28 
The attitude of the Western Allies toward Bolshevik Russia 
and toward the workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany became 
an issue in the political struggle within Germany for and against 
the consolidation of the revolution. The pro-consolidation forces 
asserted that the Western Allies would never permit Germany 
to follow the Russian example because this would bring Bolshev­
ism too close to their own home territories. 29 Concrete examples of 
hostile actions by the Allied occupation authorities, especially the 
French, against the councils were cited. Indigenous opponents of 
the council system emphasized that the Allies openly refused to 
deal with representatives of the councils and did not hesitate to 
show preference for officials of the old bureaucracy.30 
No information is available on the effectiveness of this anti­
council propaganda. However, the Executive Council in Berlin 
out preparations for the election of 
t h  e constituent national assembly. 
(Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 192.) 
The basis for Mueller's statement ·is 
the fact that the first official announce­
ment by the Provisional government 
concerning the formation of Free 
Corps is dated January 9, 1919, when 
the January uprising was well under­
way. However, numerous units of this 
type were definitely in existence prior 
to that date. (Goerlitz, op. cit., p. 301; 
Stuemke, op. cit., p. 163.) For a very 
thorough study of the entire Free 
Corps Movement, see Waite, op. cit. 
28 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
108-10, 122; lllustrierte Geschichte,
pp. 236-38; Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, 
p. 320.
29 Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 196.
30 Ernst Fraenkel, Military Occupa­
tion and the Rule of Law (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1944), pp. 
25-36. In a speech delivered on Nov­
ember 28, 1918, Liebknecht confirmed
the alleged practice of the Allies of
dissolving the workers' and soldiers'
councils in the territory occupied by
their troops. Liebknecht interpreted
this as symptomatic of Allied fear that
their own troops might become "in­
fected" by the revolutionary spirit.
(Liebknecht, Was ist zu tun?, p. 493.)
126 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
found it necessary to take steps to counteract its influence. The 
Executive Council distributed leaflets in which the bourgeois news­
papers were accused of printing false allegations concerning the 
Allied attitude towards the councils. These leaflets asserted that 
the Allies did not demand the abolition of the workers' and 
soldiers' councils, and to prove this point, the city of Trier was 
given as an example: here the American commandant had official­
ly recognized the local council. 31 
2. The Left Wing Radicals' Opposition to Consolidation
The Spartacists and the left wing radicals within the USPD 
fought with determination against the consolidation efforts of the 
combined powers of the Majority Socialists, bourgeois politicians, 
and military leaders. The opposition of the revolutionary radicals 
to the summoning of a constituent national assembly remained 
unchanged. They continued to view the assembly as nothing but 
an instrument for continuing the suppression of the working class. 
The radicals also did not share the optimism of the SPD which 
expected a socialist majority in the assembly; on the contrary, 
they anticipated a victory of the bourgeois political parties. 32
Rosa Luxemburg's opposition to the national assembly in­
.creased steadily after it became known that all political forces of 
the right, including the Supreme Command, had become sup­
porters of the "new democracy" to be founded by the constituent 
assembly. In December she identified the national assembly as 
"a counterrevolutionary fortification against the revolutionary 
proletariat."33 In an article in Die Rote Fahne, she described the 
two alternatives faced by the German people: 
31 Vollzugsrat des Arbeiter-u. Sol­
datenrates, Die buergerliche Presse ar­
beitet gegen die Revolution ( [Berlin, 
leaflet], December 17, 1918). 
32 "The capitalists and Junkers will 
utilize the war-weariness of the shop­
keepers and the speculative spirit of 
the farmers, they will incite the small 
property owners against the workers, 
and it is quite probable that the ma-
jority in the national assembly will not 
favor the class-conscious workers, but 
will be on the side of the bourgeoisie." 
(Karl Radek, Die deutsche Revolution 
[Moscow, November, 1918], p. 17.) 
Karl Liebknecht also shared this opin­
ion. (Liebknecht, Was will der Spar­
takusbund?, p. 508.) 
33 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die Wahlen 
zur Nationalversammlung," quoted in 
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Either national assembly or complete power to the workers' and 
soldiers' councils, either renunciation of socialism or most violent class 
struggle of the armed proletariat against the bourgeoisie: that is the 
dilemma. 34
In spite of the Spartacists' violent opposition to any action di­
rected toward a consolidation of the unfinished revolution, they 
did not plan, prepare, or organize an armed uprising with the in­
tention of overthrowing the government - regardless of the many 
allegations of their numerous contemporary enemies. Neither 
their political utterances and written statements nor their actions 
can be used to support these claims which were widely dissemi­
nated not only by "bourgeois" and military circles but also by the 
Majority Socialists. In fact, both the political concepts and the 
actions of the Spartacists at that time followed a very simple and 
open pattern which does not resemble the deceptive tactics of 
contemporary Communist parties. 
Their short-range revolutionary tactics were based on the fol­
lowing assumptions: ( 1) the revolution was being betrayed by the 
Majority Socialists who were supported in their endeavors by the 
traditional enemies of political, social, and economic progress; 
(2) most of the workers were unaware of the course which de­
velopments took after the mass uprising of November and, there­
fore, could not understand the "treacherous" actions of the SPD
and of the moderate wing of the USPD.35
The Spartacists' conviction of the political immaturity of the 
workers and soldiers did not affect their confidence in the masses. 
It was merely a statement of fact which called for specific remedies. 
Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, 
pp. 651-52. 
34 Rosa Luxemburg, "Nationalver­
s am m l  u n g o d e r  Raeteregierung," 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaehlte 
Reden, II, p. 640. 
35 Liebknecht blamed the policies of
the Majority Socialists for the confused 
state of mind of the masses and for a 
lack of political and social conscious­
ness. (Karl Liebknecht, "Was ist zu 
tun?," quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge­
waehlte Reden, p. 486.) The soldiers 
were especially ignorant about social­
ism. (Karl Liebknecht, "Der neue 
Burgfrieden," quoted in Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 469.) 
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Revolutionary propaganda and "revolutionary actions" were the 
means by which the Spartacists intended to educate the masses 
and gradually win over the majority of the working class. The 
revolutionary actions referred to were nothing more than street 
demonstrations and strikes, primarily of a political nature. Be­
cause of their political content, leading inevitably to clashes with 
the "reactionary" forces of the government, they would attract 
more and more workers and revolutionize growing segments of 
the masses. It was nothing but an extension of the old "revolu­
tionary gymnastics," as the opponents of the Spartacists called 
Liebknecht's tactics before and during the November uprising. 
While Liebknecht tended more toward action, Rosa Luxem­
burg believed that the principal mission of the Spartacist League 
was "to arouse a socialist spirit and consciousness in the work­
ers."36 However, both apparently agreed that the proletarian revo­
lution was only the beginning of a long and tedious road, and 
both-but particularly Rosa Luxemburg-warned their fol­
lowers against rash actions. 37 As late as December 23, 1918, after 
numerous armed clashes between left wing radicals and various 
other groups, including military formations -. struggles which 
often were used to illustrate the allegation that the Spartacists 
wanted to overthrow the government by a putsch - Liebknecht 
declared in a speech in Berlin: 
At present the Spartacists are attacked from all sides. The news­
papers of the bourgeoisie and the social patriots, from the V orwaerts
36 Ruth Fischer, op. cit., p. 74. Ruth 
Fischer believes that the difference in 
emphasis in these two tactical ap­
proaches between Luxemburg a n d 
Liebknecht reached the nature of a 
conflict during the months of Novem­
ber and December, 1918. (Ibid.) 
ar When Karl Radek returned to
Germany from Russia at the end of 
December, 1918, Liebknecht allegedly 
told him without disappointment: "We 
are only at the beginning; the road will 
be a long one." Radek further reported 
that Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, and 
he agreed that the only way to shorten 
the distance to the ultimate aim was 
relentless agitation, propaganda, and 
action. (Liebknecht, Red en, p. 3 66.) 
The Communists attach two differ­
ent meanings to the terms "agitation" 
and "propaganda." Lenin adopted the 
definition originally stated by Ple­
khanov, who is quoted by him as hav­
ing made the following distinction: 
"A propagandist presents many ideas 
to one or a few persons; an agitator 
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to the Kreuzzeitung, abound with the most fantastic lies, with the most 
insolent misrepresentations, with distortions, and defamations. There 
is nothing we are not accused of. We are supposed to advocate terror; 
we are presumed to intend to start the bloodiest civil war; we are pre­
sumed to have equipped ourselves with weapons and ammunition in 
preparation for the armed revolt. 38
The Spartacists remained confident throughout the consolida­
tion phase that, as long as the workers could prevent the counter­
revolutionary forces from suppressing the revolutionary move­
ment, the masses eventually would follow the political program 
of the Spartacist League. 39 Their confidence in the masses re­
ceived new impetus when the huge strike movement was started 
presents only one or a few ideas, but 
he presents them to a mass of people." 
(Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in Soviet 
Russia [Cambridge: Harvard Univers­
ity Press, 1950], p. 39.) 
38 Karl Liebknecht, "Was will der
Spartakusbund?" quoted in Liebknecht, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, p. 518. A typic­
al example of a bloody clash occurred 
in Berlin on December 6, 1918. The 
tension among the various political 
factions, especially between the Spar­
tacists and the Majority Socialists, was 
further aggravated by a number of 
events which transpired on that day; 
an attempted arrest of the Executive 
Council by troops, an occupation of 
the building of Die Rote Fa/me, and 
the appointment of Ebert as the new 
Reich President by a group of soldiers. 
On that day also three mass meetings 
of the Spartacists were held which 
were followed by the usual demonstra­
tion m a  re h e s .  The demonstrators 
marched toward the heart of the city 
as rumors were being spread that a 
counterrevolution had been launched. 
Troops attached to the office of the 
SPD City Commandant, Otto Weis, at­
tempted to intercept the demonstrators. 
The ensuing street fighting resulted in 
approximately 18 demonstrators killed 
and 30 wounded. For further details 
on these events, see lllustrierte Ge-
schichte, pp. 242-44; Stampfer, Die er­
sten 14 Jahre, pp. 80-81; Oertzen, op. 
cit., pp. 249-50; Volkmann, Revolu­
tion, pp. 122-24. 
39 See Liebknecht's warnings about
the counterrevolution in D i e  R o t e  
Falzne, November 21, 1918: 
" 
"Let us not deceive ourselves. The 
political power of the proletariat which 
was seized on the ninth [of November], 
is almost gone by now and continues to 
disappear hour by hour. 
"Parallel with this process of the 
weakening of the proletariat goes a 
most intensive rallying process of all 
the deadly enemies of the proletariat. 
In the country as well as in the cities, 
the counterrevolution organizes [its 
forces] w i t h  increasing cynicism." 
(Liebknecht, Das, was ist, pp. 474-75.) 
In the December 2, 1918, issue, he 
clearly pointed at the dangers coming 
from the military commanders of the 
returning front-line units. The Social­
ists in particular were threatened by 
them. Liebknecht reported cases where 
workers' and soldiers' councils were 
abolished by military commands. He 
also described other excesses com­
mitted by the military against socialist 
workers. (Karl Liebknecht. "Ruestung 
der Revolution," quoted in Liebknecht 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, pp. 499-502.) 
................. 
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at the end of November 1918 by the metal workers in Berlin and 
the miners in Upper Silesia and the Ruhr area. The strikes spread 
rapidly to other industries throughout Germany and involved 
great numbers of workers. The workers originally struck for 
purely economic reasons but soon political demands came into 
play. Clashes with counterrevolutionary troops resulted in the 
death of many workers.40 The Spartacists interpreted the spon­
taneous mass strikes as an indication that the workers again were 
beginning to take matters into their own hands in spite of the 
efforts of the consolidation forces. Rosa Luxemburg believed 
that these strikes would grow in size and importance and would 
become the focal points of the revolution. She also predicted that 
the revolution would assume an economic character and would 
become a truly socialist revolution. 41 
In an article in Die Rote Fahne she greeted these strikes as the 
beginning of the most powerful phase of direct mass action: 
Instead of waiting for the blessed decrees of the government or 
for the decisions of the famous national assembly, the masses in­
stinctively reach for the only real means which leads· to socialism: the
fight against capital. Up to now, the government has exerted every 
. effort to castrate the revolution and to establish harmony among 
classes .... 
The proletarian masses upset ... the revolutionary class harmony 
and wave the dreaded banner of the class struggle. 
The growing strike movement is proof that the political revolution 
invaded the social foundation of society. The revolution recalls its 
own original cause; it puts aside the paper wing of personnel changes 
and decrees which did not in the slightest effect changes in the social 
relation between capital and labor, and places itself upon the stage of 
events. 
The strikes which have just broken out are within [ the framework] 
of the present revolution, and are not controversies of a "trade-union 
40 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 247. 41 Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser­
reich, II, p. 676. 
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type" pertaining to trifles, to wage problems. They are the masses' 
natural answer to the powerful shock which capitalism has experi-
enced as the result of the breakdown of German imperialism and the 
short political revolution of the workers and soldiers. They are the 
first beginning of a complete settlement between capital and labor in 
Germany; they introduce the start of a powerful, direct [form of] 
class struggle in which the outcome can be nothing other than the re-
moval of the capitalist wage system and the introduction of the socialist 
economy. They release the active social power of the present revolu-
tion: the revolutionary class energy of the proletarian masses. They 
open up the period of direct activity on the part of the great masses. 
42 
This interpretation of the strike movement by Rosa Luxem­
burg was later strongly criticized by the representatives of the 
official Communist creed because, according to them, it revealed 
once more her two greatest weaknesses: over-confidence in the 
spontaneity of the masses, and a lack of appreciation of the role 
of a revolutionary class party. By the middle of December 1918, 
however, there were already specific signs that the need for a 
proletarian party which could supply leadership to the revolution­
ary masses was increasingly recognized by many of the Spartacists 
and other left wing radicals. 43 
It is possible to see in Rosa Luxemburg's program for the 
Spartacist League - published on December 14, 1918, in Die
Rote Fahne - a conscious step toward uniting the left wing 
radicals by providing them with a common platform.44 Consider­
ing that it preceded the founding of the KPD by only two weeks 
and the so-called "Spartacist Uprising" by about three weeks, this 
comprehensive statement of the Spartacists' political concepts and 
42 Rosa Luxemburg, "Der Acheron
in Bewegung," quoted in Luxemburg, 
Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 618, 620. 
43 See, for example, Oelssner, op. cit., 
pp. 133-34. Oelssner also referred to 
another "misconception" of Rosa Lu­
xemburg: "The weakness of the Ger­
man Revolution," according to him, 
was not that the revolution had not in­
cluded in its earlier phase issues re­
lated to "the social foundation of so­
ciety," but that the political revolution 
was never concluded and that no real 
decision had settled the question of
political power. (Ibid., p. 133.) 
44 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 259-63. 
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policies was important for several reasons. First of all, the pro­
gram re-emphasized the ideological independence of the Sparta­
cists from major Leninist concepts by specifically rejecting the 
use of terror as a tactical method and the precept of dictatorship 
by a minority. Secondly, it clarified the position of the Spartacists 
vis-a-vis the Ebert government and any other "bourgeois" gov­
ernment, as a policy of non-participation and non-interference in 
governmental affairs until the Spartacist League had the support 
of the majority of the proletariat. Thirdly, it formulated tactics 
for the long period of class struggle aimed at securing the con­
fidence and support of the masses. Fourthly, it provided the basis 
for searching discussions among the left wing radicals during the 
two weeks which intervened between the announcement of the 
program and the founding of the KPD.45 
Rosa Luxemburg's clear formulation of these political con­
cepts left no room for misinterpretations, especially of those issues 
related to the Spartacists' position toward a coup d'etat. Her 
statement concerning the rejection of terror reads as follows: 
The proletarian revolution requires no terror methods [ to realize] 
its objectives; it hates and despises violence and murder. It does not 
, require this means of combat because it does not fight against in­
dividuals but against institutions .... It is not a desperate attempt of 
a minority to shape the world by force according to its ideals, but the 
45 Ruth Fischer's interpretation of 
the main points of the program are: 
(1) " .•. the Spartakusbund would
not participate in any kind of workers' 
or democratic party alliance. If the 
present government reached an im­
passe, the Spartakusbund would nei­
ther attempt to support it nor attempt 
to overthrow it; it would neither share 
in a caretaker successor government, 
nor take power alone. In effect, the 
Spartacist program was equivalent to 
a critical toleration of the Ebert gov­
ernment, combined with militant pro­
paganda against army and for social­
ist aims." 
(2) " ... the rejection of revolution­
ary terror, again a conscious and strong 
rejection of Bolshevik practice. The 
Spartakusbund emphatically d e n i e d  
punitive measures against their ene-
mies; ... " 
(3) " ... a program of non-inter-
ference in the policy of the new Re­
public - of absentionism concerning 
the formation of the new state; that is, 
participation in elections to the nation­
al assembly but as a mere propaganda 
instrument." (Ruth Fischer, op. cit.,
p. 75.)
. 
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action of great masses of millions of people who are called up to fulfill 
a historic mission and to transform historic necessity into reality.46 
In the conclusions to the program, Rosa Luxemburg sum­
marized the position of the Spartacist League as follows: 
The Spartacist League is not a party desirous of obtaining political 
power over the working masses or through the working masses. 
The Spartacist League is only the most conscious part of the pro­
letariat [in terms of] objectives, pointing incessantly to the historic 
task for the entire broad masses of the working class, representing 
throughout the individual phases of the revolution the ultimate so­
cialist objective and representing in all national issues the interests of 
the proletarian world revolution. 
The Spartacist League rejects the idea of sharing power with 
Scheidemann and Ebert, tools of the bourgeoisie, because in this type 
of collaboration, it sees treason to the fundamentals of socialism, 
strengthening of the counterrevolution, and paralysis of the revolution. 
The Spartacist League will never assume governmental power un­
less it is supported by the clear, decisive will of the great majority of the 
proletariat in Germany, and in no other way except with their con­
scious acceptance of the ideas, objectives, and fighting methods of the 
Spartacist League. 
The victory of the Spartacist League stands not at the beginning 
but at the end of the revolution: it is identical with the victory of the 
millions of masses of the socialist proletariat.47 
Not all of the opposition to the consolidation policy came 
from the Spartacists. The left wing of the USPD, on many issues 
holding views close to these of the Spartacists, formed a powerful 
opposition force. The moderate USPD leaders, although on an 
entirely different level of operation (i.e., in the Provisional gov­
ernment), also frequently disagreed with the policies of the Ma-
46 Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 261. 47 Ibid., p. 263.
134 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
jority Socialists and eventually, at the end of December, 1918, 
officially joined the opposition to the Ebert government.48
The USPD's position toward the problem of consolidation 
versus continuation of the revolution was made more complex by 
the fact that the USPD had accepted governmental responsibilities 
within the "legitimate" and council governments of the Reich. In 
addition, the USPD supported two distinct positions since they 
were divided among themselves. 
The left wing of the Independents occupied the seven seats 
which the USPD originally had in the Executive Council. The 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards looked upon the Executive Council 
as their own domain, especially since one of their leaders, Richard 
Mueller, was its chairman.49 
The left wing radicals of the USPD, with their strongholds in 
the Executive Council and among the Revolutionary Shop Stew­
ards, very vigorously opposed the principle of national assembly 
and favored, as did the Spartacists, the council system. They in­
tended to make it a permanent feature of the governmental struc­
ture. 50 On November 13, 1918, Ernst Daeumig, an exponent 
of the left wing faction of the USPD and a memb(;!r of the Execu­
tive Council, proposed a resolution against the holding of the 
national assembly. Three days later the Council discussed the 
matter. Daeumig announced his preference for a "proletarian 
democracy," the class rule of the proletariat. His proposal was 
defeated by a vote of twelve to ten and the Executive Council 
thereby endorsed the national assembly.51 It was agreed, how­
ever, to call a general meeting of all the delegates of the workers' 
and soldiers' councils for November 19, 1918, at the Circus Busch 
to discuss the extremely important issue of consolidation versus 
continuation of the revolution and to give the Executive Council 
48 See below, pp. 147-49. 
49 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 100;
Tormin, op. cit., p. 74. Gradually, the 
Executive Council increased in mem­
bership to 45. See also a very interest­
ing description of the continuously ex-
panding work of the Executive Coun­
cil, Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 107, 
lllff. 
50 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 247.
51 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 128.
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an opportunity to report on its activities. At the meeting Richard 
Mueller vigorously opposed the national assembly and, like the 
Spartacists, referred to it as an instrument of the counterrevolu­
tion. It was at this meeting that he earned his nickname "Leichen­
mueller" (Corpse-Mueller) because of the following statement 
in his speech: 
We, the workers' and soldiers' councils must defend our power, 
even by force if it cannot be done otherwise. Whoever advocates the 
national assembly forces us to fight. I announce openly to you: I 
have risked my life for the revolution and I shall do it again. The 
national assembly is the road to political dominance by the bourgeoisie; 
it is the road which leads to fighting; the road to the national assembly 
proceeds over my corpse . . . 52 
Haase attempted to pacify the assembled delegates by de­
claring that it was impossible to lose the revolutionary achieve­
ments because the proletariat had the majority. He asserted fur­
thermore that in Germany democracy and socialism belong to­
gether. The meeting achieved no positive results although it con­
tributed to increased tension between the Executive Council and 
the People's Commissars. 53 
The moderates among the USPD were represented in the Pro­
visional government by Haase and Dittmann. (Barth, another 
Independent People's Commissar, opposed from the beginning 
anything the Ebert government did, but lacked the influence to 
do something about it.) They were opposed to the extreme forms 
of collaboration which the Majority Socialists undertook with the 
bourgeois and military representatives. However, they also op­
posed the revolutionary tactics of the Spartacists which were in­
terpreted by some moderate USPD followers as preparations for 
a coup d'etat.54 
52 Ibid., p. 129.
ss Ibid., pp. 129-30.
54 Haase (who was the People's
Commissar in charge of foreign affairs 
and "colonial affairs") was apparent-
ly quite dissatisfied with the collabora­
tion between the USPD and the Ma­
jority Socialists in the Provisional gov­
ernment. On November 26, 1918, he 
wrote the following in a letter to his 
' 
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The moderates among the Independents were in complete dis­
agreement with their leftist faction on the issue of the national 
assembly. Under pressure from the left, a general meeting of the 
Berlin USPD organization was held on December 15, 1918, at 
which Haase was able to achieve an important victory over the 
left wing radicals. He succeeded in obtaining support for his 
moderate policies: participation and preparation for the elections 
for the national assembly. The meeting endorsed the position 
ofthe moderates, 485 to 195 votes.55 
3. The Struggle for Consolidation
During the month of December 1918, the Majority Socialists 
attained two major political achievements in their fight for the 
consolidation of the German Revolution. The first was the crush­
ing defeat suffered by the council system at the First Reich Con­
gress of Councils. The second was the establishment of an all­
Majority Socialist government, an outgrowth of the fighting be­
tween regular troops and revolutionary military units during the 
Christmas period and the subsequent resignation of the USPD 
members from the Provisional government. 
The workers' and soldiers' councils in Germany did not chal­
·1enge the Executive Council of the Berlin Workers' and Soldiers'
Council, which claimed jurisdiction over the entire country, until
son Ernst: " ... The Scheidemaenner 
[people like the SPD leader Scheide­
mann], also kept bourgeois representa­
tives in important political [govern­
mental] positions. We still have not 
been able to accomplish the discharge 
of Solf [who had been foreign minister] 
from the Foreign Office, who without 
consulting me, publishes decrees in the 
same old manner. ... The revolution­
ary process is still in its beginning 
phase. How it will continue depends 
on the work which the government 
will perform ... " (Hugo Haase, Hugo 
Haase sein Leben und Wirken [Berlin: 
E. La u b  s ch e Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1929], p. 173.)
55 Stuemke, op. cit., pp. 172-73; Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 234-35. 
Characteristic of the position of the 
moderates was the answer Haase gave 
during a meeting of the People's Com­
missars on December 28, 1918, in re­
gard to his willingness to support any 
actions against a possible putsch by 
the Spartacists. Haase declared that he 
would oppose any v i  o I e n  t threat 
against the government regardless of 
the quarters from which it came, but 
he added that he did not believe the 
Spartacists intended to stage a coup 
d'etat. (Ibid., pp. 235-36.) 
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the controversy over the future governmental structure - demo­
cratic, parliamentary republic through a constituent national as­
sembly, or a council republic based exclusively on the council 
system - became the most urgent issue of the day. Pressure 
exerted by the councils to summon a Reich Congress of Councils 
became increasingly strong, because it appeared to the councils 
that the Executive Council was in favor of a class dictatorship. 
Thus, on November 23, 1918, after some delaying tactics, the 
Executive Council called the First Reich Congress of Councils 
for December 16, 1918, in Berlin.56 
The Majority Socialists as well as the left wing radicals placed 
great expectations in the Reich Congress, each side hoping to get 
the support of the delegates for their respective concepts of the 
future Reich constitution. Rosa Luxemburg called upon the 
Congress to elect a Central Council which would make up for 
the omissions of the past and would take action against the coun­
terrevolutionary forces which were poised to destroy the revolu­
tionary institutions, the workers' and soldiers' councils. In order 
to save the revolution, Rosa Luxemburg proposed that the future 
Central Council undertake immediately after its inception the 
following four measures: 
( 1) It must eliminate the center of the counterrevolution, the
point where all nerves of the counterrevolutionary conspiracy
come together; it must remove the cabinet of Ebert, Scheide­
mann, and Haase.
( 2) It must demand the disarming of all front units which do not
unconditionally recognize the political authority of the work­
ers' and soldiers' council and are being converted into a body­
guard for the cabinet of Ebert and Haase.
sn Richard Mueller, Vom Kaiser­
reich, II, p. 98; Tormin, op. cit., p. 94. 
Mueller claims that the People's Com­
missars demanded the Reich Congress 
because they hoped they would be able 
to work better with a central council 
elected by council representatives from 
all of Germany than with the Executive 
Council elected by the Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council of Berlin. (Hermann 
Mueller, op. cit., p. 211.) Grzesinski 
presents the erroneous version that the 
Provisional Government convoked the 
Congress. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 57.) 
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( 3) It must demand the disarming of all officers [ of the military
forces] and of the White Guards organized by the government
of Ebert and Haase and it must create a Red Guard.
( 4) It must reject the national assembly as an attack against the
revolution and the workers' and soldiers' councils.51 
The Russian Bolsheviks also saw the great influence a Reich 
Congress could exert on the further course of the German Revo­
lution. They wished to assist the left wing radicals with, at the 
very least, advice and the prestige which the presence of a number 
of Bolshevik leaders at the Congress would give. On December 
5, Lenin appointed a five-man delegation consisting of the ex­
pelled Joffe, Radek, Bukharin, Rakovsky, and Ignatov to par­
ticipate in the Reich Congress at Berlin. But the Provisional 
government refused to grant permission for this delegation to 
enter Germany.58 
In their evaluation of the general political situation, the Spar­
tacists greatly overrated the revolutionary spirit among the masses. 
As a result, the outcome of the Reich Congress - the rejection 
of the council system - came as a great disappointment to them. 
The left wing radicals found in what they called the "outdated" 
composition of the Congress the explanation for the decisions 
made by the delegates; thus they did not have to admit the ob­
vious fact that the majority of the German workers remained 
faithful to traditional Social Democratic concepts and were plainly 
opposed to a class dictatorship. The left wing radicals stressed the 
fact that the delegates were not chosen directly by the workers 
and soldiers but were actually representatives of the local councils 
which in most cases still had the same composition as when they 
were organized in the wake of the revolution. Therefore, the 
radicals claimed, they did not represent the true attitude of the 
57 Rosa Luxemburg, "Auf die Schan­
zen," quoted in Luxemburg, Ausge­
waehlte Reden, II, pp. 635-39. 
58 Lionel Kochan, Russia and the
Weimar Republic (Cambridge, Eng-
land: Bowes Publishers, 1954), p. 13. 
Only Radek, as already mentioned 
above, managed to reach Berlin dis­
guised as an Austrian prisoner of war. 
He came too late for the Reich Con-
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masses. 59 This assertion of substantial changes in the disposition 
of the masses toward the objectives of the radicals must be serious­
ly questioned in view of the results of the January elections, in 
which the Majority Socialists obtained a large majority of the 
socialist votes.60 Because of their superior organization through­
out Germany, the SPD had a decided advantage during the se­
lection of delegates for the Reich Congress. Nevertheless, the 
percentage-wise majority of the Majority Socialists among the 
delegates was not as "outdated" as claimed by the left radicals. 61 
The generally unfriendly attitude of the Congress toward the po­
litical left was also reflected in its refusal to admit Rosa Luxem­
burg and Karl Liebknecht to the Congress even in an advisory 
capacity. 62 
The outcome of the main issue of the Congress - national 
assembly versus council system - was a foregone conclusion con­
sidering the overwhelming number of SPD delegates and soldiers 
who were under the influence of the Majority Socialists unless the 
radicals through outside pressure could change substantially the 
opinions of many of these delegates. The Spartacists wasted no 
gress but was there for the founding 
congress of the Communist Party of 
Germany. (Ibid., p. 14.) 
59 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
323-24; lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 249.
60 The SPD obtained 11,400,000
votes and the USPD 2,300,000 votes. 
The KPD did not participate in the 
elections. (Ibid., p. 307.) 
61 In order to prove the "inherent 
conservative" character of the Con­
gress, the left wing radicals assembled 
some interesting statistical information. 
A total of 489 delegates had voting 
privileges: 405 were workers' councils 
and 84 soldiers' representatives. The 
political affiliation of the delegates was 
reported as follows: 288 Majority So­
cialists, 80 Independents, IO Sparta­
cists, 25 Democrats, 11 independent 
radicals, 25 members of a special sol­
diers' faction, 50 without party affili­
ation. (Ibid., pp. 249-50.) Otto Grote-
wohl gave a somewhat different break­
down, but essentially he presents the 
same picture. (Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 
73.) 
The professional composition of the 
Congress was given for most delegates: 
195 paid party officials [such as party 
and union officials, editors, etc.], 164 
from the SPD, 31 from the USPD, 179 
workers and employees, 71 intellec­
tuals [it is not clear if these 71 are a 
separate group or if they belong to 
other categories], 13 active army offi­
cers, 3 representatives of agricultural 
organizations, 1 tenant of a large land­
ed estate. (Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 
250.) Robert Leinert (SPD), Fritz Se­
ger (USPD), and Gomolka (front­
soldiers) were appointed as chairmen 
of the Congress. (Hermann Mueller, 
op. cit., pp. 215-16.) 
62 Had Liebknecht really wanted to 
attend the meetings as a delegate, he 
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time. On the first day of the meeting, a workers' delegation pre­
sented to the Congress in the name of 250,000 Berlin revolu­
tionaries a resolution which contained the following: 
( 1) Germany is a unitary socialist republic.
(2) All powers are vested in the workers' and soldiers' councils.
( 3) The Executive Council elected by the Congress of Councils
is the supreme legislative and executive authority and has
the power to appoint and discharge People's Commissars and
all Reich officials.
( 4) Abolition of Ebert's Council of People's Commissars.
( 5) Immediate, energetic execution, through the Central Coun­
cil, of all measures necessary for the protection of the revo­
lution, primarily the disarmament of the counterrevolution,
arming of the proletariat, and organization of the Red Guard.
( 6) An immediate proclamation by the Central Council ad­
dressed to the proletarians of all nations requesting them to
form workers' and soldiers' councils for the purpose of ful­
filling the common tasks of the socialist world revolution.63 
The delegates failed to be impressed by the "workers' delegation" 
even after the effort was repeated two days later. A motion by 
'Max Cohen-Reuss to hold elections for the national assembly as 
early as January 19, 1919, was accepted by a vote of 400 to 50.
Daeumig's proposal to call for a new Congress of Councils which 
should decide on the future constitution for Germany and to vest 
the supreme legislative and executive powers in the council system 
was defeated, 344 to 98.64 
could have been sent by his "National 
Association of Deserters" as a rep­
resentative of the soldiers. It is quite 
possible that the interpretation by von 
Oertzen is correct; namely, that Lieb­
knecht could only have made speeches 
as a delegate. He preferred to make 
use of the Congress by exerting pres­
sure from the outside. (Oertzen, op. 
cit., p. 254.) 
G3 Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte, 
p. 251. The terms "Executive Council"
and "Central Council" are apparently
used here interchangeably. Usually,
"Executive Council" is the name used
for the executive committee of the Ber­
lin Workers' and Soldiers' Council, and 
"Central Council" is applied to the
executive committee elected by the
Reich Congress of Councils.
64 For a detailed discussion of the 
events of the Congress of Councils in 
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Thus the Congress of Councils had, in the words of Daeumig, 
committed suicide by voting against the council system and for 
the early election of a national assembly. 
With a second major issue - the elimination of the influence 
of the old imperial army - the left wing radicals had more suc­
cess with the delegates of the Congress because " ... though di­
vided on many points of Socialist doctrine and dogma, the Con­
gress was unanimous and vociferous in its determination to put 
an end once and for all to the Officer Corps."65 On this issue the 
Spartacists also employed pressure from the outside. On the 
second day of the meeting, December 17, 1918, a delegation of 
soldiers representing the entire Berlin garrison, including the 
People's Naval Division, Eichhorn's Security Force, and even 
Otto Wels' Republican Soldiers' Army, insisted that: 
( 1) The Supreme Soldiers' Council composed of elected dele­
gates from all soldiers' councils, assumes command of all
army troops and of the navy.
(2) All insignia of rank are prohibited. All officers are to be
discharged. . .
(3) The soldiers' councils will be responsible for the reliability
and discipline of the troops. 66
These demands became the basis for the so-called Seven Ham­
burg Points which the Congress adopted. The adoption of this 
anti-militaristic proposal placed Ebert in a very difficult position. 
He defended his military allies as best he could. Hindenburg let 
his fury be known, declaring that he would not follow the pro­
visions set forth. 67
relation to the issue of national as­
sembly versus council system, see Bern­
stein, op. cit., pp. 82-84, 91-95; Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 216-19; 
Tormin, op. cit., pp. 97-100; Stampfer, 
Die ersten 14 Jahre, pp. 81-83. A mo­
tion to postpone the national assembly 
until March 16, 1919 was also de­
feated; only 50 votes were cast in its 
favor. (Ibid., p. 82.) 
65 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 32. 
66 Quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte,
p. 252; see also Hermann Mueller, op.
cit., pp. 217-18.
67 For the text of the Seven Ham­
burg Points see lllustrierte Geschichte, 
p. 253. The name derives from the
fact that it was proposed by the Ham­
burg delegation. Wheeler-Bennett, op.
cit., p. 32; Volkmann, Revolution, pp.
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On December 20, 1918, the Congress was to elect the new 
Central Council which was to assume the functions of the Execu­
tive Council as the control organ of the People's Commissars until 
the meeting of the national assembly.68 Having lost their fight for 
the perpetuation of the council system, the left wing radicals de­
manded that the powers of the Central Council be enlarged at the 
expense of the Council of the People's Commissars. There was a 
heated discussion on the interpretation of the term "supervision" 
in the adopted proposal of Luedemann-Kahmann-Severing which, 
against the votes of the left radicals, had transferred all legis­
lative and executive powers to the Council of People's Com­
missars for the period before the meeting of the national assembly. 
The motion defined the functions of the Central Council as "su­
pervision of the German and Prussian cabinet" and "the right to 
appoint and discharge People's Commissars, and until the final 
settlement of the governmental structure, also the People's Com­
missars of Prussia."69 Haase viewed this arrangement as requir­
ing the People's. Commissars to present legislative drafts to the 
Central Council and to seek its advice in important cases. How­
ever, if the Central Council should disagree with the People's 
Commissars, the latter had the right to make a decision indepen-
137-45; Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 255-56;
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 182-86;
Waite, op. cit., pp. 8-9. The Seven
Hamburg Points became law because
they were adopted by the Congress of
Councils. However, they were never
implemented. On December 20, 1918,
a joint meeting of the People's Com­
missars with the newly-elected Central
Council took place. General Groener
and Major von Schleicher were invited
to attend. The members of the Central
Council agreed that they had gone too
far in accepting the Hamburg Points.
It was decided that this law had no
validity for the units of the field army,
border troops, and navy. As far as the
home army was concerned, i.e., the
army administrative units and the units
slated for demobilization, special or-
ders implementing the Hamburg Points 
were to be worked out. (Oertzen, op. 
cit., pp. 256-57; Volkmann, Revolu­
tion, pp. 149-51.) 
For another version of this meet­
ing, see Barth, op. cit., pp. 93-94. 
68 The official announcement made
on December 21, 1918, read as fol­
lows: "The Central Council of the Ger­
man Socialist R e p u b 1 i c has been 
formed and has taken over the gov­
ernmental business for the Reich and 
Prussia. The Executive Council of the 
Workers' and Soldiers' Council of 
Greater Berlin continues its activities 
for the Greater Berlin area." (Quoted 
in Roemer, op. cit., pp. 22-23.) Cf. 
above, pp. 96-97. 
69 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp.
218-19.
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dently.10 The left wing radicals insisted that the entire legislative 
powers remain with the Central Council. A vote of 290 to 115 
decided to retain Haase's interpretation of the division of juris­
diction between the two Councils. 71 Against the advice of Haase, 
Dittmann, and Hilferding, the USPD factions decided not to par­
ticipate in the election for the Central Council. The USPD left 
wingers like Ledebour and Richard Mueller, who forced their 
party to leave the supreme council organ to the Majority Social­
ists, justified their decision by insisting that they did not wish to 
participate in the strangulation of the council system. 72 
The twenty-seven persons on the list of the SPD were elected 
to the Central Council. Among them were Max Cohen-Reuss 
(who became chairman), Hermann Mueller, Albert Grzesinski, 
and Robert Leinert.73 
The First Congress of Councils was a complete victory for 
the SPD with the one exception of the military issue. (But the 
Majority Socialists were able to straighten out quickly the tensions 
which the adoption of the Hamburg Points had created between 
the Supreme Command and the Provisional government. As has 
been pointed out above, in practice nothing was done about these 
Points.) In the first place, the proponents of the councils were 
turned down by the council delegates themselves; secondly, the 
10 For the text of Haase's statement, 
see Bernstein, op. cit., p. 93. 
11 Ibid., p. 95. 
72 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 
223; Stampfer, Die ersten 14 Jahre, 
p. 83.
73 For a listing of the members of 
the Central Council see Bernstein, op. 
cit., p. 95. Hermann Mueller reports 
interesting details of the work of the 
Central Council and its organizational 
structure. (Hermann Mueller, op. cit., 
pp. 239-40.) When the national as­
sembly met, the Central Council relin­
quished the political power it had ob­
tained from the Reich Congress. (Roe­
mer, op. cit., p. 24.) However, it did 
continue with some functions and only 
ended its activities in the middle of 
July 1920. (Grzesinski, op. cit., p. 64.) 
A second Congress of Councils met in 
Berlin on April 15, 1919, and changed 
the Central Council into a kind of 
workers' interest representation. The 
notion of political councils had been 
eliminated by the Majority Socialists in 
all bodies over which they held con­
trol. (Roemer, op. cit., pp. 30-32.) 
The last item on the agenda of the 
Reich Congress was the problem of 
socialization. The Congress directed 
the People's Commissars to start soon 
with the socialization of "ripe" indus­
tries as recommended by Hilferding in 
his report to the delegates. {Bernstein, 
op. cit., pp. 95-99; lllustrierte Ge­
schichte, p. 254.) 
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Congress reaffirmed the SPD aims of the revolution - the demo­
cratic, parliamentary republic; and thirdly, the delegates added 
to the general optimism and confidence with which the public 
looked upon the coming national assembly.74 Of paramount im­
portance was the fact that the Central Council was composed ex­
clusively of SPD members, a situation which considerably weak­
ened the position of the Independent People's Commissars. 75
Shortly after the Majority Socialists had won this major 
battle in the Reich Congress of Councils, difficulties with the 
People's Naval Division in Berlin gave them a pretext to impress 
the left wing radicals with the military strength they thought they 
could muster against any attempt to seize power. Whether this 
display of force was a deliberate act on the part of Ebert and the 
Supreme Command or was the result of a situation thrust upon 
them is most difficult to determine; the available accounts relating 
to the People's Naval Division are contradictory. Nationalists 
and Majority Socialists usually described the sailors as a group of 
mercenaries and looters; the left wing radicals made them out to 
be revolutionary idealists. 76 Even more important, the information 
relating to the incidents which brought out the bloody fighting 
on December 24, 1918, is also contradictory. The sailors al-
. legedly had agreed to vacate the Imperial Castle and to reduce the 
strength of their division as of January 1, 1919, to 600 men in 
return for 80,000 marks. 11 For reasons which are not quite clear 
Ebert and the City Commandant refused to pay the money in spite 
of the agreement made with the sailors. The left wing radicals 
74 Tormin, op. cit., p. 101. Hermann 
Mueller believed that great credit is 
due to the Congress because its de­
cisions opened the road to the national 
assembly. (Hermann Mueller, op. cit., 
p. 224.)
75 Rosa Luxemburg wrote on De­
cember 20, 1918, in Die Rote Fahne 
about the new Central Council. She 
claimed that this development finally 
achieved "the Ebert-'control' over the 
Ebert-government. Control of the 
devil by his mother-in-law." (Rosa 
Luxemburg, "Eb e r t s  Mamelucken," 
quoted in Luxemburg, Ausgewaeh/te 
Reden, II, p. 648.) 
76 Compare, fo r example, Volk­
mann, Revolution, p. 133 with the ac­
count in I//ustrierte Geschichte, pp. 
254-55.
77 The agreement, signed by all six 
People's Commissars, is quoted in 
Bernstein, op. cit., p. 104. (The Im­
perial Castle and Stables were used by 
the sailors as headquarters.) 
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charged that the violation of the agreement was a willful provo­
cation intended to incite the sailors to rash actions. The sailors 
reacted to Ebert's decision with the arrest of the People's Com­
missars, the cutting of all telephone lines from the Reich Chan­
cellery, and the seizure of Weis and two other Majority Socialists 
as hostages. Ebert used the direct telephone line to the Supreme 
Command ( the sailors did not know of its existence) to ask for 
immediate help. On the same day, units of the First Guard 
Cavalry Rifle Division under the command of General von Lequis 
were sent from Babelsberg, located a few miles from the center 
of Berlin, with the mission "to finish once and for all the People's 
Naval Division."78 There is no doubt that Ebert, without notify­
ing the USPD People's Commissars, gave orders to General von 
Lequis to liberate Weis and to force the People's Naval Division 
into unconditional surrender. 79 
The military action of the regular troops of the Supreme Com­
mand was a complete fiasco. After initial successes against the 
outnumbered sailors, fortune changed. Armed workers and units 
of Eichhorn's Security Force and the Republican Soldiers' Army 
came to the assistance of the sailors. On the same day, December 
24, 1918, Major von Harbou, Chief of Staff of Army Corps Le­
quis, phoned the Supreme Command and declared that it was 
impossible to rely on the existing regular troops. The Supreme 
Command then decided to step up the organization of the Free 
Corps units in order to have the military force needed to handle 
the "internal chaos. "80
The military outcome of the conflict gave the People's Naval 
Division a victory over the Provisional government. However, 
negotiations conducted after the cessation of fighting effectively 
78 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 258; Stampfer, 
Die ersten 14 Jahre, p. 85. 
79 Schmidt-Pauli, op. cit., p. 181; ll­
lust ri e r  t e  Geschichte, pp. 257-58; 
Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 
9. 
80 Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 259-60; 
Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
pp. 11-12; Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 
256-57; Schmidt-Pauli, op. cit., p. 181.
For very detailed accounts of the
Christmas fighting and its background,
�ee Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 100-21;
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 152-64;
Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 224-33.
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neutralized the unit. The sailors were attacned to the Republican 
Soldiers' Army and thereby came under the jurisdiction of the 
City Commandant. (Otto Wels was replaced on December 28, 
1918, by Lieutenant Anton Fischer.) The division of General 
Lequis was withdrawn immediately. On the other hand, the sail­
ors obligated themselves to vacate the Castle and in the future 
never to support an action directed against the government.81 
The Christmas incident had far-reaching political repercus­
sions which overshadowed the military setback suffered by the 
SPD and which eventually led to the second major political gain 
of the Majority Socialists in December. The Independent People's 
Commissars objected to the decision of Ebert, Scheidemann, and 
Landsberg giving unlimited authority to the Minister of War to 
deal with the People's Naval Division. They were even more 
alarmed since it had been done without consulting the USPD 
members of the Provisional government. Therefore, on Decem­
ber 27, Haase, Dittmann, and Barth directed eight questions to 
the Central Coup_cil, the alleged supervisory agency of the Council 
of People's Commissars. They made it clear that their continued 
support of the government depended upon the Council's answer. 
The questions were: Does the Central Council approve the action 
of the Majority Socialist cabinet members during the night of De­
cember 23-24, when unlimited authority was conferred on the 
Minister of War? Does the Council approve the methods em­
ployed by the troops of General von Lequis (i.e., a ten-minute 
ultimatum and artillery fire against the Castle and Stables) ? What 
is the Council prepared to do about the Hamburg Points adopted 
at the Reich Congress? Does the Council endorse the Supreme 
s1 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 118. Richard 
Mueller stresses the fact that no at­
tempts were made by the left wing 
radicals to seize power on the evening 
of December 24, even though it was 
generally known that the government 
was without protection. The Spartacists 
called for mass demonstrations for the 
following day, December 25, to pro­
test the actions of the Majority Social-
ist People's Commissars. (Ri c h  a r d
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 15-17.) 
In the course of these demonstrations, 
the Vorwaerts building was occupied 
by a group of about 500 men. How­
ever, this action was neither planned 
nor ordered by the Spartacists or by 
the Revolutionary Shop Stewards. On 
the following day, the plant was again 
freed. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 82.) 
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Command's defiance of the decisions of the workers' and soldiers' 
councils? Does the Council approve the transfer of the seat of 
government from Berlin as recommended by Ebert, Scheidemann, 
and Landsberg? Does the Council approve the limited demobili-
zation of the army to peace-time strength instead of complete de­
mobilization? How does the Council feel about the socialist re-
public's reliance for protection on the old imperial generals and 
units or on a newly-formed democratic people's army? Does the 
Council endorse immediate socialization of the industries ripe 
for it?82
After three hours of deliberation, the Central Council gave 
its reply. Because of its complete SPD composition, its answer was 
hardly a surprise. It was a complete endorsement of the actions 
of Ebert, Scheidemann, and Landsberg. The Independents there­
upon withdraw from the Council of People's Commissars, from 
almost all other governmental offices of the Reich, and from the 
Prussian government. 83
The Central Council, upon recommendation of the remaining 
People's Commissars, appointed three additional Majority So­
cialists, Gustav Noske, Rudolf Wissel, and Paul Loebe, as re­
placements. Loebe, however, declined, and since no substitute 
was elected to take his place, the Council of People's Commissars 
from then on was restricted to five members. Noske was assigned 
to handle military affairs for the Provisional government. 84 
s:2 Text of this series of questions is 
quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 123. 
83 The text of the reply of the Cen­
tral Council to Haase, Dittmann, and 
Barth is quoted in ibid., pp. 123-24. 
The statement delivered by Haase jus• 
tifying the resignation of the Inde• 
pendents from the government is quo­
ted in ibid., p. 124. Bernstein claimed 
the withdrawal of the Independents 
was "an inglorious and unfortunate 
capitulation" to the principles of the 
Spartacists. 
The withdrawal of the three USPD 
members from the Council of the 
People's Commissars was followed by 
the resignation of almost all Indepen­
dents from leading positions in the 
Re i c h and Prussian governments. 
Bernstein, Kautsky, and Wurm were 
the exceptions and they remained in 
their offices because no immediate re­
placements were available. (Ibid., pp. 
127, 130.) 
84 Starnpfer, Die ersten 14 lahre, pp. 
86-87. General Groener allegedly de­
manded from Ebert the appointment
of a strong man to replace a USPD
member. Ebert suggested Noske. This
choice was quickly endorsed by Groe­
ner since he and the other military
leaders had great confidence in Noske's
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The appointment of Majority Socialists as replacements for 
the Independents in the cabinet was advantageous to internal 
agreement. The Central Council and the Council of People's Com­
missars were composed exclusively of Majority Socialists. Both 
agencies could work harmoniously for law and order and for the 
preparation of the national assembly. The SPD enjoyed a monop­
oly of political authority. 85
The new government announced its general policies to the 
people: 
It is our intention to protect the Reich from upheavals until the 
national assembly meets, and then the elections will determine if the 
majority of the people wishes another government or if it stands be­
hind us. We are convinced that only a government which does not 
have to overcome internal frictions - that is, a government made of 
one piece of wood - can accomplish this, and we believe that we are 
that government. 86 
Although it was a great advantage for the Majority Socialists 
to have been freed from the troublesome Independents in both 
the Central Council and the Cabinet, this development had for 
the over-all socialist movement in Germany some very unfortu-
. nate and lasting effects. The resignation of the USPD members 
from the Provisional government, for example, probably re­
moved the last chance of a reunification of the two socialist par­
ties. The resignation also pushed the Independents into the camp 
of the revolutionary opposition, and many of their adherents 
eventually joined the ranks of the Communists. 87 
abilities and attitude. (Waite, op. cit., 
pp. 13-14; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 82.) 
ss Starting on December 29, 1918, 
the SPD government referred to itself 
as Reich government or Cabinet in­
stead of the Council of People's Com­
missars. This change in name was one 
of the many indications of the efforts 
made by the Majority Socialists to 
overcome the "period of the councils." 
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 101, n. 2.) Ebert 
was appointed as chairman of the 
Cabinet. All laws and decrees were 
henceforth signed in the name of the 
Reich government. (Hermann Muel­
ler, op. cit., pp. 241-42.) 
86 Quoted in Stampfer, Die ersten
14 Jahre, p. 87. For other govern­
mental proclamations pertaining to the 
policies of the new all SPD govern­
ment, see Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 129-
3 I. 
s7 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 238;
Volkmann, Revolution, p. 168; Ri-
CONSOLIDATION VS. CONTINUATION 149 
The great demonstrations which took place in Berlin on 
December 29, 1918, gave evidence of the deepened cleavage 
within the German socialist movement. That day was almost 
like a general mobilization of forces prior to the commencement 
of open warfare. The USPD, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, 
and the Spartacists had called upon the workers to attend the 
funerals of the victims who perished in the fighting on December 
24, and to demonstrate against the "blood-stained government 
of Ebert" and against the entire counterrevolution. The SPD
had also called for a demonstration on the same day under the 
slogan "against the bloody dictatorship of the Spartacist League" 
and the fight against "the terror of a minority." Both sides drew 
large crowds, and the demonstrating masses moved through the 
streets of Berlin until the late evening hours. 88 
4. The Founding of the Communist Party of Germany
During the month of December 1918, a growing number of 
Spartacists came to believe that any organizational connection 
with the USPD was out of the question, because of the policies 
and actions of the party's leadership and especially of the In­
dependent People's Commissars. The moderate USPD leaders 
had endorsed the principle of the constitutional national assembly 
and, according to the Spartacists, had thereby placed themselves 
solidly on the side of the "counterrevolution." Karl Liebknecht 
explained the position of the Spartacists as follows: 
The reactionary decisions of the [Reich J Congress of Councils 
were achieved with the cooperation of the USP-cabinet members. The 
large majority of the USP leaders made propaganda for the national 
assembly and fought against the council system. This act of treason 
committed against the revolution was completed at the Congress of 
Councils. The demand for a party congress, to make it possible for 
the masses of party comrades to make the decisions, was refused .... 
The leaders of the USP have helped to create the prerequisites for the 
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 13. Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 20-24; 
ss Stuemke, op. cit., p. 186; Richard lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 269-70. 
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rapid development of the counterrevolutionary forces, which are at 
the base of the events of December 6 and 24 .... 89 
The Spartacists, in forcefully demanding the summoning of 
a party conference, also wanted to take advantage of the increas­
ing opposition within the USPD toward its right wing leaders. 
We wanted to provoke the condemnation, by the USP members, 
of the compromised leaders. The request of the Revolutionary 
Shop Stewards as well as our ultimatum of December 22 demanding 
a party congress were refused. 90 
Simultaneous with their challenge of the right-wing leaders 
of the USPD, the Spartacist League called the delegates of its 
groups to Berlin for a national conference to begin on December 
30. The urgency on the part of the Spartacists to found their own
party was not primarily the result of their realization of the
USPD's policies. It was due to at least two other major develop­
ments. One was the growing conviction, as the result of the huge
strike movement which spread throughout Germany, that only a
proletarian class party could provide the essentia.l unified leader­
ship for the "spontaneous revolutionary masses. "91 The other was
the pressure being exerted by the Bremen Left Radicals for the
founding of an independent party.92 
89 Karl Liebknecht, "Die Krise in
der USP," quoted in Liebknecht, Aus­
gewaehlte Reden, p. 523. 
110 Ibid. Richard Mueller interpreted 
the short-term ultimatum, requesting 
that the USPD congress be held before 
the end of December, and the type of 
arguments used in the demand as proof 
that the Spartacist leaders intended to 
found their own political party. (Ri­
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 
88.) 
91 For the Spartacists' interpreta­
tion of the strike movement, see above, 
pp. 129-31. 
112 On December 24, the Bremen 
Left Radicals held a conference in Ber­
lin with representatives of their groups 
from Northern Germany, Saxony, Ba­
varia, and the Rhineland. The main 
issue was to decide whether to remain 
independent and form their own party 
or to join the Spartacist League. Karl 
Radek, the only member of the ill-fated 
Soviet delegation to the Reich Con­
gress of Councils who managed to get 
through to Berlin, attended this con­
ference and convinced the Left Radic­
als and the representatives of the Spar­
tacists, Leo Jogiches, that they should 
join forces in order to "strengthen the 
revolution." The Reich Conference of 
the Left Radicals decided to unite with 
the Spartacists, provided that the lat­
ter would leave the USPD. On the 
issue of participation in the election of 
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The Reich Conference of the Spartacist League actually 
started on December 29, 1918, with a closed meeting in which 
the decision was made to separate from the USPD and to form 
a new party. Only three votes were cast against this motion.93 
From December 30, 1918, to January 1, 1919, the Spartacists 
and the Left Radicals held the Founding Congress of the new 
party in the Banquet Hall of the Prussian House of Representa­
tives. On the first day of the congress, Karl Liebknecht declared 
the following in his speech about "the crisis in the USPD": 
Solidarity with Haase, Barth, and Dittmann is no longer possible . 
. . . Today, it has become necessary publicly to draw the dividing line 
and to constitute ourselves as a new independent party . ... Our pro­
gram and our fundamental principles have been in use for some time; 
all we have to do is to make them official. It is not necessary to make 
something new of ourselves. The masses already know what we are 
and what we represent. . . . 94
A motion made by Fritz Heckert (Chemnitz) to call the new 
party Communist Party of Germany (Spartacist League) was ac­
cepted by an overwhelming majority.95 
the national assembly, about half the 
delegates were for it and half against. 
In order not to decide this important 
question on the basis of a close vote, 
the conference adjourned until the 
delegates could consult with the mem­
bers in their respective localities. When 
the conference reconvened on Decem­
ber 30, only one delegate still advo­
cated participating in the elections. 
(lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 264.) 
The leaders of the Spartacists had 
also been preoccupied with the found­
ing of a party during December. They 
met on several occasions with the lead­
ers of the Revolution Shop Stewards 
to find ways and means to improve the 
collaboration of the two revolutionary 
factions and to establish a stronger or­
ganizational union. Richard Mueller 
reported that during these meetings 
the question of a possible withdrawal 
from the USPD and the founding of 
a new political party had been dis­
cussed. The Revolutionary Shop Stew­
ards expressed their preference for re­
maining within the USPD in order to 
enable them to enlarge their influence 
among the masses of the members who 
still followed the right-wing leaders. 
The Spartacists were strongly in favor 
of founding a new party. (Richard 
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 86.) 
93 Kommunistische Partei Deutsch­
lands (Spartakusbund), Bericht ueber 
den Gruendungsparteitag der Kommu­
nistischen Partei Deutsch/ands (Spar­
takusbund) (Berlin, 1919), p. 3 (here­
after cited as KPD, Gruendungspartei­
tag). 
94 Liebknecht, Die Krise in der USP,
p. 524.
95 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, p. 6.
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The 8 7 delegates and 16 guests at the congress represented 
46 different localities. It was a highly heterogeneous group. Very 
few of the delegates were genuine revolutionary Marxists. Most 
of them were fanatical and radical utopians who seriously be­
lieved that their immediate aim, the rule of the councils, would 
be realized very soon. They refused to see or to understand the 
various tactical problems which the actual situation entailed. The· 
influence of these vague political notions, held by a majority of 
the delegates, was much in evidence during the discussions and 
found reflection in some of the decisions taken at the congress. 9" 
The question of participation in the elections for the national 
assembly was the first major issue faced by the congress. (The 
opposition to the national assembly as "an instrument of the coun­
terrevolution" was unanimous and, therefore, did not require 
discussion.) It was an important problem because it involved the 
position which the Communists were to take toward "bourgeois 
parliamentarianism." Paul Levi spoke for the Spartacist leaders, 
who demanded participation in the elections in order to work 
against the national assembly from within. He emphasized that 
the elections would take place regardless of how vigorously the 
revolutionary forces opposed it. Even the use of violence against 
· the assembly would have no lasting effect because the real power
of the bourgeoisie would not suffer seriously from a minority at­
tack. The use of force was opportune only when it could be com­
bined with assumption of political power, and this could be done
only with the support of the majority of the working class. Levi
also reminded the delegates that the national assembly would un­
doubtedly control the political life of Germany for months to
96 Tormin, op. cit., p. 111. At a 
later date, the KPD determined that 
the majority of the participants at the 
founding congress of the party were 
people who were not Communists and 
had never even read the Spartacists' 
program. (Ibid., p. 111, n. 3.) Richard 
Mueller states that the majority of the 
delegates were anarchists, syndicalists, 
and putschist elements. (Richard Muel-
ler, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 88.) The 
"very insufficient political experience 
and lack of theoretical knowledge" of 
many of the delegates was also ex­
plained by the fact that many new 
elements had joined the League; they 
distinguished themselves primarily by 
their "revolutionary enthusiasm and 
readiness for action." (Illustrierte Ge­
schichte, p. 265.) 
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come, and it was important, therefore, for the revolutionary forces 
to be represented in the assembly in order to utilize it as a propa­
ganda forum. Most of the speakers in the discussion which fol­
lowed Levi's presentation were opposed to participation in the 
elections. Otto Ruehle declared that it would be equivalent to 
an endorsement of the national assembly. Rosi Wolfstein ad­
vocated political mass strikes against the assembly. The majority 
of the delegates were opposed to participation and neither Rosa 
Luxemburg nor Liebknecht were able to change their determina­
tion to boycott the elections. A vote of 62 to 23 ruled against par­
ticipation. 97
The contents of Levi's speech was significant not only because 
it revealed what most of the Communist leaders understood as 
participation in the elections and in the national assembly, but 
also because it was a strong re-statement of a fundamental Spar­
tacist principle - here related to an actual political situation -
that an overthrow of the government can be achieved only with 
the support of the majority of the working class. The original 
internal democracy of the party was convincingly illustrated 
when the leadership was out-voted by the rank and file. The 
newly-founded KPD had not yet learned the meaning of Lenin's 
"democratic centralism. "98
The Founding Congress also revealed the widespread con­
fusion which prevailed among the delegates concerning the po­
sition the Communists should take in regard to the trade unions. 
Paul Lange in his report on economic conflicts asserted that the 
unions were against the socialization of the economy, and that 
they were doomed as a result. The economic agencies which 
97 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, pp.
9-13; Oelssner, Rosa Luxemburg, pp.
138-39; Ruth Fischer, op. cit., pp. 77-
78.
98 The lack of understanding and
failure to apply Lenin's concept of 
"democratic centralism" is one of the 
points which Otto Grotewohl criticizes 
about the first congress. (Grotewohl, 
op. cit., p. 57.) Leo Jogiches was great-
ly disappointed with what he called the 
"lack of enlightment among the mem­
bers of the Spartacist League." He ar­
rived at the conclusion that the found­
ing congress was held too soon. (ll­
lustrierte Geschichte, p. 266.) Ruth 
Fischer reports a conversation she had 
with a "Mr. G. F.," who attended the 
congress. He had told her "that dur­
ing the session Jogiches asked him 
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should handle the interests of the workers were the factory coun­
cils: 
The organizations necessary to bring about socialism are the fac­
tory councils, which in collaboration with the workers' councils direct 
the internal affairs of the individual factories, regulate the working 
conditions, control the production, and eventually will have to take 
over the entire direction of the factory. . . . 99 
In the discussion following Lange's report, demands were made 
for immediate withdrawal from the trade unions. Rosa Luxem­
burg's intervention prevented this matter from being given a 
"premature vote. "100 
The delegates adopted the Spartacist program of December 
14, 1918, as the party platform. This event indicated that the 
organizational change from the Spartacist League to the KPD 
involved no basic changes in political thought or in fundamental 
tactical concepts. In her speech, "Our Program and the Political 
Situation," Rosa Luxemburg gave a detailed account of the de­
velopments of the German Revolution and of the lessons learned 
from them by the revolutionary Marxists. Possibly for the benefit 
of the new, impatient elements among the ranks, she discussed 
the revolutionary tactics which the Spartacists would have to pur­
sue in order to support the proletarian revolution: 
. . . what is the general tactical guiding principle applicable for 
the situation which shall confront us in the immediate future? The next 
thing you may be hoping for is the fall of the Ebert-Scheidemann gov­
ernment and its replacement by a pronounced socialist-proletarian­
revolutionary government. However, I would like to draw your at­
tention to what is happening at the lowest political level. We must not 
have [ the same] illusion we held during the first phase of the revolu­
tion on the ninth of November, that all that is necessary for a socialist 
revolution is to overthrow a capitalist government and replace it by 
whether or not he should blow up the 
whole affair." (Ruth Fischer, op. cit., 
p. 79, n. 31.)
99 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, p. 15. 
10° Tormin, op. cit., p. 111; lllustri­
erte Geschichte, p. 266.
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another one. The victory of the proletarian revolution can be achieved 
only when one goes about it in the opposite way; the Ebert-Scheide-
mann government must be undermined through social and revolution-
ary mass actions of the proletariat step by step .... 
. . . history does not make it as simple for us as it was in the case 
of the bourgeois revolutions when it was sufficient to overthrow the 
central authority and replace it by a few or a few dozen men. We must 
work from the bottom up; this is necessary because of the mass 
character of our revolution which is pointed at the very core of 
society; it is one of the requirements of the present proletarian revo­
lution that we must seize political power not from the top but from 
the bottom. . . . On the bottom where the individual employer faces 
his wage slaves, down there, where all executive organs of political 
class rule are standing face to face with the objects of this rule - the 
masses - there we must little by little tear away from the oppressors 
their powers and seize them for our purposes. . . .101 
Rosa Luxemburg knew well that many of the revolutionaries 
were greatly concerned about the length of time it would take be­
fore the revolution could be built from the bottom up. Therefore, 
she made the following statement: 
. . . The revolution is capable of accomplishing its achievements 
with tremendous speed. I cannot predict how much time this process 
requires. Who among us counts and who cares, if our lives last long 
enough to see it happen!102 
The future organization of the party was another concern of 
the congress. Hugo Eberlein proposed that the revolutionary 
program and tactics of the KPD should be the decisive factors in 
forming the organization. 
We are faced with the question of whether we should establish an 
election club or a political combat organization. The organizations of 
the old Social Democrat Party were, except during election times, dull 
and empty .... We must build our organization along entirely dif-
1o1 Rosa Luxemburg, Rede zum Pro- waehlte Reden, II, pp. 683-84, 687-88. 
gramm, quoted in Luxemburg, Ausge- 102 Ibid., p. 688. 
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ferent lines if we wish to maintain our readiness for action .... We 
demand that all political power be taken over by the workers' and 
soldiers' councils. The factory councils are at the base of the power 
[ of the workers' and soldiers' councils J. We must adapt our organiza­
tion to this situation. Therefore, it probably will be best to set up 
Communist groups in the factories. The shop stewards of the factories 
will form the conference of the functionaries of the community which 
in turn appoints the party office for the community ( Ortsleitung). In 
addition, meetings with the unemployed, etc. must be arranged. In 
the rural and industrially poor areas other solutions must be found. 
This type of organization has the advantage of increasing readiness 
for combat. This organizational form, however, must not be made 
schematic but must be adapted to local conditions. Individual locali­
ties must retain complete freedom in the selection of their own or­
ganization. It is not permissible to dictate from above. Individual or­
ganizations must have complete autonomy. They must not wait for 
direction from the top of the organization, but must work on their 
own initiative. The task of the central office is primarily to sum up 
external developments and assume political and ideological leader­
ship .... 1oa
No discussion took place, and the proposals were turned over 
to the program and organization commission for further study. 
However, the significance of the proposals was the strong em­
phasis placed on local autonomy and on the factory groups as the 
basic units for party organization. The general conviction was 
that here was the source of all political and economic powers. 
The congress elected a Central Committee composed of Her­
mann Duncker, Kaete Duncker, Hugo Eberlein, Paul Froelich ( as 
representative of the Bremen Group), Paul Lange, Leo Jogiches, 
Paul Levi, Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Meyer, Wil­
helm Pieck and August Thalheimer.104 
On the last day of the congress, Liebknecht and Pieck re­
ported the failure of the negotiations conducted with the Revo­
lutionary Shop Stewards who had been invited to join the new 
103 KPD, Gruendungsparteitag, pp. 
43-44. 
104 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 267. 
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party. The Revolutionary Shop Stewards made their acceptance 
of the offer contingent upon the adoption of five points by the 
party congress: ( 1) repeal of the anti-parliamentary decision con­
cerning non-participation in the elections for the national as­
sembly; (2) complete parity of the KPD and Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards in party leadership and in party committees; ( 3) precise 
definition of street demonstration tactics and agreement that no 
actions were to be taken without prior approval by the Revolu­
tionary Shop Stewards; ( 4) joint editing of the party newspaper 
and of all propaganda literature; ( 5) deletion of the designation 
"Spartacist League" from the party's new name. Liebknecht found 
these demands unacceptable; he was especially incensed about 
point three which was directed against the alleged putsch tactics 
of the Spartacists. 105
The failure of these unification efforts deprived the new party 
of a substantial number of members and also of the opportunity 
to win over, through the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, the radical 
elements among the workers. The KPD had only a few thousand 
members throughout Germany. In Berlin there were barely fifty 
members. It was an elite party or the framework for a mass party 
which remained isolated from the socialist masses for a consider­
able time.10" 
The events at the Founding Congress demonstrated that the 
Russian Bolshevik had nothing directly to do with the creation of 
the KPD or with its program and tactics. Karl Radek attended 
the congress as the official representative of the Bolsheviks. How­
ever, he could do no more than underline the formal solidarity 
which existed between German and Russian revolutionaries. 
105 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, pp. 88-89; Illustrierte Geschich­
te, p. 267. Tormin states that the de­
mands of the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards were primarily intended to 
keep utopian radicalism under control. 
(Tormin, op. cit., p. 112.) Richard 
Mueller, who attended the negotiations 
between the two revolutionary groups, 
gave this intention as the real reason 
for the actions of his organization. 
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
p. 88.)
106 Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 47; Illus­
trierte Geschichte, p. 267. R i c h a r d  
Mueller speaks of scarcely one thou­
sand Spartacists. (Richard Mueller, 
Der Buerkerkrieg, p. 85.) 
158 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
The congress also gave evidence that the left wing radical 
leadership had insufficient authority over the rank and file and 
that it was unable to control effectively its members. The lack of 
control was partly caused by the internal party democracy. Thus 
it was possible that in spite of Rosa Luxemburg's violent oppo­
sition to adventurous and putschist policies, so-called "revolu­
tionary actions" could get out of hand. Possibly Leo Jogiches was 
correct when he noted that the Spartacist members were not yet 
ready to form a political party.101 
101 Richard Mueller expressed the 
same opinion. He called the founding 
of the party a serious mistake. He be­
lieved that the Spartacists should have 
remained within the USPD where they 
could have exerted beneficial influence 
on that party's policies. (R i c h a r d  
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 90.) 
The Spartacists 
and the January Uprising 

"The Spartacist Uprising"­
Civil War in Berlin 
1. The Test of Strength
The hostile encounters between the Majority Socialists and 
the left opposition during December 1918 had deepened the cleav­
age within the German socialist movement. Mutual animosity 
had grown in intensity. The rival demonstrations on December 
29, 1918, at the occasion of the funeral for the victims of the 
Christmas incident, had illustrated the great antagonism existing 
between the "government" socialists and their opposition on the 
left. The attitude of the SPD leadership toward the left wing 
radicals was expressed in a candid article in Vonvaerts:
The despicable actions of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg soil 
the revolution and endanger all of its achievements. The masses must 
not sit by quietly for one minute longer while these brutal beasts and 
their followers paralyze the activities of the republican governmental 
offices, incite the people more and more to a civil war, and strangle 
with their dirty fists the right of free expression. 
They want to demolish and destroy with lies, slander, and violence 
everything which dares oppose them. They pose with boundless inso­
lence as the masters of Berlin, in spite of the fact that at least nine-tenths 
of the population hate and despise their actions from the bottom of 
their souls .... 1 
1 Extracts of this Vorwaerts article left "strangles free expression" is a 
are quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte, p. reference to the occupation of the 
269. The accusation that the radical
161 
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Middle class circles joined the Majority Socialists in their 
attacks against the left wing radicals. At the end of December 
1918, the so-called "Berlin Citizens' Council" distributed a leaflet 
which, in the manner of the SPD, blamed primarily the Spartacists 
for the unrest and violence. 
Workers, Soldiers! The Christmas blows of the Spartacist group 
lead directly into the abyss. None of us wishes to spill blood. How­
ever, it is easier to cure a mad dog with biblical phrases than [ to 
change] the Spartacists with gentle persuasion. The brutal force of 
these criminals can be countered only with force. If they intend to 
strike us down, we shall defend our skins. The hypocritical outcry of 
the Spartacists about the "blood bath" does not divert us from their 
intention to pit workers against workers and soldiers against soldiers. 
Do you want peace? Then every man must see to it that the 
Spartacists' rule of violence comes to an end! 
Do you want bread? Then see to it that all wheels are turning! 
Do you want freedom? Then eliminate Liebknecht's armed slug-
gards! 
When you are united, then the entire pack will run away. 
Do you want to be hungry? Then listen to Liebknecht! 
Do you want to become slaves of the Entente? Liebknecht can 
arrange this. 
Long live law and order! 
Down with the dictatorship of the anarchists!2 
In their propaganda warfare against the left wing radicals, the 
Majority Socialists and their allied forces blamed Spartakus for 
all violence and unrest. This practice appears to have been a 
deliberate attempt by those who favored the consolidation of the 
revolution or opposed the revolution altogether. Therefore Spar­
takus was used as the catch-all term even though the Spartacists 
were very few in number. 3 
Vorwaerts building immediately fol- 3 For a discussion of the Spartacists' 
lowing the Christmas fighting. strength, see above, p. 157, 157n. 
2 Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte, 
pp. 269-70. 
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There are several reasons for this practice of making the 
Spartacists the focal point of public hatred: ( l) It is conceivable 
that the SPD and other opponents of the left radicals acted ac­
cording to their convictions, actually believing that the Spartacists 
were the most dangerous elements among the revolutionaries and 
were retarding the process of consolidation. The fate of the Rus­
sian Kerensky government, liquidated by a determined Bolshevik 
minority, could have served as a warning. (2) The public censure 
may have been an intentional over-simplification of a complicated 
situation - a device frequently used in political propaganda war­
fare. The selection of the weakest among a multitude of op­
ponents and the use of it as a symbol of the entire opposition is 
convenient because it helps raise the morale of the censuring side. 
In addition, a defeat of the weakest component of the opposition 
can be developed, propaganda-wise, into a major and decisive 
event. ( 3) This practice could have been an attempt to drive a 
wedge between the various radical groups on the left. Making the 
Spartacists the root of all political evil could have been interpreted 
by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the left wing of the 
USPD as evidence of a more conciliatory SPD attitude toward 
them. ( 4) It also could have been a means of discrediting all the 
oppositional forces by identifying them with the "blood-thirsty" 
Spartacists. This would have been an especially desirable ob­
jective for the period preceding the elections to the national as­
sembly and could have been designed to reduce the influence of 
the USPD upon the masses. 
Whatever the reason, or combination of reasons, using the 
Spartacists as a symbol of political evil indicated that the Majority 
Socialists were concerned almost exclusively with the danger from 
the left. They apparently were not afraid that their military de­
pendence on the imperial officers would eventually lead them into 
a political subjugation by the alleged reactionary forces. This 
attitude can possibly be explained by the blind confidence of the 
SPD leaders in the security provided by democratic elections. 
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At the end of December, 1918, in spite of their improved po­
litical position, Ebert and his government felt insecure because of 
the lack of military forces to defend themselves against the coup
d'etat, presumably being prepared by the radical left.4 The Ma­
jority Socialists regarded the armed workers, the various "revo­
lutionary" military units which had failed to come to the support 
of the government during the Christmas incident, and the un­
reliable troops of the Berlin garrison as the forces which the left 
wing radicals would try to bring under their control in order to 
overthrow the government and to create a council dictatorship, 
following the Bolshevik example. On the other hand, the Spar­
tacists, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, and large parts of the 
Berlin organization of the USPD suspected that the SPD govern­
ment, in alliance with the volunteer units commanded by the for­
mer imperial officers and the reactionary political forces, were 
planning to suppress the revolutionary workers by force. 
In the opinion of this writer, neither side intended to start a 
civil war at the ·beginning of January. Even if the Ebert govern­
ment had wanted to suppress the revolutionary danger of the left 
and disarm the civilian population in order to · assure peaceful 
elections for the national assembly, the troops needed for this 
operation were not then available. On the opposite side, the newly­
formed KPD had adopted as one of its planks the principle of 
obtaining mass support before attempting to seize political power.5 
4 Many bourgeois circles and SPD 
leaders seriously believed in the coming 
coup. For example, Meinecke wrote 
". . . the most dangerous zero point 
was around the end of the old and be­
ginning of the new year 1918/19 when 
one was physically defenseless against 
the Bolsheviks, ... " (Meinecke, op. 
cit., p. 118.) 
There is also the report of a tele­
phone call from Ebert to General 
Groener at the end of December, ask­
ing impatiently when he could count 
on the promised volunteer units, the 
Free Corps. He pleaded urgently that 
the insurrection was imminent and 
that he had no military forces at his 
disposal to s u p p r e s s  the uprising. 
(Volkmann, Revolution, p. 170; lllus­
trierte Geschichte, pp. 272-73.) 
5 The unruly and noisy elements of 
the KPD who urged an immediate 
"proletarian revolution" lacked influ­
ence within the party and among the 
workers. It should be noted, however, 
that this situation was not generally 
known outside the party; this fact may 
have contributed to the fears of a coup, 
then widespread in government circles. 
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The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the left wing of the USPD 
were also against a coup d'etat. The negotiations conducted by 
the Spartacists with the Shop Stewards during the Founding Con­
gress of the KPD had given evidence of the latter's strong anti­
putsch views. 
Mutual suspicion caused the period at the end of December 
and the beginning of January to be marked by high tension. Any 
move in either camp which could be interpreted as an attempt to 
challenge or change the precarious power balance was almost 
certain to set off a test of strength, a civil war. The so-called 
"Eichhorn Incident" was the fuse that ignited the week of fighting 
which entered history under the misnomer of "Spartacist Up­
rising." Rudolf Hilferding, one of the USPD leaders, called it 
appropriately "the revolution's battle of the Marne."6 
2. The Eichhorn Incident - The Immediate Cause of the
Uprising
Emil Eichhorn, a left wing USPD Reichstag deputy, became 
the Berlin Chief of Police in the wake of the November Revolu­
tion. His imperial predecessor, von Oppen, sent a message to 
USPD party headquarters on November 9 requesting that a rep­
resentative be designated to negotiate the surrender of the police. 
Eichhorn was appointed by the USPD to head the police force 
for the time being. On the next day, the Berlin Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council formally approved Eichhorn for this position. 7
The sequence of the Eichhorn incident was as follows: Eich­
horn's dismissal from office as Chief of Police by the Prussian 
0 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 246. 
7 For a detailed account of Eich­
horn's appointment and early activities 
as chief of the Berlin police, see Emil 
Eichhorn, Eichhorn ueber die Januar­
Ereignisse (Berlin: Verlagsgenossen­
s c h  a f t  Freiheit, 1919), pp. 7-28. 
Noske's version that Eichhorn took 
over the office on his own responsibility 
and made an unidentified workers' and 
soldiers' council appoint him to this 
position prior to the time when any 
government was formed and then pro­
ceeded to create a so-called new police, 
is an example of the highly distorted 
reports on the January events. (Noske, 
Erlebtes, p. 80.) Most of the accounts 
examined in the preparation of this 
study were found to be influenced 
markedly by the political views of the 
respective authors. 
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government; his refusal to comply with this order; immediate sup­
port from the left wing radical organizations in Berlin in his at­
tempt to defy the Prussian government. 
The Majority Socialists had a simple explanation for the dis­
charge of Eichhorn by the Prussian Minister of Interior, Paul 
Hirsch. They claimed they were justified in dismissing the USPD 
Chief of Police, who refused to withdraw from the key position in 
Berlin, in spite of the fact that the Independent members of the 
Prussian government had resigned, following the example set 
by Haase, Dittmann, and Barth. The SPD had become increasing­
ly alarmed by Eichhorn's activities. His open favoritism toward 
the left wing radicals was a thorn in their side. He was accused 
of giving agents of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards leading po­
sitions in his Security Force, of having indirectly helped the mu­
tinous sailors during the Christmas incident by keeping his police 
neutral, of having armed 1,500 workers who then assisted the 
rebellious People's Naval Division, and finally of having publicly 
declared his opposition to the coming constituent national as­
sembly. The SPD newspapers opened a concerted campaign 
against Eichhorn, demanding his immediate dismissal from office. 
On January 3, 1919, Eichhorn appeared before the Prussian Min­
ister of Interior as requested, even though he had earlier an­
nounced that he recognized only the Executive Council as his 
superior authority. Confronted with the charges, Eichhorn prom­
ised to answer them in writing. The Prussian SPD government 
claimed to be convinced more than ever that it could no longer 
tolerate the situation created by a hostile Chief of Police, and on 
the following day it officially dismissed Eichhorn. Eugen Ernst, 
the Prussian Minister of Police, was appointed as his successor. 
Majority Socialists' accounts of the incident stress that the left 
wing opposition used this completely legal and justifiable dismis­
sal as a welcome pretext for beginning their long-planned fight 
against the government. 8
8 Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 131-34. The Eichhorn is quoted in ibid., p. 133. See 
text of Hirsch's letter of dismissal to also Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 
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Quite naturally, the left wing radicals viewed the discharge of 
Eichhorn in an entirely different light. They believed it was a 
premeditated action by the SPD, intended not so much as a seizure 
of an important executive office but primarily as a provocation to 
the revolutionary workers of Berlin. The leftist opposition in­
sisted that the SPD leaders knew the workers could not afford 
to give up the position of the Chief of Police without a struggle.9 
In order to prove their accusations against the Majority Socialists, 
the left wing radicals charged that the attack by the Social Demo­
cratic and bourgeois newspapers against Eichhorn was intended 
to prepare public opinion for his discharge. This censure had 
started before January 3, the withdrawal date of the Independents 
from the Prussian government. Furthermore, the preparatory at­
tack was not accidental, but allegedly was a well-coordinated af­
fair managed by the Political-Parliamentary-News-Service, a 
semi-official mouthpiece of the Ebert government. 10 The left wing 
opposition also circulated a statement ascribed to the successor 
to Eichhorn Eugen Ernst - who, on the day after the sup­
pression of the January Uprising, supposedly revealed to a cor­
respondent of the Manchester Guardian that 
a success of the Spartacists was a priori impossible; we (the Ma­
jority Socialists) forced them to resort to force prematurely because 
246-50; Grzesinski, op. cit., pp. 61-62;
Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 48; and
Volkmann, Revolution, p. 173. Volk­
mann's report of the incident is similar
to other SPD accounts. According to 
Hermann Mueller, who is obviously
mistaken, Eichhorn refused to appear
before the Prussian Minister of In­
terior.
9 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, p. 28. Walter Ulbricht asserts 
that the attack was also d i r ec te d  
against the Executive Council which 
originally appointed Eichhorn. This 
assertion is hardly justified since the 
Executive Council was by then com­
pletely under the dominance of the 
SPD, a situation which was clearly 
demonstrated when the council readily 
endorsed Eichhorn's dismissal order 
on January 6, 1919. (Ulbricht, Zur 
Geschichte, p. 37; Hermann Mueller, 
op. cit., p. 248.) 
10 Eichhorn, op. cit., p. 58. Richard 
Mueller reported that on January 1 
this news service circulated the fol­
lowing item: "Each day Mr. Eichhorn 
remains in his office as Chief of Police 
means added danger for the public 
safety." According to Mueller, this 
newspaper release carried the addi­
tional assertions that Eichhorn was in 
the pay of the Russian government and 
that he was preparing a civil war. 
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
p. 26.) See also lllustrierte Geschich te,
p. 270.
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of our preparations. They had to fight before they were ready and 
therefore we were in a position to challenge them successfully.11 
The interpretation by the left wing radicals of the over-all 
situation was as follows: 
The government people who decreed the dismissal of Eichhorn 
knew that they thereby most severely provoked the Berlin workers. 
The government wanted this controversy; they wanted it in order to 
fight, defeat, and disarm the working class. If this provocation had 
failed and Eichhorn had submitted to the order, then they would at 
least have gained the chance to change completely the police system 
in Berlin, to drive away the organized workers with whom Eichhorn 
had built up the Security Force and replace them with mercenaries. 
12 
When Eichhorn received his dismissal order, he reported to 
the party offices of the Berlin organization of the USPD. On the 
evening of the �ame day - January 4, 1919 - a joint meeting 
of the Central Committee of the Berlin organization of the USPD 
and the Revolutionary Shop Stewards had been scheduled to deal 
with routine matters. After learning about Eichhorn's discharge, 
. the discussion switched to the steps that should be taken to pre­
vent the government from carrying out its intention. Against the 
vote of a few Independents, it was decided to call the workers and 
soldiers to a protest demonstration the next day, Sunday, January 
5. No further details were worked out except the text of a joint
proclamation. The Central Committee of the KPD was notified
of the action which the USPD and the Revolutionary Shop Stew­
ards had agreed upon. The Communists decided to join the other
two organizations and to insist that the counter-measures to the
11 l/lustrierte Geschichte, p. 271. 
Richard Mueller be I i e v e d that the 
charges against Eichhorn were nothing 
but falsehoods and were made public 
only to influence public opinion for the 
planned attack against Eichhorn and 
the revolutionary workers of Berlin. 
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
pp. 26-29.) For Eichhorn's own de­
fense against the charges, see Eichhorn, 
op. cit., pp. 50-51, 60-61. 
12 lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 270-71.
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government's provocation be kept within the framework of power­
ful protest demonstrations. The Central Committee then felt that a 
violent overthrow of the government would lead nowhere, since 
a proletarian government could not remain in power in isolated 
Berlin for longer than a few days.13 
The text of the joint proclamation was immediately dissemi­
nated in leaflet form and was published the next morning in Die 
Rote Fahne and Freiheit. It read as follows: 
Attention! Workers! Party Comrades! 
The Ebert-Scheidemann government has heightened its counter­
revolutionary activities with a new contemptible conspiracy directed 
against the revolutionary workers of Greater Berlin: it tried malici­
ously to oust Chief of Police Eichhorn from his office. It wished to 
replace Eichhorn with its willing tool, the present Prussian minister of 
Police, Ernst. 
By this action, the Ebert-Scheidemann government wishes not only 
to remove the last trusted man of the revolutionary Berlin workers, but 
primarily it intends to establish in Berlin a despotic rule antagonistic 
to the revolutionary workers. 
13 Ibid., p. 273. Eichhorn, op. cit., 
pp. 67-69. Richard Mueller, Der Buer­
gerkrieg, p. 30. R i c h a r d  Mueller 
quotes from a Communist leaflet dis­
tributed shortly before the January 
fighting which reflected the lack of in­
tention on the part of the KPD to 
seize political power at that time: "If 
the Berlin workers would forcefully 
disperse the national assembly today 
and would throw the Scheidemann and 
Ebert people into jail, while the work­
ers in the Ruhr, in Upper Silesia, and 
the agricultural laborers of the area 
east of the Elbe remain inactive, the 
capitalists would be able to subjugate 
Berlin tomorrow by starving it out." 
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
p. 30.)
According to a Communist report,
published at a later date, the Central 
Committee of the KPD took the fol­
lowing position toward the Eichhorn 
incident: "The members of the Cen­
tral Committee agreed that all de­
mands which would necessarily result 
in the fall of the Ebert government 
must be avoided. Our demands were 
specified as follows: rescinding the dis­
missal of Eichhorn, disarming the 
counterrevolutionary troops ( S u p p  e 
unit, etc.), and arming the proletariat. 
None of these demands involved in any 
form the fall of the government, not 
even the demand for arming the pro­
letariat, because at that time, the gov­
ernment still had a large following 
among the proletariat. We also agreed 
then, that this constituted a minimum 
program which must be carried out 
with a maximum of energy. It was 
supposed to be the impressive result 
of a powerful revolutionary action. 
. . It was in this sense that we issued 
the slogans for the demonstrations." 
(Quoted in ibid.) 
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Workers! Party Comrades! The person of Eichhorn is not the 
main issue; you yourselves will lose the last remnants of your revolu­
tionary achievements through this major blow. 
The Ebert government with its accomplices in the Prussan Minis­
try intends to support its power through bayonettes and to secure for 
itself the grace of the capitalist bourgeoisie, whose disguised repre­
sentative it was from the very beginning. 
By this blow directed against the Berlin police headquarters, the 
entire German proletariat, the entire German Revolution is to be 
struck. 
Workers! Party Comrades! This you cannot and must not permit! 
Therefore, tum out for powerful mass demonstrations. Prove your 
power to the autocrats of today; prove that the revolutionary spirit of 
the November days has not been extinguished. 
Come today, Sunday, at 2 p.m. to the impressive mass demon­
strations in the Siegesallee! 
Come in masses! Your freedom, your future, the fate of the Revo­
lution is at stake! Down with the despotism of Ebert, Scheidemann, 
Hirsch, and Ernst! Long live revolutionary, international socialism! 
Berlin, January 5, 1919. 
The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Confidence Men of the 
large factories of Greater Berlin. 
The Central Committee of Greater Berlin Social Democratic 
Election Association of the Independent Social Democratic 
Party. 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany 
( Spartacist League) . 14 
The Majority Socialists as well as the leftist opposition had 
interpreted the events related to Eichhorn's dismissal from a 
purely political point of view. Both sides of the conflict failed to 
recognize that a strong personal element was also involved: the 
intrigues of Lieutenant Anton Fischer, the city commandant and 
successor to Otto Weis. Because of jurisdictional disputes and 
their political alignments, an intense enmity had developed dur-
14 Quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 
134.
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ing November and December of 1918 between Eichhorn's Se­
curity Force and Wels' Republican Soldiers' Army.15 Fischer 
anticipated an ultimate clash between the two militant organiza­
tions. In order to strengthen his position, he succeeded as early 
as December in bribing a number of Security Force leaders to 
make common cause with him against their Chief of Police. When 
the concerted campaign of the Majority Socialists against Eich­
horn began, Fischer thought the time had come for him to take a 
more prominent part in the final assault against his personal and 
political antagonist.16 On January 4, 1919, supported by two 
members of the Executive Council, Molkenbuhr and Frank, 
Fischer convinced the Prussian Minister of Interior that he could 
unseat Eichhorn once a dismissal order was issued.11 It is prob­
able that Fischer's intervention aggravated considerably the pre­
vailing tense situation and thereby directly contributed to the 
events which followed the Eichhorn incident. 
3. The Major Events of "Spartakus Week"
On Sunday, January 5, 1919, in response to the joint procla­
mation of the leftist opposition, huge throngs of workers surged 
into the streets and marched through the main arteries of Berlin 
shouting defiance at the "counterrevolutionary" Ebert govern­
ment. The number of participants in the demonstrations sur­
passed even the most optimistic expectations of the left wing 
radicals. 18 Great masses of people formed into marching columns, 
their revolutionary spirit further kindled by fiery speeches from 
15 For details on the tensions, juris­
dictional disputes, and mutual accusa­
tions of the two forces, see Eichhorn, 
op. cit., pp. 28-35, 42-46; Anton Fi­
scher, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 
16 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 269. Volk­
mann, Revolution, pp. 173-7 4. Fischer 
admitted that he had "bought" mem­
bers of the Security Force. (Anton 
Fischer, op. cit., pp. 55f.) 
17 Anton Fischer, op. cit., p. 54; see 
also Richard Mueller, Der Buerger-
krieg, p. 41; Oertzen, op. cit., p. 269. 
18 Bernstein believed that the over­
whelming mass response of the people 
was due to the cleverly written pro­
clamation which succeeded in con­
vincing the masses that the govern­
ment was committing a counterrevo­
lutionary, despotic act by dismissing 
the "proletarian and revolutionary 
Chief of Police." (Bernstein, op. cit., 
p. 133.)
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Liebknecht and other leaders, and moved to police headquarters 
at Alexanderplatz to bring their ovations to Eichhorn and to those 
who supported him in his struggle against the government. It 
was indeed a most inopportune time for Anton Fischer and Eugen 
Ernst to appear in the police building and demand Eichhorn's 
ouster. Caught in the spirit of the demonstrating masses, even 
those of the Security Force leaders who had accepted bribes from 
Fischer declared their loyalty to the Chief of Police and asked 
him to remain in office. Fischer, greatly disappointed by the be­
trayal of "his" men among the Security Force, recognized that 
neither threats nor pleading would change Eichhorn's mind. It
would require force.19 
A number of functionaries of the Revolutionary Shop Stew­
ards and a few members of the Central Committee of the Berlin 
USPD and of the KPD had come to police headquarters to confer 
on the next move, in view of the successful response to their joint 
summons for mass demonstrations. They were not able to arrive 
at any decision. and therefore postponed the conference for the 
evening of the same day. In the meantime Eichhorn, Ledebour, 
Daeumig, Liebknecht, and others addressed the huge crowds from 
the balcony of the police building. All of them severely attacked 
· the Ebert government for its alleged counterrevolutionary ac-
tivities, although none of the speakers called for violent actions.
The demonstrators waited patiently until the evening hours for
further instructions; when nothing developed, the mob gradually
dispersed. 20
Later in the evening, about seventy Revolutionary Shop Stew­
ards, the Central Committee of the Berlin USPD, and Liebknecht 
and Pieck from the Central Committee of the KPD gathered in 
police headquarters to resume their discussion on further action. 
It was at this meeting that the decision was taken to overthrow 
the government. 
10 Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 55-59; 20 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger-
Eichhorn, op. cit., pp. 69-70; Richard krieg, p. 32; Eichhorn, op. cit., p. 70. 
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 3 I; and 
Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 269-70. 
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The impact of the huge mass demonstrations upon the as­
sembled functionaries was so great that they believed sincerely 
that the masses were ready to overthrow the Ebert cabinet and 
support a new revolutionary government of the left wing radicals. 
Reports of spontaneous mass actions, the occupation of the V or­
waerts and of other bourgeois newspapers and press services in 
the area of the Belle-Alliance-Platz convinced the oppositional 
leaders that the revolutionary workers of Berlin were again taking 
matters into their own hands. Dorrenbach, the leader of the 
People's Naval Division, described the high revolutionary spirit 
of his own unit and of the other troops of the Berlin garrison. 
According to him, all these units, including troops in Spandau 
and in other parts of the Reich, were ready to overthrow force­
fully the Ebert government. Against the votes of six persons, 
among whom were Ernst Daeumig and Richard Mueller, the con­
ferees decided to take up the fight against the government with 
the aim of replacing it with a revolutionary government. It was 
also decided to maintain the occupation of the newspaper plants 
and to proclaim a general strike for Berlin. A provisional Revo­
lutionary Committee, comprised of fifty-three persons with three 
co-chairmen, Ledebour, Liebknecht, and Paul Scholze, was 
elected. This Committee was charged with the preparation, di­
rection, and coordination of the struggle for power. After the 
fall of the Ebert government it was temporarily to take over gov­
ernmental affairs. 21
The so-called "spontaneous occupation" of the newspaper 
plants on January 5, followed by the seizure of several public 
21 See Richard Mueller, Der Buer­
gerkrieg, pp. 32-35 for a detailed de­
scription of this revolutionary evening 
meeting on January 5. Mueller re­
lates the position taken by most of 
the prominent leaders among the or­
ganizations represented at the meet­
ing. He also describes the arguments 
of the six functionaries, including his 
own, who were opposed to the de­
cision of overthrowing the govern-
ment by violence. The other four who 
shared his and Daeumig's views were 
Paul Eckert, Heinrich Mahlzahn, Neu­
endorf, and Oskar Rusch. 
See also lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 
274-75. A long quote of Ledebour's
statement at his trial for treason on
the occurrences at this meeting is given
in ibid. Another account of a par­
ticipant is Eichhorn, op. cit., pp. 70-
72. See also Bernstein, op. cit., pp.
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buildings, became one of the most controversial and significant 
issues of the January incidents. The left wing radicals as well as 
the Majority Socialists used their respective interpretations of 
these seizures as proof that the other side had planned this action 
as a fight to the finish. The opposition of the left insisted that 
it had neither planned nor ordered the seizure of the buildings; 
it regarded the occupation of the V orwaerts and of the other news­
paper buildings as a spontaneous mass protest action against the 
continued dissemination of vicious propaganda by these papers 
against Eichhorn and the revolutionary workers of Berlin. After 
the conclusion of the January fighting, the leftist forces changed 
their story into a declaration that they had been deceived by the 
SPD. They asserted that absolute proof had been obtained that 
the seizures were the work of agents provocateurs who were mem­
bers of an intelligence organization built up by Anton Fischer 
during his days as Berlin City Commandant. The left claimed 
that the occupation of these buildings was designed to lure them 
into the fight, to tie down their forces in unimportant and isolated 
locations, and to give the SPD an excuse to use its newly-organized 
military units for the destruction of the left wing opposition.22
On their part the Majority Socialists pointed to the same events 
as proof that the left wing extremists had been waiting for an 
opportune moment to start their long-prepared insurrections.28
135-36, and Herman Mueller, op. cit.,
pp. 252-54. Different figures have
been given for the number of persons
o n t h e Revolutionary Committee.
Richard Mueller, Hermann Mueller,
and Stampfer set the number at fifty­
three. Bernstein claims it had only
thirty-three, while Eichhorn speaks of
some thirty men.
22 For details of the personalities
and actions of these agents provoca­
teurs, see Richard Mueller, Der Buer­
gerkrieg, pp. 41-46, 74-75; lllustrierte 
Geschichte, pp. 280-81. R i c h a r d  
Mueller also describes the wild seiz­
ures of the days after January 5, for 
example, the occupation of the Gov-
ernment Printing Office on January 6 
and of the Railroad stations and Main 
Railroad office building during the 
night of January 7-8 as actions of 
small groups of bona fide revolution­
aries incited by agents provocateurs. 
While Anton Fischer does not verify 
this accusation from the left, he con­
firmed the existence of a "small and 
unimportant intelligence unit" under 
the direction of a certain Suckow and 
Lichtenstein. The unit had about forty 
men. (Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 66-
68.) 
23 Hermann Mueller declares that 
"with the occupation of the newspaper 
section [of the city], the German Revo-
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During its short life the Revolutionary Committee distin­
guished itself by incredible incompetence and lack of initiative. 
The only accomplishments of the committee were the creation 
of a number of commissions which never became operative, the 
issuance of a few proclamations, and the ordering of an unsuccess­
ful attempt to seize the War Ministry.24 
The following is the first proclamation which summoned the 
workers and soldiers to leave their factories and barracks and to 
demonstrate again in the Siegesallee. Once more thousands of 
people marched through the streets in protest against the Ebert 
government and again waited in vain for further instructions from 
the Revolutionary Committee. 
Workers! Soldiers! Comrades! 
On Sunday you demonstrated with overwhelming force your in­
tention to destroy the latest malicious assault by the blood-stained 
Ebert-government. 
Now there are more important things in the offing! It is necessary 
to stop all counterrevolutionary intrigues! 
lution entered the decisive week which 
was to determine everything. In the 
event of a Spartakus victory, the world 
would have become enriched only by 
the new Soviet Republic Berlin. The 
rest of the Reich would not have fol­
lowed the capital. This time the 
People's Commissars were determined 
not to avoid the fight." (Hermann 
Mueller, op. cit., p. 251.) Bernstein, 
who in the early part of 1919 returned 
to the fold of the SPD, did not be­
lieve the assertion of Ledebour, Eich­
horn, and others that the seizure of 
the newspapers was the product of 
revolutionary mass action without di­
rection from the revolutionary leader­
ship. Bernstein stated that the occu­
pations of the v a r i o u s buildings 
showed too much coordination in time 
for spontaneous mass actions. He also 
maintained that the seizure of news­
papers was not as a c c i  d e n  t a  1 as 
claimed, but was intended to silence 
"inconvenient criticism." (Bernstein, 
op. cit., pp. 139-40.) Oertzen blames 
the occupation on groups of armed 
Spartacists who acted without orders 
from the leadership. (Oertzen, op. 
cit., pp. 270-71.) The Vorwaerts ap­
peared on January 6, 1919, as the 
"organ of the revolutionary workers 
of Greater Berlin." A long proclama­
tion of the first morning edition is 
quoted in Runkel, op. cit., pp. 205-07. 
24 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 276.
Eichhorn emphasizes that there was 
absolutely no central leadership for 
any military action. Operations of a 
military type which did occur during 
the January fighting were carried out 
by individual groups without coordi­
nation with each other. The reason 
for this situation was that "the organi­
zations participating [in the uprising] 
really had no intention of undertak­
ing any military operations" against 
the government. (Eichhorn, op. cit., 
p. 52.)
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Therefore, come out of your factories! Appear in masses this 
morning at 11 a.m. in the Siegesallee! 
Our task is to strengthen the revolution and bring it to fulfillment! 
Forward to the fight for socialism. Forward to the fight for the power 
of the revolutionary proletariat! 
Down with the Ebert-Scheidemann government! 
Berlin, January 6, 1919. 
The Revolutionary Shop Stewards and Confidence Men of the 
large factories of Greater Berlin. 
The Central Committee of the Greater Berlin Social Democratic 
Election Association of the Independent Social Democratic 
Party. 
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany 
( Spartacist League). 25
The second proclamation was prepared for release after the 
seizure of power: 
Comrades! Workers! 
The Ebert-Scheidemann government has compromised itself. It 
is herewith declared deposed by the undersigned Revolutionary Com­
mittee, the representatives of the revolutionary socialist workers and 
soldiers (Independent Social Democratic Party and Communist Party). 
The undersigned Revolutionary Committee has temporarily taken 
over governmental affairs. 
Comrades! Workers! 
Join the actions of the Revolutionary Committee. 
Berlin, January 6, 1919. 
The Revolutionary Committee. 
Ledebour Liebknecht Scholze26
[Liebknecht signed for the absent Ledebour] 
25 Quoted in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 
138. 
26 lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 272. 
The Revolutionary Committee moved 
during the night of January 5-6 from 
the police headquarters to the Im­
perial Stables, where it was not wel­
comed by the sailors who intended' to 
remain neutral in the forthcoming 
fight. So on January 6, it returned to 
its original location in the police build­
ing. (Bernstein, op. cit., p. 150; Anton 
Fischer, op. cit., p. 63.) The attempted 
seizure of the War Ministry, ordered 
by the Revolutionary Committee, was 
a tragic-comical incident which illus­
trated the total incompetence of that 
committee. A sailor was placed in 
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One of the best descriptions of the situation during these fate­
ful days in January is a sarcastic article printed one year later in 
Die Rote Fahne in reply to Ledebour's claim that he had started 
the January revolution. 
What happened on Monday in Berlin was perhaps the greatest 
proletarian mass action in history. We do believe that not even in 
Russia were there mass demonstrations of this size. From Roland to 
Viktoria, proletarians were standing shoulder to shoulder. Deep into 
the Tiergarten they were standing. They had brought along their 
weapons, they had their red flags. They were ready to do anything, to 
give everything, even their lives. There was an army of 200,000 such 
as no Ludendorff had ever seen. 
Then the inconceivable happened. The masses were standing from 
9 in the morning in the cold and fog. Somewhere their leaders were 
sitting and conferring. The fog lifted and the masses were still standing. 
Their leaders conferred. Noon came and in addition to the cold, hun­
ger came. And the leaders conferred. The masses were feverish with 
excitement: they wanted one deed, even one word to calm their ex­
citement. But nobody knew what to say. Because the leaders were 
conferring. The fog came again and with it the dusk. The masses 
went home sad. They wanted great things, but they had done nothing. 
Because their leaders conferred. They conferred in the Imperial 
Stables, then they went to the police headquarters and continued to 
confer. Outside the proletarians were standing in the empty [sic] 
Alexanderplatz, rifles in hand, with light and heavy machine guns. 
And inside the leaders conferred. In the police headquarters guns were 
ready for action; sailors were posted at every corner in the corridors; 
in the anti-chamber was a milling throng of soldiers, sailors, and pro­
letarians. Inside the leaders sat and conferred. They sat the entire 
evening and the entire night and conferred; they sat during the next 
morning. When dawn came, they either were still conferring or were 
conferring again. And again the grey masses marched into the Sieges­
allee, and still their leaders sat and conferred. They conferred, con­
ferred, conferred. 
No! These masses were not ready to take over political power, 
otherwise they would have acted on their own and placed men at the 
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head whose first revolutionary deed would have been to make the 
leaders in the police headquarters stop conferring.27
The end of the Revolutionary Committee was as undistin­
guished as its brief life. On January 8, after it had become certain 
that the government was ready to take aggressive military action 
against the insurgents, the Committee issued as its last deed a 
leaflet ending with the empty injunctions: "Show those scoundrels 
your power! Take up arms! Use these weapons against your 
deadly enemies, Ebert and Scheidemann. Forward to the fight!" 
On January 9, the Committee is reported to have held its last of 
a series of useless meetings. 28 
The "declaration of war" by the left wing radicals put the gov­
ernment in a very difficult position. With the announcement of 
an all-out campaign dedicated to its forceful overthrow, the SPD 
government found itself with practically no military protection. 29 
It turned for help to its followers among the workers. During the 
night of January 5-6, a leaflet was printed calling on the workers 
to come to Wilhelmstrasse, the seat of the Reich government, and 
protect the Republic against the assaults from the "armed bandits 
of the Spartacist League." 
charge of three hundred men and or-
. dered to occupy the War Ministry. 
Upon their arrival at the Ministry, the 
sailor handed an official the written 
order from the Revolutionary Com­
mittee demanding the surrender of 
the building. The official replied that 
he was willing to comply, provided 
that the sailor present him a legal 
document signed by the representatives 
of the new revolutionary government 
who had failed to sign the paper before 
the sailor went on his mission. There­
upon, the sailor left his three hundred 
men waiting in front of the Ministry 
while he went back to the Imperial 
Stables, then the seat of the Revolu­
tionary Committee, to obtain the sig­
natures. Liebknecht and S c h o 1 z e 
signed the document for him. On the 
way out of the Imperial Stables, he 
overheard members of the People's 
Naval Division asking revolutionary 
workers to leave the building. He also 
learned that the sailors had decided 
not to participate in the conflict. Mak­
ing the policy of the People's Naval 
Division his own, he put the freshly 
signed document in his pocket, forgot 
about his three hundred men, and 
went home; he stayed away from his 
unit for eight days, reporting sick. 
(Richard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, 
pp. 37-38; lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 
276.) 
27 Quoted in Noske, Von Kiel bis 
Kapp, pp. 69-70. ("Roland" is a monu­
ment standing in front of the Berlin 
city hall; "Viktoria" is another desig­
nation for the Siegessaeule or Victory 
Column.) 
28 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 275; Richard 
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, p. 75. 
29 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 142; Ri-
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Workers! Citizens! Soldiers! Comrades! 
The armed bandits of the Spartacist League have forcefully oc­
cupied the V orwaerts for the second time. The leaders of these bands 
publicly announced again today their intention to overthrow the gov­
ernment. Murder and bloody civil war and the establishment of the 
Spartakus dictatorship [ are their aims]. Mortal dangers are threaten­
ing the German people, especially the workers. Anarchy and hunger 
will be the sequel to the Spartacist rule. 
Our patience is now at an end! 
We do not intend any longer to be terrorized by lunatics and 
crimmals. Order must finally be established in Berlin, and the peace­
ful reconstruction of the new revolutionary Germany must be secured. 
We are asking you, as a sign of protest to the outrage of the Spartacist 
bands, to stop working and to come immediately with your [political] 
leaders to the building of the Reich government, Wilhelmstrasse 77. 
Workers! Citizens! Comrades! Soldiers! 
Appear in masses! Show that you are strong enough to protect 
your freedom, your rights, and your party property.30 
Tens of thousands of workers followed the appeal of the Ma­
jority Socialists and assembled in front of the Reich Chancellery 
ready to protect their government. Scheidemann addressed the 
crowd and promised them arms. 31 
During the morning of January 6, the cabinet met with im­
portant members of the Central Council and the Minister of War, 
Colonel Reinhardt. Ebert declared that his patience with the 
leftist opposition had come to an end and that the events of 
January 5 must be countered by the most stringent military meas­
ures if the government wished to retain any authority. Additional 
troops would be needed for the suppression of the uprising. 
Colonel Reinhardt proposed the employment of the Guard­
Cavalry-Rifle-Division stationed in the vicinity of Berlin under 
the command of General Hofmann. The government believed 
chard Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 31 Bernstein, op. cit., p. 138; Her-
46-57. mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 254-55; 
30 Quoted in Hermann Mueller, op. Oertzen, op. cit., p. 271. 
cit., pp. 254-55. 
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it would be a tactical error to assign to a general the task of sup­
pressing the uprising, because the workers would resent this. 
Someone else had to be found. Noske was easily persuaded to ac­
cept the assignment.32 He immediately set out to organize the gov­
ernment's military counteraction against the left wing insurgents. 33
When the government recognized the Revolutionary Commit­
tee's failure to take decisive action, it gained courage and began 
vigorously to improve its over-all position which had looked so 
hopeless on the morning of January 6. On the afternoon of that 
day, the Berlin Executive Council- the agency which Eichhorn 
recognized as his superior office - approved, twelve votes to 
two, the dismissal of Eichhorn by the Prussian government, thus 
adding insult to injury. (Daeuming and Richard Mueller were 
the only Independent Executive Council members present. They 
cast the two dissenting votes.) 3• 
s2 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 256; 
Bernstein, op. cit., p. 143. The famous 
discussion leading to Noske's appoint­
ment was reported _by him as follows: 
"We were standing around in Ebert's 
Office quite excited because time was 
pressing and our followers in the street 
clamored for arms. I demanded that 
a decision be made. Somebody sug­
. gested: 'Then you take over this job!' 
I responded to this without hesitation: 
'It's all right with me! Someone has 
to become the blood hound ["hired 
ruffian" or "Myrmidon"]. I will not 
s h r i n k from this responsibility.' " 
(Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 68.) 
33 Noske was convinced that the 
only reliable new troops were the sin­
cere patriots, professional soldiers, 
non-commissioned officers, officers, 
and reservists who had not yet found 
suitable civilian occupations. The so­
called revolutionary military forces 
such as the Republican Soldiers' Army 
w e r e  useless. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 
114.) On January 6, Noske left Ber­
lin to assemble enough troops to 
guarantee successful military opera­
tions against the insurgents. He moved 
into the Luisenstift at Dahlem which 
for the next few days became the cen­
ter for the activation of volunteer 
units. Noske reported that Dahlem 
looked like a "war camp" within three 
days. (Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, pp. 
71-72; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84.) Noske
worked closely with General Luett­
witz who had been appointed on De­
cember 25, 1918, as successor to Gen­
eral Lequis as Supreme Commander
of all troops stationed in and near
Berlin. For detailed information con­
cerning the variety of troops assembled
under the command of "Abteilung
Luettwitz," l a t e r renamed "Army
Corps Luettwitz" ( Generalkomman­
do), see Luettwitz, op. cit., pp. 22-25;
Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 272-73, 290; and
Waite, op. cit., pp. 33-39.
(The German Military term, Ab­
teilung, usually refers to a military unit 
of battalion strength. This was ob­
viously not the case here; the unit in 
question was far larger than a bat­
talion. It was the designation used for 
the over-all command of the new 
troops, and its purpose was to conceal 
its actual strength.) 
34 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, pp. 52-53. The text of the 
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The military situation of the government improved with every 
hour. A Social Democratic Auxiliary Service (Sozialdemokra­
tischer Helferdienst) was organized and took over the protection 
of the Reichstag building and the area around the Brandenburger 
Tor.35 A few troop leaders of the Berlin garrison arrived at the
seat of government and offered the services of their units. One 
of them, the leader of the Potsdam troops, Klawunde, was ap­
pointed as the new City Commandant, replacing Anton Fischer. 
The others formed a newly-established garrison council (Kom­
mandanturrat). Anton Fischer became Noske's deputy for Ber­
lin. 36 As early as January 6, 1919, the mold was cast for the sub­
sequent events of Spartakus Week which ended in the complete 
defeat of the scattered, leaderless groups of left wing radicals. 
Moderate USPD leaders of the Reich organization and some 
ad hoc workers' committees offered their good offices to the gov­
ernment and to the left wing USPD and Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards in an attempt to settle the conflict through negotiation. 
Their efforts were in vain; the preliminary discussions broke down 
because neither side was willing to make significant concessions. 
The radicals of the left accused the government of accepting the 
offer of negotiations only to gain time for its military preparations. 
The very fact that the left wing opposition would agree to nego­
tiate with the government it intended to overthrow by force was 
an indication of its weakness or even utter helplessness.37
On January 8, the government began its offensive. A pro­
clamation announced its determination to fight force with force. 
The insurgents were warned that "the hour of reckoning" was 
near. 
Executive Council's approval is quoted 
in ibid. 
35 Oertzen, op. cit., p. 273; Richard 
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 54, 73-
74. On January 19, 1919, the Social
Democratic Auxiliary Service became 
a bona fide Free Corps which bore the 
name "Regiment Reichstag" because 
of the location of its headquarters. 
(Luettwitz, op. cit., pp. 25-26.) 
36 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, p. 54; Anton Fischer, op. cit., 
p. 65.
37 For details on the negotiation ef­
forts as seen from the SPD point of 
view, consult Bernstein. op. cit., op. 
140, 145-53. The position of the left 
opposition is presented in Richard 
Mueller, Der Buergerkrieg, pp. 48-60 
and Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 284-85. 
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Fellow-Citizens! 
Spartakus is now fighting for complete power. The government, 
which within ten days wants to permit the people to decide freely about 
their own fate, is to be overthrown by force. The people are not per­
mitted to speak; their voices are to be suppressed. You have seen the 
result! Where Spartakus rules, all personal freedom and security is 
suspended. The newspapers are suppressed; traffic is paralyzed. Sec­
tions of Berlin are scenes of bloody fighting. Others are already with­
out water and light. Food depots are stormed. The food supply for 
the soldiers and civilian population is interrupted. 
The government is taking all measures necessary to destroy tWs 
rule of terror and to prevent its recurrence once and for all. Decisive 
action will be forthcoming soon. However, it is necessary to do the 
work thoroughly and tWs requires preparation. Have patience for a 
little while longer. Be confident, as we are, and resolutely take your 
place with those who will bring you freedom and order! Force can 
be fought only with force. The organized power of the people will 
end oppression and anarchy. Individual successes of the enemies of 
freedom, which are magnified by them in a ridicnlous fasWon, are of 
only temporary· significance. 
The hour of reckoning is near! 
Berlin, January 8, 1919. 
The Reich Government! 
Ebert, Scheidemann, Landsberg, Noske, Wissel.38 
On the same day, units of the Berlin garrison stormed a num­
ber of occupied buildings and succeeded in re-capturing the Gov­
ernment Printing Office, the Main Railroad Office and a railroad 
station, and most of the newspaper printing plants. 39 
The V orwaerts building was attacked by the Potsdam Regi­
ment during the night of January 10-11. Approximately three 
hundred defenders surrendered after artillery fire had caused a 
Noske was greatly opposed to negoti­
ations and to a compromise solution 
with the insurgents because he was 
convinced that an ultimate fight was 
inevitable. (Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84; 
Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 73.) 
as A photostat of the above pro­
clamation is contained in lllustrierte 
Geschichte, p. 277. 
31:l Anton Fischer, op. cit., pp. 75-76; 
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 151-54; Illus­
trierte Geschichte, p. 285. 
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number of casualties. The police headquarters, the last of the 
strongholds of the insurgents, fell during the night of January 
11-12. Most of Eichhorn's Security Force had gone over to the
government side, and less than two hundred men defended the
building against the attack by the Maikaefer Regiment.40
When Noske, leading approximately 3,000 men, marched 
demonstratively into Berlin on January 11, 1919, the uprising 
was all but suppressed. There still was fighting at police head­
quarters and other isolated places. With the few reliable troops 
of the Berlin garrison and some of their own units, such as the 
Social Democratic Auxiliary Service, the government had suc­
ceeded in overwhelming most of the leftist strongholds before 
Noske's Free Corps arrived.41 
A few days after the first volunteer units, which Noske per­
sonally led into the city, had duly impressed the people of Berlin, 
the final occupation of the capital was completed by the units of 
Army Corps Luettwitz according to a detailed and carefully pre­
pared plan. 42
On January 13, Spartakus Week ended in a great fiasco for 
the left wing opposition. Any further resistance was useless. The 
40 Descriptions of the military events 
are contained in Schmidt-Pauli, op. 
cit., pp. 185-87; Runkel, op. cit., p. 
213; Oertzen, op. cit., p. 277; Bern­
stein, op. cit., pp. 157-64. Details of 
the fightings described from the left 
wing radicals' point of view are con­
tained in Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 
285-92. The latter report emphasizes
the brutal treatment accorded the sur­
rendered defenders and the shooting 
of parliamentarians by the troops. Ma­
jor Stephani, the commander of the 
troops which attacked the Vorwaerts, 
claimed that he had orders from the 
City Commandant to shoot any cap­
tives carrying arms. Stephani asserted 
that this order was confirmed over the 
phone from the Reich Chancellery. 
(Ibid., p. 290.) 
41 "The soldier decides [sic] the 
game. Not General Luettwitz's Free 
Corps, but the bands of undisciplined 
soldiers of the Berlin and Potsdam 
barracks and a few republican fighting 
units assembled hastily during the last 
few days [suppressed the left wing 
radicals]." (Volkmann, Revolution, p. 
185. See also Richard Mueller, Der
Buergerkrieg, p. 92.)
42 Noske, Von Kiel bis Kapp, pp. 
74-75; Noske, Erlebtes, p. 84. The de­
ployment order for Army Corps Luett­
witz was Noske's Secret Order I A No.
10 of January 13, 1919. It is quoted
in full in Oertzen, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
Anton Fischer soon became disgusted
with Noske's troops because of their
hostility toward the Republican Sol­
diers' Army. (Anton Fischer, op. cit., 
;pp. 77-78.) A good illustration of
Noske's attitude is given in a leaflet
which he had distributed the day he
entered Berlin, January 11. A photo-
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Revolutionary Shop Stewards and the Berlin organization of the 
USPD asked their followers to return to work. 43 The government 
had succeeded in establishing its superiority - at least for the 
period immediately following the bloody January events. Since 
the fighting potential of the opposition of the left was crushed, 
the elections to the national assembly could take place without 
major disturbances and interference. 
A factual evaluation of the January events supports the as­
sertion that the "Spartacist Uprising" was not a premeditated 
undertaking but was an outgrowth of the policy meeting of Janu­
ary 5 held by the left wing factions because of the overwhelming 
mass response to the Eichhorn incident. The estimate of the revo­
lutionary situation arrived at by the over-optimistic radical leaders 
- especially concerning the attitude of the soldiers was in­
correct and misleading. However, there is general agreement 
among contemporaneous observers that a determined leadership 
could have seized political power in Berlin either on January 5 
or 6. How long the revolutionaries could have retained power is 
another question; it appears that, since the rest of Germany would 
not have followed the example set in the capital, it would have 
been only a short "council dictatorship." Because the Revolution­
ary Committee was divided internally concerning its own ob­
jectives, it was incapable of giving directives to the masses which 
waited patiently for two days. The Revolutionary Committee de­
cided to maintain the occupation of strategically and tactically 
unimportant buildings instead of seizing the traditional seats of 
political power, such as the Chancellery and the Ministry of War. 
In this context it really did not matter if those buildings were 
originally occupied by spontaneous mass actions or through the 
agitation of agents provocateurs.44 
An examination of the events leading to the January fighting 
does not support the assertion that the SPD government provoked 
graphic copy is in Illustrierte Ges­
chichte, p. 276. 
43 Hermann Mueller, op. cit., p. 270. 
44 For various views concerning the 
short-range possibilities of the revo­
lutionary forces, see Cyril L. R. James, 
World Revolutions 1917-1936 (Lon­
don: Secker&Warburg, 1937),p. 101; 
--
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the action of the left wing radicals in order to create a situation 
in which the government would be justified in suppressing by 
force. It was not the beginning of a contemplated all-out offensive 
by the government against the opposition forces. However, once 
the position of power began to change in favor of the government, 
the determination to settle the basic issue with the revolutionary 
trouble-makers won the upper hand.45 
The number of persons killed during the January uprising re­
mains unknown. Even reliable estimates are not available.46 
4. The Spartacists and the January Uprising
The attitude of the Communists toward the uprising was not 
uniform. Their views toward an expansion of the mass protest 
demonstration on behalf of Eichhorn into a full-scale fight for 
the seizure of political power were divided as follows: ( 1 ) Karl 
Liebknecht and Wilhelm Pieck, the two Central Committee mem­
bers who participated in the January 5 meeting of the function­
aries of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and of the Berlin USPD, 
strongly endorsed the uprising. (2) Rosa Luxemburg, Leo Jo­
giches, and the rest of the Central Committee of the KPD were 
opposed but believed that, regardless of their views, the new KPD 
had the moral obligation to support the revolutionary workers in 
their life and death struggle. ( 3) Karl Radek was strictly opposed 
Volkmann, Revolution, pp. 184-85; 
Meinecke, Die Revolution, p. 117; 
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 137, 142; Noske, 
Von Kiel bis Kapp, p. 69; Ulbricht, 
Zur Geschichte, pp. 38-39. Richard 
Mueller blames the lack of initiative 
displayed by the Revolutionary Com­
mittee on the fact that it did not rec­
ognize the weakness of the govern­
ment. (Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, p. 40.) 
45 It is possible that Noske for one
was pleased with the opportunity 
created by the January events. They 
accelerated the creation of the mili­
tary instrument which he thought was 
necessary to establish law and order 
first in Berlin and then in the rest of 
the Reich. See his statement in Noske, 
Erlebtes, p. 83. 
46 Bernstein claims that the exact
figure was never determined. (Bern­
stein, op. cit., pp. 156-57.) Halperin 
claims over one thousand casualties 
for "Spartakus Week" in Berlin, but 
fails to indicate on what sources he 
bases his figure. (Halperin, op. cit., 
p. 122.) Stampfer stated that one hun­
dred fifty-six persons were killed in
addition to Rosa Luxemburg and Lieb­
knecht. (Stampfer, Die e r s t  e n  14
Jahre, p. 92.) Official reports assert
that approximately two h u n d r e d
people were killed. (lllustrierte Ges­
chichte, p. 292.)
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to the uprising and urgently advocated discontinuing the hopeless 
fight before the revolutionary organizations suffered severe de­
feats which would affect their work for a long time to come. 
Liebknecht and Pieck, in siding with the advocates of the up­
rising, had acted without the knowledge and approval of the 
Central Committee of the KPD. Liebknecht was severely criti­
cized by Rosa Luxemburg for his unilateral action. How many 
of the rank and file members of the Spartacists concurred with 
Liebknecht's endorsement of the all-out struggle for power is not 
known. During the days of the uprising, Liebknecht spent his 
time either in conferences with the Revolutionary Committee or 
with the dispersed groups of entrenched insurgents. He main­
tained little contact with the party leadership. On January 10, 
the Central Committee finally ordered Liebknecht and Pieck not 
to continue their participation in the Revolutionary Committee. 
This directive was meaningless by then since the committee had 
already suspended its meetings and had scattered in all di­
rections. 47 
The attitude of most of the KPD leaders, including Rosa 
Luxemburg and Leo Jogiches, toward the uprisin� was determined 
by their conviction that political developments in Germany had 
not reached the point where an attempt to assume power should 
· be made. 48 The decision of the January 5 meeting in favor of the
all-out fight created a difficult problem for the Communist leaders.
Should the KPD support the fight of the revolutionary workers in
spite of the fact that the Central Committee did not endorse the
uprising and was certain from the beginning that the insurrection
had no real chance of realizing its objectives? Rosa Luxemburg's
views ( which doubtlessly reflected the Party's position on this
controversial issue) were related by Clara Zetkin on the basis
47 Froelich, Rosa Luxemburg, pp. 
339, 342; Illustrierte Geschichte, p. 
283; Hermann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 
253, 270. Liebknecht's actions were 
certainly no indication of the policies 
of the KPD during the January Up-
rising. Runkel, for example, fails to 
recognize this. (Runkel, op. cit., p. 
207.) 
48 Oelssner, op. cit., p. 148. Cf. 
above, p. 169. 
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of a letter she had received from Leo Jogiches, who probably 
was Rosa Luxemburg's closest collaborator during the January 
days. 
Rosa Luxemburg saw the events - as significant and as hopeful 
as they were not from the viewpoint of the assault against the Ber­
lin City Hall. She related these events to the prevailing situation and 
especially to the degree of political maturity of the broad population of 
all Germany. On that basis, the overthrow of the Ebert government 
could be, for the time-being, only a propagandistic over-all slogan of 
the revolutionary proletarians, and not the immediate objective of 
revolutionary struggles. Under the prevailing circumstances related 
primarily to Berlin, in the most favorable case they [ the revolutionary 
fighters] could have led to a Berlin "Commune," ... The aim of the 
fight could only be a strong defense against the attack of the counter­
revolution. Thus the reinstatement of Eichhorn, the withdrawal of the 
troops which were to subjugate the revolutionary proletariat of Berlin 
in a violent manner, the arming of the workers, and the transfer of the 
military command power to the revolutionary political representatives 
of the proletarians - these were the demands which required action, 
not negotiations. 
Because of this situation, the young Communist Party led by Rosa 
Luxemburg had a difficult mission, full of conflicts. It could not accept 
the objective of the mass action the overthrow of the government; 
it had to reject this aim, but at the same time it was not permitted to 
detach itself from the masses which had taken up the fight. In spite 
of this contradiction, the Party had to remain with the masses; it had 
to remain among the masses to strengthen the fighters in their struggle 
against the counter-revolution aad to expedite the process of their revo­
lutionary maturation during the operations by making them aware of 
the purpose of their struggle. Toward this end, the Communist Party 
had to reveal its own aims and make known its precise estimate of 
the situation without injuring the revolutionary solidarity it owed 
to the fighters. . . . 49
49 Quoted in Froelich, Rosa Lu­
xemburg, pp. 340-41. There is very 
little information available about the 
formulation of KPD policies during 
the uprising and none about the actual 
participation of the Party or its lea­
ders in the operational phase, except 
a vague notion of Liebknecht's and 
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Thus the Communists joined the insurgents not because they 
believed that the uprising was a politically and tactically well­
founded operation, but because of the obligation the Party thought 
it owed to the revolutionary fighters. "Under the circumstances 
there was only one decision possible for the Communist Party: 
to remain with the fighters, to strengthen their power of resistance 
and their courage, to be ready not only to share in their victories 
but also in their defeats."50 The KPD also intended to aid the 
revolutionary mass action by clarifying and limiting objectives. 
The aims set by the Communists for the uprising were disarma­
ment of the counterrevolution, arming of the proletariat, merger 
of all revolutionary troops into a Red Guard, and new elections 
for the workers' and soldiers' councils in order to bring their com­
position into harmony with the changes which had occurred since 
November, 1918. The overthrow of the Ebert government, the 
main purpose of the uprising as determined by the Revolutionary 
Committee, became the slogan and general directive for the entire 
coming phase (?f the revolution. 51
The articles of Rosa Luxemburg, "What Are the Leaders 
Doing?" and "Neglected Duties," in Die Rote Fahne present a 
candid view of the KPD about the revolutionary implications of 
. the January Uprising. They also furnish an insight into Com­
munist attempts to formulate limited and reasonable objectives 
and to compel the revolutionary leaders of the insurrection to 
fulfill their obligations. 
Those who saw yesterday's [January 6, 1919] mass demonstra­
tions in the Siegesallee, who felt this adamant revolutionary conviction, 
this magnificent attitude, this energy flowing from the masses, must 
have reached the lfollowing] conclusions: the proletarians have grown 
enormously in a political sense through the experience of the last weeks. 
Pieck's activities. Froelich asserts that 
a direct party influence and participa• 
tion in the fighting existed, although 
he admits the lack of specific informa­
tion on the subject. (Ibid., p. 342.) 
The sources of information for the 
Party's policy formulation are re­
stricted to the letter of Jogiches men­
tioned above and a few articles in 
Die Rote Fahne. 
so lllustrierte Geschichte, p. 283. 
s1 Ibid.
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They have realized their strength and lack nothing but to use their 
power. 
However, have their leaders, the executive organs of their will, 
progressed with them? Have the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and 
Confidence Men of the large factories, have the radical elements of the 
USP acquired more energy and more determination in the meantime? 
Has their capacity for action kept abreast of the growing energy of 
the masses? 
... The masses followed the call of their leaders with impetuosity . 
. . . They are waiting for further directives and actions from their leaders. 
What have the leaders done in the meantime, what have they de­
cided? What measures have they taken to secure the victory of the 
revolution in this tense situation during which the fate of the revolu­
tion will be decided at least for the next phase? We see and hear 
nothing! It may be true that the representatives of the working class 
are thoroughly and abundantly conferring. However, now is the time 
to act.
No time must be wasted. Thorough measures must be taken im­
mediately. Clear and urgent directives must be given to the masses 
and to the soldiers who remained faithful to the cause of the revolu­
tion; ... 
Act! Act! Courageously, decisively, and constantly - that is the 
... duty and obligation of the Revolutionary Shop Stewards and of 
the honest socialist party leaders. Disarm the counterrevolution, arm 
the masses, and occupy all positions of power. Act quickly! ... 52
... the weakness and immaturity of the revolution manifest them­
selves in the questions: How does one conduct the fight to remove the 
Ebert government? How does one convert this increased internal ma­
turity into practical use? Nothing like the last three days have shown 
so strongly these weaknesses and deficiencies. 
The elimination of the Ebert-Scheidemann government does not 
mean storming into the palace of the Reich Chancellery and chasing 
away or arresting a few people: it means first of all to seize all real 
power positions and hold on to them and make use of them. 
52 Rosa Luxemburg, "Was machen Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 689-92. 
die Fuehrer?" quoted in Luxemburg, 
190 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
The experience of the last three days speaks eloquently to the 
leaders of the working class: Do not talk! Do not confer forever! 
Do not negotiate! Act.53 
Karl Radek's opposition to the January uprising and to the 
participation of the KPD in the futile attempt to seize political 
power cannot be accepted as an indication of the official Soviet 
attitude toward the events. It is highly doubtful that Radek had 
any contact with his party during this period. His views are of 
great interest because they can be cited as proof that the Bol­
sheviks did not incite the German revolutionary leaders to the 
uprising contrary to the assertions of Edward Bernstein. 54 On 
the basis of the information available to this writer, at the be­
ginning of January, Radek was the only official representative of 
the Bolsheviks in Berlin. As has been said, he shared the belief 
of Rosa Luxemburg and her associates that the time for the all­
out struggle for power had not yet come. He added authority to 
this conviction because of his reputation among the Communists 
as an experien�ed revolutionary tactician. On January 6, he de­
clared his opposition to the decision of the January 5 meeting. 
On the 9th, he addressed a letter to the Central Committee of the 
KPD in which he requested that the Party use its influence upon 
. the Revolutionary Committee and the proletarian masses to cease 
the insurrection immediately. fie offered the following reasons 
for his request: 
In your program pamphlet, "What Does the Spartacist League 
Want?", you explain that you intend to take over the government only 
when you have the majority of the working class behind you. This 
absolutely correct stand finds its justification in the simple fact that a 
government of the workers is unthinkable without an existing prole­
tarian mass organization. At present, the only mass organizations to 
be considered, the workers' and soldiers' councils, are of only nominal 
strength .... In this situation, one cannot even consider the proletariat's 
53 Rosa Luxemburg, "Versaeumte 
Pflichten," quoted in Luxemburg, Aus­
gewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 693-97. 
54 Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 139-40. 
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taking over political power. If the government should fall into your 
hands as the result of a coup d'etat, within a few days it would be cut 
off from the rest of the country and would be strangled. 
In this situation, the action taken by the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards in response to the attack of the social-patriotic government 
against the police headquarters, should have been only a protest action. 
The advance guard of the proletariat - provoked by government 
policy and misled by the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, who as the 
result of their political inexperience are not capable of understanding 
the power relation throughout the entire Reich - has in its enthusiasm 
transformed the protest demonstration into a struggle for political 
power. This enables Ebert and Scheidemann to strike a blow against 
the Berlin movement which can weaken the entire movement for 
months. The only force which can prevent this disaster is you, the 
Communist Party. You have sufficient insight to know that the fight 
is hopeless; ... Nothing can prevent a weaker [power J from retreating 
before a superior force. 55 
Shortly after the last skirmishes ended, Rosa Luxemburg 
evaluated the events of Spartakus Week. In her article "Order 
Rules in Berlin" (Die Ordnung herrscht in Berlin), she explained 
that a victory of the proletarians - the overthrow of the Ebert 
government and the establishment of a socialist dictatorship -
could not be expected because of the political immaturity of the 
German Revolution. The fact that the soldiers, most of whom 
were from rural areas which were hardly affected by the revolu­
tion, could be used for suppressing the revolutionary workers was 
for Rosa Luxemburg one of the significant symptoms of the 
general political immaturity of Germany. Under these circum­
stances a victory of the working class was impossible. 
55 Quoted in lllustrierte Geschichte, 
p. 282. See also Radek's letter writ­
ten from prison after the January up­
rising to Alfons Paquet, the well­
known German writer and newspaper
correspondent of the Frt1nkfurter Zei­
tung who was stationed in Moscow
during 1918. Radek strongly empha-
sized in this letter his opposition to 
the uprising. He also explained that 
the KPD was not an effective party 
and had no control over the masses -
a situation different from that of the 
Bolsheviks in Russia. Therefore, the 
KPD could neither prevent nor stop 
the bloody fighting as, for example, 
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... A final and lasting victory in this moment could not be ex­
pected. Was, therefore, the fight of the last week a "mistake"? Yes, 
if it had been an intentional "assault," a so-called "putsch." However, 
what was the cause of the fighting of the past week? As in all previous 
instances ... it was a brutal provocation of the government! ... The 
revolutionary working class was forced to take up arms. It was a 
matter of revolutionary honor to repel immediately the assault [ of the 
counterrevolution] .... 56
Rosa Luxemburg emphasized that the suppression of the 
January Uprising was only a defeat in one single engagement, 
and she predicted that the next day the revolution would proclaim: 
"I was, I am, I shall be!"5' 
Liebknecht was of the same mind. The uprising was defeated 
because "the time was not ripe" for it. This could not be helped 
because the workers had not chosen to start the fight. "The fight 
was forced on the proletariat by the Ebert-gang."58 
Indeed, it was a strange twist of history which gave the Janu­
ary Uprising the name of that left wing opposition group within 
the German socialist movement which officially had nothing to 
do with starting the insurrection and which became connected 
with it only to maintain "proletarian solidarity." If the January 
Uprising must be identified at all with a left-wing faction, then the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards, whose functionaries voted unani­
mously for it, should be first in line for this "honor. "59 
5. The Aftermath
The uprising in Berlin did not remain a completely isolated 
event. Radical groups of the left in several German cities followed 
the example set in the capital. Newspaper plants were occupied 
by "revolutionary workers" in Brunswick, Dortmund, Duessel-
the Bolsheviks were able to do during 
a hopeless uprising in Petrograd in 
July of 1917. (Alfons Paquet, Der 
Geist der russischen Revolution [Leip­
zig: Wolf Verlag, 1919], pp. viii-ix.) 
56 Rosa Luxemburg, "Die Ordnung
herrscht in Berlin," quoted in Luxem-
burg, Ausgewaehlte Reden, II, pp. 
709-1 I.
51 Ibid., pp. 712-14.
58 Karl Liebknecht, "Trotz alle­
dem!" quoted in Liebknecht, Ausge­
waehlte Reden, pp. 526-30. 
59 Professor Bergstraesser regards 
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dorf, Nuremberg, Hamburg, and Wolfenbuettel (Lower Sa­
xony). In Duesseldorf, the workers' and soldiers' council seized 
power. A Soviet republic was proclaimed in Bremen. Armed 
revolutionaries seized the city hall and the banks in Delmenhorst 
(Lower Saxony). A general strike broke out in the Ruhr. Vio­
lent skirmishes occurred in many other places throughout the 
Reich. But none of these proved to be serious challenges for the 
authorities. Local security forces, such as police detachments or 
small military units, suppressed the individual revolts before they 
were able to advance very far.00 
After the arrival of Noske's Free Corps in Berlin, a clean-up 
operation began. Its objectives were to crush the organizations 
of the left wing radicals and to disarm the civilian population by 
confiscating all unauthorized weapons. The brutal methods used 
by the volunteer units during the days following the January Up­
rising gave Germany a preview of the coming Noske campaign 
of re-establishing "law and order" throughout the country.61 
The violent Anti-Spartakus offensive did not decrease in in­
tensity even after the end of hostilities. The revolutionary leaders, 
especially Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, and Karl Radek, 
became major targets. 62 Georg Ledebour and Ernst Meyer had 
the January Uprising as a putsch in­
stigated by the Revolutionary Shop 
Stewards of the large Berlin factories 
and joined by the Communists in spite 
of their better judgment. (Bergstraes­
ser, op. cit., p. 207.) 
60 Illustrierte Geschichte, pp. 281-
82. See, for example, the description
by Keil of the planned revolt in Stutt­
gart and its suppression by the security
forces of the local provisional govern­
ment. (Keil, op. cit., pp. 136-37.)
61 Hugo Haase, the leader of the 
USPD. described the general situation 
in Berlin in a letter as follows: " ... 
You cannot imagine the conditions in 
Berlin. White terror rages exactly as 
it did under the tzarist regime. Even 
under the Anti-Socialist Law, at lea�t 
an attempt was made to make it ap­
pear that the law was followed. At 
present, however, brutal force rules 
in the open. Disregarding any legal 
restrictions, soldiers - government 
troops - with loaded rifles break into 
apartments at night, make arrests 
without warrants, and search the 
apartments without court orders. In 
the apartment of Oskar Cohn [a lead­
ing member of the USPD] a house 
search was made the day before yes­
terday. He escaped being arrested 
only because he was out of town. His 
property was confiscated. Landsberg, 
Ebert, and Scheidemann, who try to 
pose as the guardians of the law, let 
the hordes of brutal soldiers (Solda­
teska) do as they like .... " (Haase, op. 
cit., pp. 173-74; letter dated January 
16. 1919, addressed to "Else.")
G2 On January 13, 1919, the Vor­
waerts printed the following poem 
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been arrested as early as January 9 in the latter's apartment. Leo 
Jogiches and Hugo Eberlein were apprehended when troops, fol­
lowing the re-capture of the V orwaerts building, sacked the 
offices of the KPD in Friedrichsstrasse. Emil Eichhorn was in 
hiding for several days and then managed to escape by car into 
Brunswick. 63
On January 15, 1919, Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, 
and Wilhelm Pieck were captured in the apartment of friends 
living in Wilmersdorf, a residential section of Berlin, by members 
of the local "Citizen Guard." They were turned over to the 
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division which had its headquarters at the 
Hotel Eden. On that same day, Liebknecht and Rosa Luxem­
burg were brutally murdered by the members of this division. 
Both were clubbed and shot to death and Rosa Luxemburg's body 
was thrown into a canal running through Berlin. Her body was 
written by Artur Zickler: 
Many hundred dead are lying in 
a row 
Proletarians! 
Iron, powder, and lead do not ask 
if a person belong to the right, to 
the left, or to Spartakus, 
Proletarians! 
Who has brought violence into 
the streets, 
Proletarians? 
Who first took up arms 
and relied on their results? 
S p a r t a k u s !
Many hundred dead are lying in 
a row 
Proletarians! 
Karl, Radek, Rosa and 
companions -
none of them is there, none of 
them is there! 
Proletarians! 
(Quoted in Illustrierte Geschichte, 
p. 293.)
A reward of 10,000 Marks was
offered by the "Association for Com­
batting Bolshevism" for information 
leading to the arrest of Radek. A pho• 
tograph of a wall poster announcing 
this reward is contained in ibid., p. 
265. The Volkswehr, organ of the Ber­
lin Volunteer Corps, printed the fol­
lowing announcement on January 14,
1919:
"Berlin, January 13. The fear has 
been expressed that the government 
would relax its persecution of the Spar• 
tacists. We have been assured by in­
fluential circles that the achievements 
made so far are not considered as 
satisfactory and that all energy will 
be used to proceed against the Spar­
tacists and the leaders of the move• 
ment. The people of Berlin need not 
believe that the leaders, who for the 
time being have evaded arrest, will be 
able to enjoy life elsewhere. The next 
days will show that the situation has 
become critical for them." (Quoted in 
ibid., p. 296.) 
63 For details of the arrest of Le­
debour and Meyer, see Bernstein, op.
cit., p. 164; Richard Mueller, Der 
Buergerkrieg, p. 71; lllustrierte Ge­
schichte, pp. 286-87. For Jogiches' and 
Eberlein's arrest, see Froelich, Rosa 
Luxemburg, p. 345. Jogiches was re­
leased but re-arrested again and mur­
dered in the police prison on March 
10 by a plain-clothes man named Tam-
-
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not found until the end of May. Pieck's escape without being 
harmed by the troops has caused considerable speculation. 64
schick; the same man also shot the 
former leader of the People's Naval 
Division, Dorrenbach, when he "at­
tempted to escape." (Ibid., p. 351-52. 
Also see Anton Fischer, op. cit., p. 
62.) Eichhorn's escape is mentioned 
in Bernstein, op. cit., p. 164. Radek 
eventually was arrested by government 
troops on February 17, 1919, when he 
attended a meeting of the "Red Sol­
diers' League." (Stuemke, op. cit., p. 
206.) 
64 The Communists c I a i m that 
Pieck convinced Captain Pabst of the 
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division that he 
was really somebody else. He alleged­
ly was transferred to a jail from which 
he managed to escape. (lllustrierte 
Geschichte, p. 298; see also Fritz Er­
penbeck, Wilhelm Pieck [B e r  Ii n : 
Dietz Verlag, 1952], pp. 99-101.) 
Since Wilhelm Pieck is a prominent 
contemporary political figure in the 
Communist world - he is President 
of the "German Democratic Republic" 
- Erich Wollenberg's report of this
incident is interesting. A G e r m a n
Communist leader, Hans Kippenber­
ger, who was in charge of the "Under­
ground Military Apparatus" of the
KPD from 1928 to 1935, was ordered
in 1930 by the leader of the KPD,
Ernst Thaelmann, to investigate the
Pieck incident of January, 1919. Pieck
allegedly was a I r e a d y standing up
against a wall to be shot when he re­
quested to see an officer alone. This
request was granted and subsequently
Pieck was permitted to leave the Eden
Hotel with a letter of protection signed
by the intelligence officer of the
Guard-Cavalry-Rifle Division. A 11
this occurred prior to the murder of
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. The
results of Kippenberger's investigation
were never published or made known.
After the arrest of Thaelmann in
March, 1933, Jonny Scheer took over
the leadership of the Party, and after
Scheer was taken into custody by the
Gestapo, Walter Ulbricht - the pres­
ent Secretary General of the Socialist 
Unity Party of Eastern Germany -
ascended to the Party's leadership. He 
ordered the headquarters of the "Un­
derground Military Apparatus" to be 
moved abroad. Its central office was 
o r g a n i ze d in Paris. Kippenberger 
moved to Paris in 1934. 
Great differences developed between 
Ulbricht and Kippenberger. Ulbricht 
ordered that Trotskyites and other op­
positional Communists be denounced 
to the Gestapo in order to put them 
out of the way. When Kippenberger 
refused to relay this order, Ulbricht 
relieved him of his functions and sent 
him to Moscow to report. There, Kip­
penberger was arrested in 1936 by the 
Russian Secret Police and upon the 
request of Wilhelm Pieck, who from 
1934 on had been the representative 
of the KPD leadership with the Com­
munist International, was liquidated 
by a shot in the neck. The elimination 
of Kippenberger was a welcome de­
velopment for Pieck who thereby eli­
minated a person who knew too much 
about him. (Wollenberg, op. cit., pp. 
576-78.)
The text of the official government
announcement about Liebknecht's and 
Luxemburg's murders is quoted in 
Runkel, op. cit., pp. 217-20. Accord­
ing to this announcement, Liebknecht 
was shot when he tried to escape and 
Luxemburg was lynched by the angry 
masses in front of the Eden Hotel. On 
January 17, the USPD organ Freiheit 
challenged this version. (See ibid., pp. 
220-22.) Later, the USPD published
a pamphlet containing the facts of the
investigation about the murder as well
as the trial held against the murderers.
(Freiheit, Der Mord an Karl Lieb­
knecht und Rosa Luxemburg [Berlin:
Verlagsgenossenschaft ' ' F r  e i h e i t, ' '
1920].) For example, the Majority
Socialist version is presented in Her­
mann Mueller, op. cit., pp. 271-79 and
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When the news of the murder of the two leading Commuruscs 
became known, the leaders of the USPD and the Central Com­
mittee of the KPD called the workers to a general strike in Berlin. 
The response to this summons for a protest demonstration was 
very poor. It came too close on the heels of the January defeat 
which had temporarily diminished the fighting strength of Berlin's 
workers.65
The death of these two outstanding Communist leaders was 
of great significance not only for the immediate future of the 
KPD but was of even greater importance for its long-run develop­
ment. Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg might have been 
able to prevent the Russian Bolsheviks from becoming the con­
trolling power of the German Communist movement.06 
In the middle of January, the Majority Socialist government 
appeared outwardly as the unquestionable victor of the fight with 
the left wing radicals. In truth, the January events made "the 
Ebert government even more dependent on the Army than be­
fore, and wh�n the National Assembly met at Weimar on 
February 6, 1919, it was under the protection of Maercker's 
bayonets."67 It has been repeatedly asserted, therefore, that the 
real victors were the political reactionary forces, represented by 
the confessedly anti-republican Free Corps and the remnants of 
regular units, upon which the SPD leaders had primarily relied 
in suppressing the revolutionary left wing opposition. The pat­
tern set in Berlin was soon followed in many other parts of 
Germany.ea 
Bernstein, op. cit., pp. 165-71. Repre­
sentative Communist accounts can be 
found in Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 150-55 
and lllustrierte Geschichte, pp. 292-
307. Oertzen's version of the incident
is based on his own investigation. He
completely exonerates the officers of 
the Guard-Cavalry-Rifle-Division; oth­
erwise his version comes very close to
that of the leftist opposition. (Oertzen,
op. cit., pp. 284-89.)
e5 Richard Mueller, Der Buerger­
krieg, p. 83. 
66 Bergstraesser, op. cit., p. 205, and 
James, op. cit., p. 102. 
07 Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., p. 37.
Wheeler-Bennett means here under 
"Army" not the regular army units, 
but the newly founded Free Corps 
which were commanded by national­
istic former imperial officers. 
68 Waite claims that the Free Corps 
were strongly supported by industry 
and landed interests. The political 
and financial independence of the Free 
Corps was convincingly demonstrated 
when many of these volunteer units 
refused to join the Provisional Reichs­
wehr ( Germany Army), which was 
formed on March 6, 1919. Most of the 
Free Corps preferred to maintain their 
independence. One year later, in 
March, 1920, these forces staged the 
ill-fated Kapp-Luettwitz Putsch which 
attempted to overthrow the Weimar 
Constitution and government and put 
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a military dictatorship in its place. 
(Waite, op. cit., pp. 78, 137, 140-67, 
189-90.) Waite presents in the ap­
pendix of his book (pp. 285-96) a
long roster of Free Corps leaders who
played significant parts in both the
Free Corps Movement and in the fu­
ture Nazi Party or its military or­
ganizations, the SA and SS. ( See also





Throughout the inter-war period, the November Revolution 
and the January Uprising remained highly controversial issues 
between the German socialists and Communists, since both sides 
considered these events as having determined to a very large de­
gree the further development of the German labor movement and 
the nature of the Weimar Republic. The Communists continued 
to accuse the SPD leaders of having consciously betrayed the 
revolution and of having cooperated closely with the reactionary 
forces in willfully suppressing the revolutionary workers. The 
SPD leaders insisted that the Communists' putschist activities had 
forced them to defend their own revolutionary concepts. 
The Communists considered the actions of the Majority So­
cialists as the primary cause for the failure of the German Revo­
lution. The actions and concepts of the Spartacists also became 
the targets of Communist criticism. The Spartacists were ac­
cused of having neglected organizational work among the work­
ers in spite of the fact that Lenin himself had urged Rosa Lu­
xemburg to break with the reformists of the socialist movement. 1
1 Lenin allegedly pressed the Spar­
tacists to break with the USPD, but 
Rosa Luxemburg refused to do so. 
Then the Communists accused Rosa 
Luxemburg of failing to understand 
the necessity of creating an organiza­
tion with clearly defined principles 
and aims, which could have served as 
a collecting point for revolutionary 
workers who were discontented with 
the Social Democratic Parties. (James, 
op. cit., p. 96. See also Ulbricht, Der 
Zusammenbruch, p. 6.) The Com­
munists' claim that Lenin had advo­
cated the split of the Second Interna­
tional and of the European Social 
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The Communists asserted that this fateful omission was the reason 
why the German revolutionary workers were left without the 
leadership of a genuinely Marxist-Leninist party. The self­
criticism, practiced by the Communists, also served to convince 
the KPD members of the absolute superiority of Bolshevik con­
cepts upon which the successful Russian Revolution was based 
over the ideological misconceptions introduced by Rosa Luxem­
burg into the German party. The Communists claimed that not 
until 1925, when Ernst Thaelmann ascended to the leadership 
of the KPD, was the Party finally able to acquire a genuine 
Marxist-Leninist character.2 
After World War II, the German Communists, primarily in 
the Soviet Zone of Occupation, undertook a new analysis of the 
November Revolution of 1918. Otto Grotewohl, one of the 
leading functionaries of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany . 
Democratic parties before 1914 is 
repudiated by Paul Froelich, who re­
ported that the · Russian Party his­
torian Sluzki found that Lenin did 
nothing of the kind. Lenin allegedly 
did not support the fight of the Ger-. 
man radical left against the SPD Cen­
ter of Kautsky whom he regarded then 
as the leading socialist theorist. Sluzki 
claimed that it was Stalin's idea to use 
Lenin as the authority for the concept 
of splitting the European labor move­
ments. Sluzki was liquidated in the 
Great Purge of 1936 to 1938. (Paul 
Froelich, "Wie die SED Rosa Luxem­
burg ehrt," Der Kochel-Brief [Ober­
bayern: January-February, 1953], p. 
7.) 
2 Matern, op. cit., p. 13. Thaelmann 
was credited with eliminating the rem­
nants of "Luxemburgism" in the KPD, 
the name given to the heresy of the 
followers of Rosa Luxemburg, Oelss­
ner considers "Luxemburgism" as a 
variation of S o c i a I Democratism. 
(Oelssner, op. cit., pp. 212-13.) Lu­
xemburg's mistakes were summarized 
by Thaelmann in 1932 as follows: 
"We must frankly state that in all 
questions in which Rosa Luxemburg 
held an opinion different from that of 
Lenin, her opinion was wrong; there­
fore, the entire group of German left 
wing radicals in the period before and 
during the war remained, in clarity 
and revolutionary steadfastness, con­
siderably behind that of the Bolshe­
viks. 
"Only this knowledge gives us an 
understanding of why the split between 
revolutionary M a r x i s m and petit­
bourgeois opportunism or its Centrist 
accomplices within the labor move­
ment came so late in Germany. Rosa 
Luxemburg's invalid concepts of the 
theory of accumulation [of capital], 
the agrarian question, the nationality 
issue, the questions concerning prob­
lems of the revolution, the question 
of the proletarian dictatorship, the 
question concerning organization, the 
problems related to the role of the 
party, respectively to the spontaneity 
of the masses all resulted in a series 
of blunders, which prevented Rosa 
Luxemburg from reaching the clarity 
Lenin did." (This is a quote from 
Ernst Thaelmann, Der revolutionaere 
-
THE REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT 201 
( SED) ,3 explained the "compelling reasons" for a study of the 
revolution of 1918: 
A thorough examination of the German November Revolution of 
1918, its causes, its objectives, and its effects is of urgent necessity for 
the German working class. [The analysis of the revolution] not only 
satisfies historical interest but is of the greatest current political sig­
nificance because it provides doctrines for the further struggle. 
The German labor movement - and thereby the entire German 
people - today faces tasks similar to those facing it in 1918 .... 4 
A resolution of the Executive Committee of the SED, issued 
on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the 1918-19 Revolution 
on September 16, 1948, formulated the purpose of the study of 
the November Revolution as follows: 
The historical development after 1918 and the horrible catastrophe 
of 1945 which stood at the end of this development, demands that 
we occupy ourselves with the causes, objectives, and effects of the 
November Revolution in order to draw lessons from these experiences 
for our further struggle and to protect the German working class from 
once more following the same incorrect and therefore disastrous road. 
It is necessary to understand completely the background, the 
course, and the effects of the November Revolution in order to draw 
from it the essential lessons. A thorough study of these issues will 
assist us to train the Party within the spirit of Marxism and Leninism. 
Therefore, the Party's Executive Committee assigns the entire Party 
Ausweg und die KPD [Berlin, 1932], 
pp. 71-72, quoted in Oelssner, op. cit., 
p. 214.}
3 The German term for the Socialist
Unity Party of Germany is Sozialis­
tische Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands. Its 
abbreviation SED will be used here­
after. The SED came into existence 
at a joint congress of the SPD and 
KPD of the Soviet Zone. The formal 
announcement of the merger of the 
two parties and of the formation of 
the SED was made on April 21, 1946. 
(Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch-
lands, Dokumente der Sozialistischen 
Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands [Berlin: 
Deitz Verlag, 1952], I, pp. 5-10, [here­
after cited as SED, Dokumente].) 
Otto Grotewohl, referred to above, 
was one of the left wing SPD pro­
tagonists of the merger. He was the 
chairman of the SPD of the Soviet 
Zone before the merger. Afterwards, 
he became the second secretary of the 
SED. Since 1949 he has been Prime 
Minister of the German Democratic 
Republic. 
• Grotewohl, op. cit., p. 9.
202 THE SPARTACIST UPRISING OF 1919 
the task of studying the lessons of the November Revolution at con­
ferences, in meetings, and in educational courses, on the basis of these 
directives. A correct knowledge of the lessons of the November Revo­
lution of 1918 and of the Weimar Republic is a prerequisite for the 
creation of a party of the new type. 5 
Thus, the analysis of the revolution, allegedly serving the pur­
pose of discovering the major causes for its failure, enabled the 
SED to claim in its propaganda that the new party was basing 
its contemporary program on these "scientific" findings. Many 
of the premises upon which this analysis was based were arbitrary 
assumptions ascribed by the Communists to the post-World War 
I situation whether they corresponded to the actual conditions or 
not. For example, the SED reported the demands of the Spar­
tacist League as being those made by the German soldiers and 
workers and created thereby the false impression that the "broad 
masses" expected the following fundamental changes: 
(a) Immediate establishment of a close alliance with the [Rus­
siaµ] Soviet Republic in order to provide the German Revo­
lution with a broad international basis and to create a
counter-weight to the imperialism of the Entente;
(b) immediate cessation of hostilities on all fronts and punish­
ment of persons responsible for having brought about the
war and of war criminals;
( c) destruction of the Junker-bourgeois state apparatus, and es­
tablishment of the rule of the workers' and soldiers' councils;
(d) completion of the middle-class revolution by confiscating
large landed estates and by transforming it into a socialist
revolution [ as part of] the struggle for the political rule of
the working class;
( e) assumption of control by the people of the large factories,
banks and loan-banks, concerns, trusts, and mines as a pre­
requisite for the socialist revolution.
None of these demands was realized in the 1918 revolution in 
spite of the fact that the broad masses clamored for these measures 
5 SED, Dokumente, II, p. 107. 
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and the vanguard of the working class conducted heroic fights for 
their realization. 6 
The SED practice of building on false premises was most 
likely little more than a convenient tool in their conscious attempt 
to falsify the facts to make them fit preconceived propaganda 
patterns. It is also possible, however, that the Communist leaders 
were deceiving themselves and had become captives of their own 
system of re-interpreting history. Regardless of the motivation, 
the end product of the SED's evaluation of the revolutionary 
events of 1918-19 is of extreme interest because it provides an 
insight into a number of current problems, e.g., the problem of 
the unity of the working class, the present role of the SPD, and 
the "dangers" which "U.S. imperialism" holds for the revolution­
ary proletariat. 
According to the Communists, the most important lesson 
learned from their investigation of the German Revolution was 
that to be victorious the working class must be united and must 
be led by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party. Contemporary 
Communist leaders stress that the German Revolution confirmed 
that the left wing radicals should have broken with the "op­
portunists and reformists" of the SPD before World War I. Wal­
ter Ulbricht expressed this view as follows: 
The class struggle which increased in intensity from the beginning 
of the imperialist period called for an organization which was capable 
of leading the working class to victory under these new conditions. 
The creation of a revolutionary party of the working class was the 
order of the day in Germany as in all capitalist countries.7 
6 Ibid., p. 115. 
7 Ulbricht, Der Zusammenbruch, p.
7. Oelssner, one of the leading SED
theorists, considers the failure of the
German left wing to sever relations
with the "opportunists" and its failure
to found a revolutionary party as its
"greatest historic guilt." These errors
left the masses to the continued influ­
ence of t h e "opportunist" leaders.
(Oelssner, op. cit., p. 84.) Otto Grote­
wohl emphasizes that approval of the 
war appropriations by the SPD lead­
ers on August 4, 1914, should have 
made it obvious to the radical social­
ists that the German workers lacked 
a revolutionary Marxist party to guide 
them in their future struggle. (Grote­
wohl, op. cit., p. 53.) 
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In the opinion of the Communists, there was a definite and 
direct correlation between the failure of the German Revolution 
of 1918-19 and the lack of a revolutionary Marxist party.8 
Another aspect of the organizational problem of the German 
labor movement which was greatly influenced by the November 
Revolution - the complex problem of the unification of the 
divided working class - can be treated here only in a cursory 
manner. 
As has been pointed out before, the bloody fighting during 
and after the November Revolution resulted in a deep cleavage 
within the German labor movement.9 The Communists believed 
that the German workers were dissatisfied with a divided labor 
movement, which resulted in a considerable weakening of their 
position in relation to other social classes and political forces. 
The KPD proposed to capitalize on this alleged discontent by 
posing as the protagonists of a re-united labor movement, and 
thus theoretically increase its influence among the working class. 
Throughou! the period of the Weimar Republic, the Com­
munists shifted their tactics directed at the unification of the Ger­
man working class. At times, the Party pursued the policy of 
forming a united front from above by attempting to reach an 
. agreement with the leadership of the SPD on the basis of a spe­
cific action program. At other times, they appealed directly to 
the Social Democratic workers, inviting them _to join a united 
front, in spite of their leaders' refusal to make common cause 
with the KPD against the growing dangers of German Fascism. 
This policy was referred to among the Communists as the united 
8 SED, Dokumente, II, p. 117; Ma­
tern, op. cit., p. 13; Ulbricht, Zur Ge­
schichte, pp. 39-40, 48; Karl Radek, 
Die Entwicklung der Weltrevolution 
{Moscow: Westeuropaeisches Sekre­
tariat der Kommunistischen Interna­
tionale, 1920), p. 21. See also the 
book Der Einfluss der russischen Fe­
bruarrevo/ution und der Grossen So­
zia/istischen Oktoberrevolution auf die 
deutsche Arbeiterklasse, by the re-
search assistant of the Marx-Engels­
Lenin-Stalin Institutes in East Berlin, 
Klaus Mammach, which was published 
late in 1955. 
9 During the period of the Weimar 
Republic, the two major socialist par­
ties were the SPD and the KPD. The 
USPD, which had played an important 
part during the Revolution and short­
ly thereafter, split in October of 1920. 
Its leaders and members eventually 
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front from below. 10 Both the united front from above and below 
(such as the Communist sponsored Anti-Fascist Front) failed 
to attain their avowed objective of bringing the workers of both 
parties closer together. This was due, in part at least, to the fact 
that the KPD appeared to have been primarily interested in utiliz­
ing the "nonpartisan socialist combat organization" as a means 
of alienating the Social Democratic workers from their leaders, 
whom the Communists referred to as Social Fascists. 
That the divided German socialist movement facilitated the 
growth of Nazi Fascism is generally accepted as valid. The Com­
munists blame the split of the labor movement entirely on the 
SPD. A post-World War II Communist view indicates that same 
hatred: 
The victory of Fascism in Germany was not inevitable. The im­
perialist finance capital was able to bring the Fascist war party into 
power because of the Social Democracy's policy of division [ of the 
German labor movement] . The lessening of the split of the working 
class and the creation of a unity among the workers on a revolutionary 
basis were prerequisites for the prevention of a Fascist victory. Under 
the leadership of Ernst Thaelmann, the KPD fought ceaselessly for 
this aim. The Social Democracy prepared the road for Fascism and 
is therefore responsible for the defeat of the German working class. 11 
Not even the Hitler period put an end to the antagonism be­
tween the two rival workers' parties, which were then forced un-
joined either the SPD or the KPD.
(Flechtheim, op. cit., p. 70; Matern, 
op. cit., pp. 12-13.) 
10 The first KPD attempt to form a
united front from above was made as 
early as January, 1921. The SPD lead­
ers refused the offer possibly because 
they either recognized the real inten­
tions of the Communists or they be­
lieved that the KPD was then too small 
and insignificant to deal with. How­
ever, not all Communist offers in the 
following years were rejected. For 
example, in 1922 the KPD succeeded 
in forming a united front with the 
SPD for a short time. (Flechtheim, op.
cit., pp. 72, 83.) For information 
about the discussion within the KPD 
about their different united front tac­
tics, see ibid., pp. 85-87. A third meth­
od of re-uniting the German labor 
movement would have been organiza­
tional unity, the merger of both par­
ties. However, this could not be ac­
complished on a voluntary basis as 
long as the members of the two work­
ers' parties remained loyal to their re­
spective organizations. 
11 Matern, op. cit., p. 7. 
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derground. They continued to accuse each other of having brought 
on the catastrophe which had befallen the German people, es­
pecially the workers. Among the emigres the old hostilities con­
tinued with unrelenting vigor.12 However, many of the rank:-and­
file members of both illegal parties, who were persecuted by the 
Gestapo and frequently suffered side by side in the Nazi concen­
tration camps, came to believe that a united working-class party 
would be to the advantage of the workers. 
When a Socialist Unity Party was founded in the Soviet Zone 
of Occupation after the war, under the sponsorship of the KPD 
and the Soviet Military Administration, this party was primarily 
the product of Communist pressure exerted by the KPD and the 
Soviet authorities. However, there were a number of left wing 
SPD leaders and many Social Democratic workers in the Eastern 
Zone who welcomed a unified socialist party because they saw 
in the merger an important and desirable strengthening of the 
German labor movement. Otto Grotewohl's views on this sub­
ject are as follc:>ws: 
After the destruction of Hitler Fascism in 1945, virtually no one 
believed it possible or desirable to return to the era of fratricide in the 
German labor movement. On the contrary, among the masses of 
workers and employees, the conviction of the need for both workers' 
parties to act in harmony was widespread. From this conviction, the 
will developed [ to move] from common action to common organiza­
tion. The desire for unity was at first a natural reflex of the German 
working class from the dreadful and inhuman twelve-year Hitler 
period, and it corresponded to the pure class feeling of the German 
worker. The task of the present Socialist Unity Party of Germany, 
which united both workers' parties in the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 
consists in transforming the natural class feeling into a Marxist class 
consciousness.13 
12 It is reported that Communist
functionaries resorted to such incred­
ible moves in their fight to eliminate 
Social Democratic influence among 
the workers as to denounce SPD un-
derground leaders to the G e r m a n 
Secret Police. Cf. above, p. 195, n. 
64, referring to the same practice, but 
directed against Communist elements. 
13 Grotewohl, op. cit., pp. 134-35.
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The SEO resolution referred to above summarizes the ex­
periences of the November Revolution as they relate to the issue 
of the unity of the working class: 
The experiences of the November Revolution of 1918 and of the 
Weimar Republic teach that only the working class is capable of lead­
ing the masses in the struggle for a democratic system and for social­
ism. The renunciation of this important role by the working class 
leads without fail to the destruction of democracy and to the rule of 
imperialistic reaction. . . . 
In the East Zone, the class-conscious Social Democrats and Com­
munists kept the oath which, under the Hitler regime, they took in 
prisons, in concentration camps, and in the illegal resistance move­
ment: to end once and for all the division of the labor movement. 
The working class has become considerably stronger by overcoming 
the split and has thereby gained for itself decisive influence for its 
further development. The present task is to establish the unity of the 
working class ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Ideo­
logical compromises are not permissible. Only in this manner can 
the working class realize its leading role. 
The experience of the November Revolution of 1918 and of the 
Weimar Republic teaches that the working class cannot be victorious 
without a party which understands the necessity of mobilizing and 
organizing the class and masses for the revolutionary struggle and of 
leading them in this fight to victory. It must be a party which unites 
The same developments also took 
place in the satellite countries. In Po­
land and the Balkan countries, the 
Soviet authorities "promoted" the mer­
ger of the Socialist and Communist 
parties following "liberation" by the 
Red Army. A short time after the 
fusion, the Social Democratic com­
ponents lost their entire influence and 
for all practical purposes, the new par­
ties were continuations of the former 
Communist parties under different 
names. Also in these instances, a num­
ber of the left wing Social Democratic 
leaders actively supported the Com­
munist endeavor of creating "unity 
parties." Whether these Social Demo­
crats acted under pressure, or were 
fearful that the Social Democratic 
movement would be stamped out, or 
were opportunists, or were genuinely 
ideologically convinced cannot be de­
termined on the basis of the material 
available. Among the leading Social 
Democrats who advocated the fusion 
of the Socialist and Communist par­
ties were Zdenek Fierlinger of Czecho­
slovakia, Arpad Szakasits of Hungary, 
and Dimitri Neikov of Bulgaria. (An­
drew Gyorgy, Governments of Danu­
bian Europe [New York: Rinehart & 
Co., 1949], pp. 43-44.) 
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the best elements of the working class, which stands on the revolution­
ary theories of Marxism and Leninism, and which insists on strict 
discipline based on the conviction of all members. It must be a party 
which is built on the principle of democratic centralism; in which, 
through the use of criticism and self-criticism, all hostile and harmful 
elements are eliminated; and which, through its own example, gains the 
sympathy of the broad masses of the working people and understands 
how to win the majority of both the working class and toilers. The 
absence of such a party in 1918 was the decisive reason for the defeat 
of the revolutionary working class. 
Therefore the most important lesson learned from the November 
Revolution of 1918 is to make our Socialist Unity Party into a revo­
lutionary fighting party based on Marxism and Leninism. H 
The merger of the two German labor parties was, as far as the 
Communists were concerned, an extremely important achieve­
ment of the period following the defeat of the Nazis. It assured 
them control of the labor movement and thereby greatly facili­
tated the establishment of an indigenous administration com­
pletely subservient to the Soviet government. 
SED propaganda efforts to discredit the SPD have also made 
considerable use of the lessons learned from the analysis of the 
, November Revolution. According to the SED resolution, the 
SPD leaders refused to learn from the grim experiences of the 
past and continued to pursue the very policies which brought 
disaster to the German working class.15 
... In West and South Germany, with the active assistance of 
the Western occupation powers, the same disastrous policy, like that 
of 1918, is being followed again. Under the leadership of Schumacher 
and Ollenhauer, the SPD has adopted anew the same fatal policies of 
the leaders of 1918. The right wing SPD leaders in West Germany 
14 SED, Dokumente, II, pp. 122-24.
15 The SED resolution repeats the 
traditional Communist accusations 
against the SPD, beginning with the 
assertion that the SPD leaders had 
caused the fateful split of the German 
labor movement by their actions of 
supporting the imperialist war and the 
Imperial German government. (Ibid., 
pp. 112, 115, 117.) 
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and in Berlin are full of the same blind hate against the Soviet Union 
as were the leaders of 1918. They continue with the greatest zeal the 
Nazis' lie campaign against the Soviet Union - an infallible sign of 
the reactionary forces - and thereby work in the interest of monopoly 
capitalism and reactionary elements. Through their acceptance of the 
Marshall Plan, the right wing SPD leaders submit the German people 
to Dollar imperialism and thereby betray their national sovereignty. 
The revival of imperialist reaction in these parts of Germany and the 
danger of a new world war are the inevitable consequences of this 
policy 
. . . While keeping up the division of the labor movement, the SPD 
continues its coalition policy which made the party nothing but an 
appendage to the reactionary bourgeois parties.16 
16 Ibid., pp. 120-22. M. D. Zebenko 
went one step further in his condem­
nation of the Social Democratic par­
ties in Western Europe. In his pub­
lication, Die reaktionaere ldeologie 
der Rechtssozialisten im Dienste des 
amerikanischen lmperialismus (Ber­
lin: Dietz Verlag, 1953), p. 3., he 
"proved" that the Social Democratic 
p a r t i e s operated in the European 
countries for many years as the 
"agencies of the imperialists within 
the labor movement." 
Present Communist propaganda at­
tempts to utilize every opportunity to 
discredit the United States. In 1951, 
a Soviet historian, A. E. Kunina, in 
her book dealing with "American 
plans to conquer the world" during 
the years from 1917 to 1920, pre­
sented the material which Oelssner 
and other Communist authors needed 
to link "United States imperialism" 
with the failure of the German Revo­
lution of 1918-19. A. E. Kunina, Pro­
val amarikanskikh ulanov gavoevaniia 
mirovege gospodstva v 1917-1920 gg 
[The collapse of American Plans of 
World Conquest in the Years 1917-
1920] (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe iz­
d a t e  I's t v o politicheskoi literatury, 
1951). In the introduction to the 
second edition of his book about Rosa 
Luxemburg, Oelssner pays the high­
est tribute to the contribution of Ku­
nina: "In this book, with the use of 
American documents, it is proved that 
the bloody defeat of the revolutionary 
movement in Germany in the years 
from 19 I 8 to 1920 and the murders 
of the leaders of the revolutionary 
proletariat was not alone the deed of 
the G e r m a n counterrevolution but 
that the agents of American imperial­
ism were actively engaged in it as 
instigators and helpers." (Oelssner, op. 
cit., p. 5.) For more details on Oelss­
ner's utilization of Kunina's material, 
see ibid., pp. 145-47. Karl Obermann, 
Professor of Contemporary History in 
Eastern Germany, in his book Die 
Beziehungen des amerikanischen lm­
perialismus zum deutschen lmperia­
lismus in der Zeit der W eimarer Re­
publik (1918-1925) (Berlin: Ruetten & 
Loening, 1952) undertakes to investi­
gate the first contacts of United States 
imperialism with German imperial­
ism to determine to what extent the 
political developments in the Weimar 
Republic were caused by the coopera­
tion of German and American capi­
talists. (Ibid., pp. 7-8.) Obermann also 





HIS STUDY has been concerned with the crisis of the German 
socialist movement which commenced during World War I 
and came to a climax in January of 1919 in Berlin with the 
bloody fighting between the Majority Socialists - supported by 
regular army units and by the notorious Free Corps - and the 
left wing radicals. Interpretations dealing with the Spartacist Up­
rising usually contain one of the following two assertions: ( 1 ) 
The uprising was a deliberately planned and organized attempt 
by the German Communists and their allied revolutionary organ­
izations to overthrow the provisional Majority Socialist govern­
ment and to create a Soviet-type proletarian dictatorship. (2) 
The insurrection was a defensive action of the Berlin proletariat 
which was deliberately provoked by the government into open 
rebellion in order to furnish the government forces with a pretext 
to crush the revolutionary workers and their organizations prior 
to the elections for the national assembly on January 19, 1919. 
The first of these interpretations is found in the writings of 
Social Democratic authors like Bernstein, Hermann Mueller, and 
Noske, and in the accounts of exponents of the political right such 
as Volkmann, Oertzen, and Runkel. The second interpretation 
is that of the left wing radicals, for example, Richard Mueller, 
Barth, and Eichhorn, and, of course, of the Communists. An 
interesting position is maintained by former KPD members who 
were in the Party during its early period. Representatives of this 
group, such as Ruth Fischer and Paul Froelich ( who are un­
doubtedly most sincere in their opposition to contemporary Mos­
cow-directed parties), go out of their way to report events which 
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occurred during the time they belonged to the Communist move­
ment in a manner which makes their own contemporaneous ac­
tions appear consistent with their present altered views. For ex­
ample, Ruth Fischer's account, which factually is highly inaccur­
ate, lends itself to strengthening her argument favoring the Com­
munist interpretation of events as far as the guilt of the Majority 
Socialists is concerned. Her evaluation, along with that of Paul 
Froelich, concerning the philosophy and program of Rosa Lu­
xemburg are, however, at great variance with those of the Com­
munists, who place much of the blame for the failure of the Ger­
man socialist revolution on the ideological and tactical mistakes 
of the early party leaders.1 
Several "scholarly" interpretations of the Spartacist Uprising 
are marked by the fact that they are based on incorrect facts and 
1 Compare, for example, the fol­
lowing account of Ruth Fischer with 
the events as they can be discerned 
from documentary sources generally 
available and reported in this study: 
" . . Deliberately to provoke the Shop 
Stewards, on January 4 Ebert ordered 
Eichhorn to leave the police presidium 
and appointed as his successor Social 
Democrat Eugen Ernst. On January 
5, Noske ordered the attack on the 
police presidium and on the newspaper 
building. The Executive Committee 
of the Shop Stewards, recognizing the 
importance of this test, decided to 
fight to retain Eichhorn. The Spar­
tacist [sic] Central Committee, meet­
ing on the same day, passed a motion 
denying support to Eichhorn because 
this might lead to the fall of the Ebert 
government. When they later reversed 
their position, they stated explicitly 
that they were still opposed to over­
throwing the cabinet. 
"Thus, the first and most important 
group of German resistance to the 
restoration of Kaiserlich (Imperial) 
imperialism, the Shop Stewards, had 
to act alone, estranged from all party 
leadership and organization. T h e y 
gave the Ebert cabinet an ultimatum, 
demanding that Eichhorn be main­
tained and the army be disarmed and 
disbanded immediately (together with 
the usual host of social demands). 
The Shop Stewards, however, did not 
call for the resignation of the Ebert 
cabinet; (and of course they did not 
know of the agreement between Ebert 
and the army) that Comrade Ebert 
was really their enemy. [sic] They ex­
pected him to yield to their pressure 
ultimately and accept a compromise." 
(Ruth Fischer, op. cit., pp. 83-84.) 
Equally interesting is Ruth Fischer's 
evaluation of the possible effects of 
an overthrow of the Ebert government 
upon the general political development 
in Germany. She bases her conjec­
tures on an over-estimate of the po­
tentialities of the "revolutionary situ­
ation," just as the left radicals did dur­
ing the January crisis. 
"The rapid overthrow of the Ebert 
cabinet, the establishment of a work­
ers' government in Berlin would have 
acted like a bellows to the smoldering 
fires in Germany. Once the industrial 
centers were set in motion, the de­
moralized military would have been 
unable to regroup enough cadres. They 
would have lost their chance to march 
CONCLUSIONS 213 
consequently lead to erroneous conceptions about the event. 2 
German historians, sociologists, and political scientists of the post­
World War I and post-World War II periods fail to deal adequate­
ly with what Professor Werner Conze calls "the second revolu­
tionary wave" which commenced after the USPD left the cabinet. a 
Generally, there is a peculiar lack of German works which attempt 
to provide accurate background information and careful inter­
pretation of the revolutionary events of 1918-19 and of the Wei­
mar Republic. This is true in spite of the fact that it is generally 
recognized that these evaluations are essential for an analysis of 
the Third Reich and the most recent political developments in 
Germany.4 It is hoped that the analysis of the January Uprising 
on Berlin. Just this was their cauche­
mar [nightmare]. In 1919, in spite of 
all their shortcomings, the Shop Stew­
ards could have crushed the counter­
revolution with a minimum of effort 
and sacrifice. In the continuing duel 
between the Berlin workers and the 
General Staff, the officer corps was at 
its most disadvantageous point since 
the foundation of the Reich." (Ibid., 
p. 83.) See also E. H. Carr's remarks
on Ruth Fischer in his Studies in Revo­
lution (London: MacMillan & Co.,
Ltd., 1950), pp. 187-89.
2 For example, A. J. P. Taylor 
states: "Berlin ... , turned mainly to 
the Spartacists, who were radical Ger­
man nationalists; the rest of Germany, 
indignant at the failure of the Reich 
to which everything had been sacri­
ficed, turned mainly to the Indepen­
dents." 
"Rosa Luxemburg .. . , intended to 
make her peace with the Independent 
Socialists - a development w h i c h  
would have ruined the plans of Ebert 
and Groener. Therefore, in December, 
1918, the Provisional government 
broke the stalemate which had lasted 
since November, and took the offensive 
against the Spartacists in Berlin. The 
High Command by a refinement of 
political strategy took no part in the 
operation beyond dispatching its bless-
ing. The 'bloodhound' of order was 
a Social Democrat, Noske, and his in­
strument the 'Free Corps,' organiza­
tions of out-of-work officers, who 
would fight against anyone - at first 
the Spartacists and Independents, later 
against any democratic government, 
true condottieri, without any principle 
or belief other than that of the bullet 
in the back. . . . The Spartacists were 
broken; but broken too was the life 
of the German republic, for it could 
not exist without a united Socialist 
movement, and now the blood of Lieb­
knecht and Rosa Luxemburg ran for­
ever between the associates of Ebert 
and the men of the Left." (A. J. P. 
Taylor, The Course of German His­
tory [London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1951], pp. 182-83.) 
a Werner Conze, "Die Weimarer 
Republik 1918-1933,'' Deutsche Ge­
schichte im Ueberblick, ed. by Peter 
Rassow (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersche 
Verlagsbuchhandlung, l 9 5 2 - 5 3), p. 
618. However, Professor Conze him­
self only superficially treats the events
connected with this "second revolu­
tionary wave." (See ibid., pp. 618-
20.)
4 Karl Dietrich Brachner, "Zurn 
Verstaendnis der Weimarer Repu­
blik," Politische Literatur, No. 2 and 3 
(Frankfurt a.M., 1952), pp. 69-70. 
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contained in this study will serve to correct some of the miscon­
ceptions concerning the background, nature, and significance for 
the over-all course of the German Revolution. 
Contrary to the widespread assumption that the January Up­
rising was the product of a deliberate plan (formulated either by 
the Majority Socialists or by the left wing radicals), this study in­
dicates that it was an outgrowth of the tensions which existed 
between the highly antagonistic camps within the socialist move­
ment. In the opinion of this writer, the showdown of forces in 
January was planned neither by the Majority Socialists nor by 
the left wing radicals. It was a violent outburst of the sharp 
hostility which then existed between the socialist factions. The 
immediate cause was an incident which probably in a different 
situation would have failed to produce such a serious political 
crisis. 
In order to bring the January insurrection into proper relation­
ship with the over-all crisis of the German socialist movement, an 
attempt has be�n made to trace the development of the division 
of the German labor movement from its beginning down to the 
eventful January of 1919. This division resulted.from the growth 
of various factions within the Social Democratic Party. These 
, factions advocated different political policies for the SPD on the 
basis of their own philosophy of the party's mission, of the work­
ing class within the bourgeois state, and of the methods to be 
Dr. Bracher states: "An examination 
of the literature concerning the de­
velopment after the first World War 
reveals that, besides a wealth of me­
moirs and political tracts, only legal­
istic discussions about constitutional 
and administrative questions . . ., 
showed any activity which, however, 
never transcended the most restricted 
specialists' circles. On the other hand, 
scientific attempts of historians, so­
ciologists, economists, and political 
scientists who after all are of con­
siderable consequence for the over-all 
evaluation of the development as well 
as for the formulation of political 
views, are still less numerous." (Ibid,, 
p. 70.)
Some well-known German historic­
al accounts, such as that of Bruno 
Gebhardt, Handbuch der Deutschen 
Geschichte (2 vols.; Stuttgart-Berlin­
Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsge­
sellschaft, 1931) do not even mention 
the January Uprising. Others, such as 
Erich Eyck, Geschichte der W eimarer 
Republik (Vol. I; Erlenbach-Zuerich 
and Stuttgart: Eugen Rentsch, 1934) 
treat this event in a very superficial 
manner. 
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employed in bringing about socialism. The anti-war issue had 
also worked within the Social Democracy to break up the unity 
of the party. 
In November of 1918, when the war-weary German soldiers 
and substantial parts of the disillusioned urban population seized 
the initiative in order to end hostilities, the various factions of the 
German socialist movement attempted to superimpose their re­
spective political aims upon the revolutionary developments. This 
writer has concluded that the socialist movement, because of its 
traditional position of opposition to the Imperial authorities and 
because of its ability to provide the masses with an alternative 
political myth, could have given form and aims to the revolution 
beyond the immediate objectives of ending the war and removing 
the Imperial government. The German socialists failed in this 
task because of their own disunity and their refusal to com­
promise with each other. The Majority Socialists, possibly with 
such noted exceptions as Noske and others who had completely 
accepted the values of the "bourgeois" state as superior to the 
ideals of socialism, were no less sincere in the pursuit of their 
evolutionary policies toward the ultimate goal of socialism, than 
the leftist groups with their revolutionary approach. 
The outcome of the conflict was that none of the socialist 
factions was able to gain a dominant influence over German po­
litical developments. Thus the victor of the internal struggle was 
not the SPD or KPD but the nationalistic, reactionary forces 
which, because of the divided labor movement, were able to re­
establish eventually their former position of political hegemony. 
The Spartacist Uprising as such did not bring about the re­
organization of the counterrevolutionary powers, as has been 
asserted in some interpretations; they were by that time already 
in the process of being built-up. Contrary to another frequent 
misconception about the January events, the Free Corps, which 
constituted the most tangible manifestation of the anti-socialist, 
anti-democratic, anti-republican forces, did not become involved 
in the January Uprising until the very end, when the defeat of 
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the revolting workers had already been accomplished by remnants 
of regular army units and Social Democratic fighting forces. In 
one important respect most interpretations, including that of this 
writer, agree: The January Uprising deepened the cleavage within 
the German labor movement and thereby greatly reduced its over­
all strength during the period of the Weimar Republic. 
This study has also attempted to indicate that a number of 
specific conceptions relating to this critical phase of the German 
labor movement are incorrect. For example, the Spartacist League 
( and subsequently the KPD in its early phase) and the center of 
international Communism were independent organizations. This 
study has sought to demonstrate that the alleged direction of the 
German Communists by Moscow was non-existent during the 
period under discussion. 
This fact is important because it explains the foundation for 
the later criticism of Luxemburgism, the German ideological de­
viation from Marxism-Leninism, by the Communist International. 
It is also significant because it disproves the charges that the 
Spartacist Uprising was ordered and directed by the Russian Bol­
sheviks. 5 Apparently the only official representative of the Rus­
sian "brother" party during this eventful period was Karl Radek. 
The personalities of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, 
leaders in their own right who could not easily be persuaded by 
foreign direction, also made for the independence of the young 
KPD. 
Last but not least, the findings of this study confirm, in the 
case of Germany, the validity of assertions made by such leading 
experts in the field of Communism as Franz Borkenau and Hugh 
Seton-Watson, that during the first phase of international Com­
munism from 1918 to 1920, foreign revolutionary movements 
were not directed by Moscow. 6 
5 See, for example, Bernstein, op. 6 Seton-Watson, op. cit., p. xii; Bor-
cit., pp. 145, 188. Bernstein even has kenau, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 
Russians participating in the uprising. 
Summary 
IN NOVEMBER of 1918, the socialists came to power in Ger­
many in the wake of the German Revolution which was started 
by a spontaneous mass uprising of war-weary sodiers, sailors, and 
large parts of the urban civilian population. Spontaneous mass 
actions, beginning with a mutiny of German sailors at Kiel and 
spreading rapidly over the rest of Germany, had as their major 
aim the ending of the hopeless and costly war. As a secondary 
objective, the masses were determined to abolish all those in­
stitutions which they regarded as obstacles for obtaining peace 
from the Allies. A growing majority of the German people had 
come to believe that the Emperor himself was one of the main 
obstructions, and that he had to be removed, together with the 
Imperial government and the Supreme Command of the military 
forces. Both of these institutions had lost the people's confidence, 
largely because of the military defeat. 
The German socialists formed a revolutionary, provisional 
government in spite of the fact that the German Revolution was 
definitely not inspired by socialist ideas. They were able to as­
sume power simply because the masses believed that for over two 
years they had been opposed to a continuation of the war and had 
been working toward the conclusion of an early armistice. Con­
sequently, the socialists were the only organized political groups 
acceptable to the majority of the people because presumably they 
- and only they - could bring peace, the major objective of
the mass uprising.
At the end of the war, the German socialist movement was 
..:omprised of two mass parties, the Majority Socialists (SPD -
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che successor to the former Social Democratic Party of Ger­
many) and the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany 
(USPD) . The movement also included several other political 
factions, of which the Spartacist League and the Revolutionary 
Shop Stewards were the most important. When the Majority 
Socialists took over the government from the last Imperial Chan­
cellor, Prince Max von Baden, they were uncertain as to the 
strength of their influence among the people. They did not know 
whether the workers' and soldiers' councils - the real power 
factors in Germany at the moment, which were created spon­
taneously wherever the revolutionary masses removed the Im­
perial and state authorities - were willing to cooperate with the 
new Reich government. It was thought possible that the councils 
might consider a Majority Socialist cabinet as undesirable com­
petition to their own revolutionary ambitions. In order to broaden 
its base among the people, the Majority Socialists invited the 
Independents to participate in the government on the basis of 
parity. For oyer a month, Germany was ruled by a socialist 
coalition cabinet, which, in the interest of appealing to the revolu­
tionary forces, had assumed the radical-sounding name of Coun­
cil of People's Commissars. It was a fragile coalition, however, 
. because both parties attempted to impose their respective political 
concepts on the revolutionary changes. The dissension which de­
veloped within the cabinet was further aggravated by a number 
of bloody clashes between the Majority Socialists, who were sup­
ported by remnants of the regular army, and the left wing radical 
workers. This led to the withdrawal of the Independents from 
the government in December, 1918. From that time until the 
formation of the so-called Weimar Coalition (SPD and a num­
ber of democratic "bourgeois" parties), which took place after 
the general elections in January, 1919, the Majority Socialists 
occupied a position of political monopoly in the Reich cabinet. 
The fight among the socialist factions for a dominant position 
in order to influence the development of the German Revolution 
was also carried on within the revolutionary agencies created by 
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the mass uprising, the workers' and soldiers' councils. The latter 
had formed a pyramidal structure which reached its apex at the 
Reich level in the so-called Central Council, the permanent 
executive committee of the First Reich Congress of Workers' and 
Soldiers' Councils. (Prior to the First Reich Congress of Coun-
cils, held December 16-24, 1918, the Berlin Workers' and 
Soldiers' Council with its Executive Council had usurped au-
thority for all of Germany.) Within the council system, the 
Majority Socialists succeeded in occupying the controlling po-
sitions after the Independents' refusal to participate in the Central 
Council because of their opposition to the Majority Socialists' 
program endorsed by the Reich Congress. Thus the two parallel 
governmental structures - the old state apparatus headed by 
the Provisional government, the Council of People's Commissars, 
and the new council system with the Central Council at its helm 
,- cooperated effectively in most localities throughout the Reich. 
The general tendency was to shift more and more governmental 
functions to the traditional agencies and to consider the councils 
as supervisory or controlling organs of the revolutionary masses. 
The Majority Socialists, who considered themselves only as 
trustees of the people until general elections could be held, used 
their power to consolidate the political, social, and economic 
gains made in the course of the German Revolution. These ef­
forts of the Majority Socialists were in complete agreement with 
their ideological concepts and with their confidence in the su­
periority of evolutionary and democratic reform methods in 
achieving improvements for the lower social classes. They were 
effectively supported by the influential trade union leaders; they 
were violently opposed, however, by the left wing radical forces 
such as the Spartacist League, the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, 
and the Berlin organization of the USPD. 
A severe crisis in the socialist movement had already started 
during the war as the result of factional differences in matters of 
ideology and policies. The strong anti-war attitude of the leftist 
opposition elements, which openly defied SPD policies supporting 
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the war, had led to a division of the party in April, 1917. This 
ended the formal monopoly position of the SPD within the so­
cialist movement. A second Social Democratic mass party, the 
USPD, entered the political stage. However, the advent of the 
German Revolution brought these two socialist parties together 
for a short time. Factional strife concerning the aims of the revo­
lution aggravated earlier tensions. The Majority Socialists ac­
cused the left wing radicals, especially the Spartacists, of plotting 
to overthrow the Provisional government and of intending to 
erect a proletarian dictatorship in the form of a government by 
councils. The left wing radicals, in turn, charged the moderate 
socialists with betraying the proletarian revolution by attempting 
to arrest its developments and by making common front with the 
avowed enemies of socialism. In January, 1919, the mounting 
tension between the two hostile camps within the socialist move­
ment burst into open hostilities. Berlin witnessed a general strike 
combined with an armed uprising lasting from January 6 to 13. 
This event is u�ually referred to as the Spartacist Uprising, in 
spite of the fact that an ad hoc revolutionary committee which 
charged the workers in Berlin to overthrow the Majority Socialist 
government was dominated not by the Spartacists but by the 
Revolutionary Shop Stewards. 
This study attempted to investigate the nature of this crisis in 
the German socialist movement in the light of contemporaneous 
power relations and to determine its influence upon the further 
course of the German Revolution of 1918-19. A re-examination 
of the evidence appeared desirable because most of the available 
interpretations are either based on erroneous factual premises or 
are highly influenced by the political views of their authors. 
To provide a basis for conclusions concerning the nature of 
this insurrection, an attempt has been made to trace the growth 
of those political concepts of the left wing which have a direct 
bearing upon the theories guiding the left wing radicals, primarily 
the Spartacists, in the formulation of their policies and actions. 
Contrary to the assertion of the moderate socialists, the political 
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�octrines of the Spartacists did not envisage the use of a coup
d'etat, a violent overthrow of the government by a determined 
minority, as a method of acquiring political power. The political 
concepts of the Spartacist leaders, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, stressed that only when the "revolutionary prole-
tarian party" had succeeded in obtaining the support of the ma-
jority of the proletariat would the party, as the vanguard of the 
workers, assume political power from the bourgeois or quasi-
bourgeois government and establish the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. Both Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht emphasized that 
this situation had not been realized in Germany at the end of 
1918 or the beginning of 1919. The revolutionary party had just 
been founded. The masses of workers still followed the alleged 
treacherous SPD leaders. Therefore, they believed the main task 
of the young KPD was to educate the workers and make them 
understand that their interests were being betrayed by the SPD 
and USPD and that only the KPD was working consistently for 
the socialist revolution. 
An examination of the events leading to the January fighting 
does not support the second assertion either. One of the most 
convincing arguments that the Majority Socialists did not in­
tentionally start the series of events is the almost complete lack 
of physical forces available to the government at that time. When 
the position of power began to change in favor of the Majority 
Socialists, however, the determination to settle the basic issue 
with the revolutionary troublemakers won the upper hand. 
Thus, contrary to the widespread assumption that the January 
Uprising was the product of a premeditated plan (by either the 
Majority Socialists or the left radicals), this study has indicated 
that it was an outgrowth of the tensions which existed between 
the highly antagonistic camps within the socialist movement. It 
was a violent outburst resulting from the sharp hostility between 
the socialist factions. Its immediate cause, the Eichhorn incident, 
would probably have failed to produce a similar serious political 
crisis in a different situation. 
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The defeat of the insurgents in Berlin is often credited with 
having ended the opportunity for the extreme left to prevent the 
consolidation of the German Revolution. Following the January 
crisis the revolutionary organizations were considerably weak­
ened, and the government, by contrast, had the newly-formed 
military force, the notorious Free Corps, at its disposal to deal 
forcefully with the leftist opposition elements. 
The outcome of the violent conflict was that none of the 
socialist factions was able to gain a dominant influence on German 
political developments. The real victor of the struggle was neither 
the SPD nor the KPD, but the nationalistic and reactionary 
forces which came to the assistance of the Majority Socialist gov­
ernment. Because of the divided labor movement, they were able 
to survive the German Revolution and eventually to re-establish 
their former position of political hegemony. This was most cer­
tainly one of the major contributing factors to the growth of 
German Fascism and the ascendance of National Socialism. 
This.study has also provided some insight into the early phase 
of the German Communist movement. Among other things it 
has revealed a German Communist position completely indepen­
dent in ideological and tactical matters from that of the Russian 
· Bolsheviks. (The Communist International was not founded un­
til March, 1919.)
The events of the German Revolution of 1918-19 still play 
an important part in contemporary Communist propaganda in 
Germany. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) of Eastern Germany 
emphasizes that the working class grows in proletarian wisdom 
by studying the effects of past theories and tactics. The SED 
points out that the most significant lesson to be learned from the 
German Revolution is the need for a united working class led 
by a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party. The catastrophe which 
befell the German labor movement under National Socialism is 
related directly to the divided socialist movement. Thus, at the 
end of World War II, when a Socialist Unity Party was proposed 
by the German Communists and the Soviet Military Adminis-
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tration, this new idea found favorable response among some of the 
German Social Democratic leaders and some of the rank-and-file 
members of the SPD. When these well-meaning Social Democrats 
awakened to the fact that the new party was not the product of 
a merger of the SPD and KPD on a co-equal basis but a con-
tinuation of the KPD under a different name, it was too late to do 
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